Among our four main cases, the European Union (EU) has the least complete history in the sense that it has not ratcheted toward intensive executive centralization. The EU has not locked-in in the same way as the other cases. The citizens of the EU member countries coexist in a complex, sprawling international union that has unmistakably trended toward representative centralization. They live in a system where uneven but enormously consequential authority is wielded by a government in Brussels that has final authority above nation-state governments on a host of important policy issues.

It is tempting for two reasons to put the focus on the inevitable, and say that the EU has “not yet ratcheted” toward executive centralization and is “not yet locked-in.” First, there were moments in the recent past when the member states in the EU appeared to be on the verge of approving changes that would lead toward substantial executive centralization, but they stepped back. Second, and related, recent circumstances will possibly lead them to take that leap. There are, as of this writing, loud calls for more centralization within the EU in response to economic crises and even stalwart opponents of a stronger EU executive among the member states – the governments of Germany and France, for instance – have shown more openness toward common economic policies decided on by an executive and backed up by rigorous enforcement. In 2013, the EU set the stage for a dramatic strengthening over the next few years of banking regulation by central administrators.