Skip to main content Accessibility help
Rationality in Economics
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 43
  • Export citation
  • Recommend to librarian
  • Buy the print book

Book description

The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, under information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory. In personal, social, and economic exchange, as studied in two-person games, cooperation exceeds the prediction of traditional game theory. This book relates these two findings to field studies and applications and integrates them with the main themes of the Scottish Enlightenment and with the thoughts of F. A. Hayek: through emergent socio-economic institutions and cultural norms, people achieve ends that are unintended and poorly understood. In cultural changes, the role of constructivism, or reason, is to provide variation, and the role of ecological processes is to select the norms and institutions that serve the fitness needs of societies.


‘The journey that brought Vernon Smith to his Nobel Prize is not over. It obviously brought us constructive tools, in the form of controlled experimental methods that allow economists to see the lay of the behavioral land more clearly than before. But this magisterial review of the whole journey, including precursors, reminds us that the scope of economics has always been much wider than the straw man that behaviorists like to attack. Properly understood, experimental methods force all economists to think of constructivist and ecological rationality as complementary ways of understanding behavior, rather than as fundamentally inconsistent views of behavior. The journey, then, has really just begun.’

Glenn W. Harrison - College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida

‘Vernon Smith has spent a lifetime of research, combining theory and experimental evidence, exploring the idea and implications of rationality in economics. This book recounts that lifetime, synthesizes it and adds to it - producing a volume that soars above the usual material of economics. The end-product is a volume that takes an eagle's eye view of rationality in economics, and puts it in a new and glorious perspective. Reading it is essential for theorists and practitioners.’

John D. Hey - University of York, UK and LUISS, Italy

‘Rationality in Economics is a delight, garnished with fascinating historical detail, philosophical scientific insights, and an eye on current public policy issues. Vernon Smith, as always, shows a skeptical, irreverent attitude toward ‘rationality models’ based on assumptions that are not stress-tested with cash-motivated subjects in the lab. His own policy recommendations, like the ‘Combinatorial Clock Auction’, are original and innovative.’

Charles Holt - University of Virginia

‘Locating human sociality as a centerpiece of economics, Smith’s clear vision of the meaning of rationality pierces the fog surrounding the place of economics in human society. Ideas of David Hume, Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek and Herbert Simon are masterfully synthesized with fifty years of experimental data from the economics laboratory to bring us a book that might as well be called ‘The Origin of Human Institutions’.’

Shyam Sunder - School of Management, Yale University

'I am pleased to report that Vernon Smith’s new volume of opinions amounts to the most important book on economic methodology of the past decade.'

Source: Journal of Economics and Philosophy

'… a rich book that is full of stimulating ideas …'

Source: History of Economic Ideas

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Send to Kindle
  • Send to Dropbox
  • Send to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.


