Hitler's triumph in defeat

Hitler's long period of procrastination before finally reaching a decision over strategy in the east was not without consequences for commanders on the front. The absence of a clear strategic directive caused hesitancy and confusion about where particular forces were to be deployed along the front, and what timetable they could expect for the commencement of operations. There were also major strategic questions such as the holding of the Yel'nya salient which was being stubbornly defended on nothing more than an assumption of what the next phase of the campaign would be. The uncertainty was especially troubling for Guderian as he was constantly unsure how much strength he should devote to his offensive in the south. On 18 August he wrote in a letter to his wife:

Guderian's Chief of Staff, Colonel Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein, also noted the absence of clarity and even the outright contradictions in the issuing of orders, leading to his conclusion: ‘The troops must think we are crazy.’ While Guderian's forces were constantly being pushed south by Hitler's desire to clean up the southern flank and exploit successes, at the army group headquarters, under Bock's wilful tutelage, there was an attempt to resolve the ambiguity by favouring Moscow as the clear priority. When Greiffenburg met with Weckmann on 17 August to clarify the coming offensive operations, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre told his counterpart at 9th Army: ‘The enemy in front of the army group is to be destroyed. The armies will break through in the general direction of Moscow.’ Similarly, on 19 August Bock set his sights firmly on Moscow and urged Weichs to make all haste in concluding the operations in the south. This, together with a successful drive towards Velikie Luki, would mean in Bock's estimation, ‘the entire army group can attack towards the east’.