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A Physicalist Manifesto
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  • Cited by 108
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    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Dove, Guy 2018. Redefining Physicalism. Topoi, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 513.

    Goldwater, Jonah 2018. Physicalism and the sortalist conception of objects. Synthese, Vol. 195, Issue. 12, p. 5497.

    Morris, Kevin 2018. Physicalism Deconstructed.

    Kovacs, David Mark 2018. The myth of the myth of supervenience. Philosophical Studies,

    DiFrisco, James 2018. Token physicalism and functional individuation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 8, Issue. 3, p. 309.

    Tiehen, Justin 2018. Physicalism. Analysis, Vol. 78, Issue. 3, p. 537.

    Wilson, Jessica M. 2018. Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Topoi, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 495.

    Yates, David 2018. Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers. Synthese, Vol. 195, Issue. 10, p. 4525.

    Morris, Kevin 2018. Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems. Topoi, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 473.

    Kovacs, David Mark 2018. The Deflationary Theory of Ontological Dependence. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 68, Issue. 272, p. 481.

    Morris, Kevin 2018. Multiple realization and compositional variation. Synthese,

    Saad, Bradford 2018. A causal argument for dualism. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 175, Issue. 10, p. 2475.

    Morris, Kevin 2018. What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience. Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 59, Issue. 2, p. 256.

    Baysan, Umut 2018. Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence. Erkenntnis,

    Melnyk, Andrew 2018. In Defense of a Realization Formulation of Physicalism. Topoi, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 483.

    Witmer, D. Gene 2018. Physicality for Physicalists. Topoi, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 457.

    Elpidorou, Andreas 2018. Introduction: The Character of Physicalism. Topoi, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 435.

    Moore, Dwayne 2017. Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 47, Issue. 1, p. 20.

    Lubashevsky, Ihor 2017. Physics of the Human Mind. p. 171.

    Haug, Matthew C. 2017. No microphysical causation? No problem: selective causal skepticism and the structure of completeness-based arguments for physicalism. Synthese,

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Book description

A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this 2003 book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science.

Reviews

‘This is unquestionably the best elucidation and defense of physicalism as a general world view ever produced by a philosopher.’

Michael Tye - The University of Texas, Austin

‘This excellent book by Andrew Melnyk is both timely and significant. It is timely because now is a good time to take stock of the physicalist debate over the past half century, and Melnyk does that with impressive systemacity and comprehensiveness. Moreover, the book is an important … contribution to that debate. Melnyk offers us a form of physicalism, ‘realization physicalism’, that is robustly reductionist and yet non-eliminative - that is, reductive physicalism that respects the integrity of the causal/explanatory claims of the special sciences. Melnyk’s physicalism is a far cry from the pale, insubstantial forms of nonreductive physicalism that have been dominant. One particularly valuable aspect of the book is its extensive coverage of the question of empirical support for physicalism. Here, Melnyk goes far beyond those physicalists who take the attitude ‘I say that mental states are physical states - refute me if you can!’’

Jaegwon Kim - Brown University

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