Acheson, J. 1975. “The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry.” Human Ecology 3:183–207.
Akerlof, G. A. 2002. “Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior.” American Economic Review 92:411–33.
Alchian, A. 1950. “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory.” Journal of Political Economy 21:39–53.
Anderson, T., and Hill, P. J.. 1975. “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West.” Journal of Law and Economics 18:163–79.
Andrioni, J. 1995. “Cooperation in Public Good Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?American Economic Review 85:891–904.
Angel, R. 2001. “Future Optical and Infrared Telescopes.” Nature Insights 409:427–30.
Arrow, K. 1987. “Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System.” In Hogarth, R. and Reder, M., eds., Rational Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 201–15.
Arthur, W. B. 1989. “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events.” Economic Journal 99(395):116–31.
Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., and Piankov, N. N.. 2006. “Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness.” Experimental Economics 9:193–208.
Augier, M., and March, J.. 2004. Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A. Simon. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Aumann, R. 1990. Foreword to Roth, A. and Sotomayer, M.. Two-Sided Matching: A Study of Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. ⅸ–ⅺ.
Backerman, S., Denton, M., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V. L.. 2001. “Market Power in a Deregulated Electrical Industry.” Journal of Decision Support Systems 30:357–81.
Backerman, S., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V. L.. 2000. “Efficiency and Income Shares in High Demand Energy Network: Who Receives the Congestion Rents When a Line Is Constrained?Pacific Economic Review 5:331–47.
Banks, J., Ledyard, J., and Porter, D.. 1989. “Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach.” Rand Journal of Economics 20:1–25.
Banks, J., Olson, M., Porter, D., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V.. 2003. “Theory, Experiment and the Federal Communications Commission Spectrum Auctions.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 51:303–50.
Barkow, J., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J.. 1992. The Adapted Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. 1995. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Baumol, W. 1979. “Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing.” Yale Law Journal, November:1–26.
Baumol, W., Panzer, J., and Willig, R.. 1982. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure. New York: Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., and Damasio, A. R.. 1997. “Deciding Advantageously before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.” Science 275(5304):1293–5.
Beck, A. (translator). 1989. The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K.. 1995. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10:122–42.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K.. 2005. “Risk Preference Instability across Institutions: A Dilemma.” Proceedings National Academy of Science 102:4209–14.
Berg, J., Forsythe, R., Nelson, F., and Rietz, T.. 2000. “Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Market Research.” Iowa Electronic Market, available online at
Binmore, K. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract, vol. 1: Playing Fair. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Binmore, K.. 1997. Game Theory and the Social Contract, vol. 2: Just Playing (Economic Learning and Social Evolution). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Binswanger, H. P. 1980. “Attitudes toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63:395–407.
Binswanger, H. P.. 1981. “Attitudes toward Risk: Theoretical Implications of an Experiment in Rural India.” Economic Journal 91:867–90.
Bisson, T. 1995. Bears Discover Fire and Other Stories. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Bloom, P. 2004. “Can a Dog Learn a Word?Science, June 11, 304:1605–6.
Bohnet, I., Frey, B., and Huck, S.. 2001. “More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding.” American Political Science Review 95:131–51.
Bolton, G. E. 1991. “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence.” American Economic Review 81:1096–136.
Bolton, G., Katok, E., and Zwick, R.. 1998. “Dictator Game Giving: Rules of Fairness Versus Acts of Kindness.” International Journal of Game Theory 27:269–99.
Bolton, G., and Ockenfels, A.. 2000. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.” American Economic Review 90:166–93.
Borenstein, S., and Bushnell, J.. 1999. “An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry.” Journal of Industrial Economics 47:285–324.
Born, M. 1943. Experiment and Theory in Physics. New York: Dover.
Bortoft, H. 1996. The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe's Way of Science. Edinburgh: Floris.
Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., Shen, Y., and Whitelaw, R.. 2007. “Do Asset Markets Reflect Fundamentals? Freshly Squeezed Evidence from the FCOJ Market.” Journal of Financial Economics 83: 397–412.
Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., and Shizgal, P.. 2001. “Functional Imaging of Neural Responses to Expectancy and Experience of Monetary Gains and Losses.” Neuron 30:619–39.
Bronfman, C., McCabe, K., Porter, D., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V. L.. 1996. “An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism.” Rand Journal 27:681–99.
Brown, D. E. 1991. Human Universals. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Buchan, J. 2004. Crowded with Genius the Scottish Enlightenment: Edinburgh's Moment of the Mind. New York: Perennial.
