Husserl's later philosophy contains an extensive critique of the modern sciences. This critique of what Husserl calls the ‘positive’, ‘naive’, or ‘objective’ sciences has been very influential in Continental philosophy and, in particular, in the retreat from holding up science and technology as models for philosophy. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Habermas, and Derrida, along with many others on the Continent, have been influenced by this part of Husserl's thought. There is also in Husserl's work, however, a very grand view of the value and possibilities of science, provided that science is understood appropriately and in a broad sense as a theory of the many forms of reason and evidence. It cannot be adequately understood as a narrow, technical, naturalistic, and ‘one-sided’ specialization of one sort or another. Indeed, in its broadest sense, science would coincide with the rigorous exercise of philosophical reason. In Husserl's writings we find (1) reflections on the nature of science as a whole; (2) studies of particular sciences, especially geometry, arithmetic, logic, and natural science; but also (3) a far-reaching analysis of how modern scientific culture has fallen away from its higher calling. I will discuss each of these aspects of Husserl's philosophical thinking. (For some earlier studies of these topics see, e.g. Gurwitsch 1974; Heelan 1989; Ströker 1988, 1987a, 1979.)