Skip to main content
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 9
  • Cited by
    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    HUNG, NGUYEN MANH 2012. WAR AND PEACE: A LIBERALIST REASSESSMENT. International Journal of Development and Conflict, Vol. 02, Issue. 02, p. 1250011.

    Hoffmann, Magnus 2010. Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 34, Issue. 2, p. 249.

    Hausken, Kjell 2008. EXCHANGE, RAIDING, AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, Issue. 2, p. 89.

    Dorussen, Han 2006. Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, Issue. 1, p. 87.

    Hafer, Catherine 2006. On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73, Issue. 1, p. 119.

    Hausken, Kjell 2004. Mutual Raiding of Production and the Emergence of Exchange. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 42, Issue. 4, p. 572.

    Skaperdas, Stergios and Syropoulos, Constantinos 2002. INSECURE PROPERTY AND THE EFFICIENCY OF EXCHANGE. The Economic Journal, Vol. 112, Issue. 476, p. 133.

    Kang, Heejoon and Reuveny, Rafael 2001. Exploring multi‐country dynamic relations between trade and conflict. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 12, Issue. 3, p. 175.

    Anderton, Charles H. 2000. Exchange of goods or exchange of blows? New directions in conflict and exchange. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 11, Issue. 1, p. 55.

  • Print publication year: 1996
  • Online publication date: December 2009

5 - Competitive trade with conflict



“If no Naval Force, no Trade,” a British official commented in the eighteenth century. Such an assessment is hardly unique to the beginnings of the British trading empire. Historically, trade, arming, and conflict have always gone hand in hand. The experience of all other European colonial powers can attest to that: the Spaniards, the Dutch, the French, the Russians. Earlier on, Venice and Genoa had similarly created their own trading empires, mostly within the Mediterranean, with the necessary help of strong navies. The Vikings who founded Kievan Russia in the ninth century were both traders and formidable warriors. Similarly, the expansion of Islam in its first century was spearheaded by merchant-warriors.

How does trading affect arming? How do arming and conflict affect trading and the welfare of the interested parties? Such questions cannot be answered with the help of extant models of trade since, by construction, arming and conflict are ruled out. Therefore to begin thinking systematically about issues of conflict and trade, one needs a conceptual framework from which to start. The issue is not of concern just for historical reasons. Trade with overt conflict is pervasive even today but, probably more importantly, other less overt forms of conflict are in principle similar to overt arming and warfare. Our first aim in this paper is to reconcile, in a general equilibrium economic setting, the simultaneous presence of arming, conflict, and trading and thus provide a framework within which such questions can be asked.

Recommend this book

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's collection.

The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation
  • Online ISBN: 9780511619984
  • Book DOI:
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to *