Buchanan, J., and Tullock, G.. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Burnham, T. 2003. “Engineering Altruism: An Experimental Investigation of Anonymity and Gift Giving.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 50(1):133–44.
Burnham, T., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 2000. “Friend-or-Foe Intentionality Priming in an Extensive Form Game.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44:1–17.
Caldwell, B. 2003. Hayek's Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Camera, G., C. Noussair, and S. Tucker. 2001. “Rate-of-Return Dominance and Efficiency in an Experimental Economy.” Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University.
Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C., T-H. Ho, and J. Chong. 2004. “Behavioral Game Theory: Thinking, Learning, and Teaching.” In Huck, S., ed., Advances in Understanding Strategic Behavior. New York: Palgrave.
Camerer, C., and Hogarth, R. M.. 1999. “The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19:7–42.
Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D.. 2005. “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 43:9–64.
Camerer, C., and Thaler, R. H.. 1995. “Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2):209–19.
Camerer, C., and Weigelt, K.. 1988. “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model.” Econometrica 56(1):1–36.
Cason, T., and D. Friedman. 1993. “An Empirical Analysis of Price Formation in Double Auction Markets.” In Friedman, and Rust, J., eds., The Double Auction. Redwood City: Addison-Wesley.
Cassady, R. 1967. Auctions and Auctioneering. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cesari, M., and Plott, C.. 2003. “Decentralized Management of Common Property Resources: Experiments with a Centuries-Old Institution.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 51:217–47.
Charles River and Associates, Inc., and Market Design, Inc. 1998a. Report 1A: Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions. Charles River and Associates No. 1351–00.
Charles River and Associates, Inc., and Market Design, Inc.. 1998b. Report 1B: Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses. Charles River and Associates No. 1351–00.
Charles River and Associates, Inc., and Market Design, Inc.. 1998c. Report 2: Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding. Charles River and Associates No. 1351–00.
Charness, G., and Rabin, M.. 2003. “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:817–69.
Charness, G., Frechette, G., and Kagel, J.. 2004. “How Robust Is Gift Exchange?Experimental Economics 7:189–205.
Cherry, T., Frykblom, P., and Shogren, J.. 2002. “Hardnose the Dictator.” American Economic Review 92:1218–21.
Cherry, T., Kroll, S., and Shogren, J.. 2005. “The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Public Good Contributions.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 57:357–65.
Chew, S. H., and N. Nishimura. 1999. “Revenue Non-Equivalence between the English and the Second Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence.” Working paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Christie, R., Colgin, F., and Geis, L.. 1970. Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press.
Chu, Y.-P., and Chu, R.-L.. 1990. “The Subsidence of Preference Reversals in Simplified and Market-Life Experimental Settings: A Note.” American Economic Review 80:902–11.
Coase, R. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3:1–44.
Coase, R.. 1974. “The Lighthouse in Economics.” Journal of Law and Economics 17:357–76.
Colgin, L., and Moser, E.. 2006. “Neuroscience: Rewinding the Memory Record.” Nature 440: 615.
Cooper, D., and Kagel, J.. 2003. “Lessons Learned: Generalizing Learning across Games.” American Economic Review 93(2):202–7.
Cooper, D., and J. Kagel. 2004. “Learning and Transfer in Signaling Games.” Working paper, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
Cooper, D., and Huyck, J. B.. 2003. “Evidence on the Equivalence of the Strategic and Extensive Form Representation of Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 110(2):290–308.
Coppinger, V., Smith, V., and Titus, J.. 1980. “Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions.” Economic Inquiry 18(1):1–22.
Corelli, K. McCabe, and V. L. Smith. 2000. “Theory-of-Mind Mechanism in Personal Exchange.” Proceedings, 13th Annual Toyota Conference on Affective Minds. In Hatano, G., Okada, N., and Tanabe, H., eds., Affective Minds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, chapter 26.
Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby. 1992. “Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange.” In Barkow, J., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J., eds., The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 163–228.
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J.. 1996. “Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians after All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Uncertainty.” Cognition 58:1–73.
Coursey, D., Isaac, R. M., Luke, M., and Smith, V.. 1984a. “Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Cost.” Rand Journal of Economics Spring: 69–84.
Coursey, D., Isaac, R. M., and Smith, V.. 1984b. “Natural Monopoly and Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results.” Journal of Law and Economics April:91–113.
Cox, J. 2000. “Implications of Game Triads for Observations of Trust and Reciprocity.” Working paper, University of Arizona, Department of Economics.
Cox, J.. 2002. “Trust, Reciprocity and Other-Regarding Preferences: Groups vs. Individuals and Males vs. Females.” In Zwick, R. and Rapoport, A., eds., Advances in Experimental Business Research. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 33–350.
Cox, J.. 2004. “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity.” Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–81.
Cox, J., and Deck, C.. 2005. “On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives.” Economic Inquiry 43:623–35.
Cox, J., and Grether, D.. 1996. “The Preference Reversal Phenomenon: Response Mode, Markets and Incentives.” Economic Theory 7:381–405.
Cox, J., Isaac, R. M., and Smith, V.. 1983. “OCS Leasing and Auctions: Incentives and the Performance of Alternative Bidding Institutions.” Supreme Court Economic Review 2:43–87.
Cox, J., B. Roberson, and V. Smith. 1982. “Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions.” In Smith, V., ed., Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 2. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Cox, J., and V. Smith. 1992. “Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auction.” Mimeograph, Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona.
Cox, J., Smith, V., and Walker, J.. 1988. “Theory and Individual Behavior of First Price Auctions.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1:61–99.
Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., and Steinberg, R., eds. 2006. Combinatorial Auctions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Crockett, S., V. Smith, and B. Wilson. 2006. “Specialization and Exchange as a Discovery Process.” Working paper, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science. George Mason University. Available online at
Dalton, G. 1979. “Aboriginal Economies in Stateless Societies.” In Earle, T. and Ericson, J., eds., Exchange Systems in Prehistory. New York: Academic Press.
Damasio, A. R. 1994. Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam.
Darwin, C. 1859; 1979. The Origin of Species. Darby: Arden Library.
Darwin, C.. 1872; 1998. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davis, D., and Holt, C.. 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Davis, D., and Williams, A. W.. 1991. “The Hayek Hypothesis in Experimental Auctions: Institutional Effects and Market Power.” Economic Inquiry 29:261–74.
Dawes, R. 1988. Rational Choice in an Uncertain World. New York: Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich.
Deck, C., McCabe, K., and Porter, D.. 2006. “Why Stable Fiat Money Hyperinflates: Evidence from an Experimental Economy.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61:471–86.
Deck, C., and Wilson, B.. 2004. “Economics at the Pump.” Regulation 1:22–9.
Deck, C., and Wilson, B.. 2006. “Tracking Customer Search to Price Discriminate.” Economic Inquiry 44:280–95.
Deck, C., and Wilson, B.. 2007. “Experimental Gasoline Markets.” FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 253. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Dehaene, S. 1997. The Number Sense. New York: Oxford University Press.
Demmert, H., and Klein, D. B.. 2003. “Experiment on Entrepreneurial Discovery: An Attempt to Demonstrate the Conjecture of Hayek and Kirzner.” Journal of Economics and Behavioral Organization 50(3):295–310.
Dentin, M., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V. L.. 2001. “Spot Market Mechanism Design and Competitivity Issues in Electric Power.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44:435–53.
Waal, F. B. M. 1989. “Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obligations among Chimpanzees.” Journal of Human Evolution 18(5):433–59.
Waal, F. B. M.. 1997. “Food-Transfers through Mesh in Brown Capuchins.” Journal of Comparative Psychology 111:370–8.
Waal, F. B. M.. 2005. “How Animals Do Business.” Scientific American, April: 73–9.
Donahue, G. 2002. “The US Air Transportation System: A Bold Vision for Change.” Paper prepared for the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Airspace Industry, September 19.
Dufwenberg, M., Lindqvist, T., and Moore, E.. 2002. “Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment.” American Economic Review 95:1731–7.
Durham, Y., McCabe, K., Olson, M., and Rassenti, S.. 2004. “Oligopoly Competition in Fixed Cost Environments.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 22(2):147–62.
Dutta, P. K., and Radner, R.. 1999. “Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis.” Review of Economic Studies 66:769–98.
Dyer, D., and Kagel, J. H.. 1996. “Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winners' Curse.” Management Science 42:1463–75.
Eckel, C., and Grossman, P.. 1996. “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 16:181–91.
Eckel, C. C., and Wilson, R. K.. 2004. “Is Trust a Risky Decision?Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 55(4):447–65.
Economic Science Laboratory Research Group. 1985. “Alternatives to Rate of Return Regulation.” Final Report for the Arizona Corporation Commission, February 15.
Einstein, A. 1905; 1989. “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies.” In A. Beck, tr., The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Einstein, A.. 1907; 1989. “On the Relativity Principle and the Conclusions Drawn from It.” In A. Beck, tr., The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, vol. 2, pp. 252–311. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Einstein, A.. 1934. The World as I See It. New York: Covici, Friede.
El-Gamal, M., and Grether, D.. 1995. “Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 90:1137–45.
Ellickson, R. C. 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Engelmann, D., and Strobel, M.. 2004. “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency and Maximum Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments.” American Economic Review 94:857–69.
Erev, I., and Roth, A.. 1998. “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed-Strategy Equilibria.” American Economic Review 88:848–81.
Falk, A., E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher. 1999. “On the Nature of Fair Behavior.” Working Paper No. 17, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 1424–0459, University of Zurich.
Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U.. 2002. “Why Social Preferences Matter: The Impact of Nonselfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation, and Incentives.” Economic Journal 112:C1–C33.
Fehr, E., and S. Gachter. 2000. “Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?” Working paper, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., and Riedl, A.. 1993. “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2):437–59.
Fehr, E., and Rockenbach, B.. 2002. “Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism.” Nature 422:137–40.
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M.. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3):817–68.
Feyerabend, P. 1975. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: NLB.
Fiske, A. P. 1991. The Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations. New York: Free Press.
P, Fletcher, Happe, F., Frith, U., Baker, S., Dolan, R., Frakowiak, R., and Frith, C.. 1995. “Other Minds in the Brain: A Functional Imaging Study of ‘Theory of Mind’ in Story Comprehension.” Cognition 57:109–28.
Fölsing, A. 1997. Albert Einstein. New York: Viking.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., and Sefton, M.. 1994. “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior 6:347–69.
Forsythe, R., Nelson, F., Neumann, G. R., and Wright, J.. 1992. “Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market.” American Economic Review 82:1142–61.
Forsythe, R., Rietz, T. A., and Ross, T. W.. 1999. “Wishes, Expectations, and Actions: Price Formation in Election Stock Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39:83–110.
Foster, D., and Wilson, M.. 2006. “Reverse Replay of Behavioral Sequences in Hippocampal Place Cells during the Awake State.” Nature, 440:680–3.
Fouraker, L., and Siegel, S.. 1963. Bargaining Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Franciosi, R., Kujal, P., Michelitsch, R., Smith, V. L., and Deng, G.. 1995. “Fairness: Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prices in Posted Offer Markets.” Economic Journal 105:938–50.
Frank, R. H. 1988. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W. W. Norton.
Freuchen, P. 1960. Book of the Eskimos. Cleveland: World Publishing.
Friedman, D. 1984. “On the Efficiency of Double Auction Markets.” American Economic Review 74:60–72.
Friedman, D.. 1993. “The Double Auction Market Institution: A Survey.” In Friedman, J. and Rust, J., eds., The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence: Proceedings of the Workshop on Double Auction Markets Held June 1991 in Santa Fe, NM. Santa Fe: Perseus, pp. 3–26.
Friedman, M. 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Friedman, M.. 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University Press.
Friedman, M., and Savage, L. J.. 1948. “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk.” Journal of Political Economy 56:279–304.
Fuster, J. 1999. Memory in the Cerebral Cortex. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Garvin, S., and Kagel, J.. 1994. “Learning in Common Value Auctions.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25:351–72.
Gazzaniga, M. S. 1998. The Mind's Past. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gazzaniga, M., Ivry, R., and Mangun, G.. 1998. Cognitive Neuroscience. New York: W. W. Norton.
Gibran, K. 1918; 2002. The Madman. Mineola: Dover.
Gibran, K.. 1928. Jesus the Son of Man. New York: Knopf.
Gigerenzer, G. 1991. “How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond Heuristics and Biases.” In Stroebe, W. and Hewstone, M., eds., European Review of Social Psychology, vol. 2. New York: Wiley, pp. 83–115.
Gigerenzer, G.. 1993. “The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Models.” In Manktelow, K. and Over, D., eds., Rationality. London: Routledge, pp. 284–313.
Gigerenzer, G.. 1996. “On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky.” Psychological Review 103:592–6.
Gigerenzer, G., and Selten, R., eds. 2002. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., and the ABC Research Group. 1999. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Giocoli, N. 2003. “Fixing the Point: The Contribution of Early Game Theory to the Tool-Box of Modern Economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (1):1–39.
Gode, D., and Sundar, S.. 1993. “Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality.” Journal of Political Economy, 101:119–37.
Gode, D.. 1997. “What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?Quarterly Journal of Economics 57: 603–30.
Goel, V., Grafman, J., Tajik, J., Gana, S., and Danto, D.. 1997. “A Study of the Performance of Patients with Frontal Lobe Lesions in a Financial Planning Task.” Brain 120(10):1805–22.
Goeree, J., and Holt, C.. 2001. “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions.” American Economic Review 91:1402–22.
Goldberg, I., Harel, M., and Malach, R.. 2006. “When the Brain Loses Its Self: Prefrontal Inactivation during Sensorimotor Processing.” Neuron 50:329–39.
Goldberger, A. 1979. “Heritability.” Economica 46(184):327–47.
Gomez, R., J. K. Goeree, and C. A. Holt. 2008. “Predatory Pricing: Rare Like a Unicorn?” In Plott, C. A. and Smith, V. L., eds., Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. New York: Elsevier.
Gouldner, A. W. 1960. “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement.” American Sociological Review 25:161–78.
Grandin, T. 1996. Thinking in Pictures. New York: Vintage.
Grandin, T., and Johnson, C.. 2005. Animals in Translation. New York: Scribner.
Grether, D., and Plott, C.. 1984. “The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: The Ethyl Case.” Economic Inquiry 22(4):479–507.
Guala, F. 2005. The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gunnthorsdottir, A., Houser, D., McCabe, K., and Ameden, H.. 2002a. Disposition, History, and Contributions in a Public Good Experiment. Working Paper, George Mason University.
Gunnthorsdottir, A., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 2002b. “Using the Machiavellianism Instrument to Predict Trustworthiness in a Bargaining Game. Journal of Economic Psychology 23:49–66.
Güth, W., Huck, S., and Ockenfels, P.. 1996. “Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study.” Economic Journal 106(436):593–604.
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B.. 1982. “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3:367–88.
Gwartney, J., and Lawson, R.. 2003. “The Concept and Measurement of Economic Freedom.” European Journal of Political Economy 19(3):405–30.
Hamowy, H. 2003. “F. A. Hayek and the Common Law.” Cato Journal 23(2):241–64.
Harrison, G. 1988. “Predatory Pricing in a Multiple Market Experiment: A Note.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9:405–17.
Harrison, G.. 1989. “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions.” American Economic Review 79(4):749–62.
Harrison, G., Johnson, E., McInnes, M., and Rutström, E.. 2005. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment.” American Economic Review 95(3):897–901.
Harrison, G., and List, J.. 2004. “Field Experiments.” Journal of Economic Literature 52: 1005–55.
Harrison, G., and McKee, M.. 1985a. “Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Law and Economics 28:653–70.
Harrison, G., and McKee, M.. 1985b. “Monopoly Behavior, Decentralized Regulation, and Contestable Markets: An Experimental Evaluation.” Rand Journal of Economics 16(1):51–69.
Hawkes, K. 1990. “Showing Off: Tests of an Hypothesis about Men's Foraging Goals.” Ethnology and Evolutionary Biology 12:29–54.
Hayek, F. A. 1937. “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica 4:33–54.
Hayek, F. A.. 1942; 1979. “Scientism and the Study of Society.” Economica 9(35):267–91. Reprinted in The Counter-Revolution of Science, pp. 19–40. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35(4):519–30.
Hayek, F. A.. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order (Essays). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1952. The Sensory Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1956. “The Dilemma of Specialization.” In White, L., ed., State of the Social Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1967. Studies in Philosophy Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1973. “Law, Legislation, and Liberty.” In Rules and Order, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A.. 1974. “Banquet Speech.” December 10. Available online at
Hayek, F. A.. 1976; 1991. “Adam Smith (1723–1790): His Message in Today's Language.” In Bartley, W. and Kresge, S., eds., The Trend of Economic Thinking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 119–24.
Hayek, F. A.. 1978; 1984. “Competition as a Discovery Procedure.” In The Essence of Hayek. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, chapter 13.
Hayek, F. A.. 1988. The Fatal Conceit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Henrich, J. 2000. “Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon.” American Economic Review 90(4):973–9.
Henrich, J.. 2004. “Cultural Group Selection, Co-Evolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53:3–35.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Henrich, N., Hill, K., Gil-White, F., Gurven, M., Marlowe, F., Patton, J., and Tracer, D.. 2005. “‘Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(6):795–815.
Hertwig, R., and Ortmann, A.. 2001. “Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24(3):383–403.
Hertwig, R., and A. Ortmann. 2003. “Economists' and Psychologists' Experimental Practices: How They Differ, Why They Differ, and How They Could Converge.” In Brocas, I. and Carrillo, J. D., eds., The Psychology of Economic Decisions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 253–72.
Hill, E., and D. Sally. 2003. “Dilemmas and Bargains: Autism, Theory of Mind, Cooperation and Fairness.” Working paper, University College, London.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., and Smith, V.. 1994. “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 7(3):346–80.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 1995. “Ultimatum and Dictator Games,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:236–9.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 1996a. “On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 25(3):289–301.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 1996b. “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games.” American Economic Review 86(3):653–60.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 1998. “Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology.” Economic Inquiry 36(3):335–53.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 2000. “The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games.” Experimental Economics 3(1):5–9.
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. Smith.. 2008. “Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator Games.” In Plott, C. A. and Smith, V. L., eds., Handbook of Experimental Economics Results. New York: Elsevier, chapter 4.
Hoffman, E., and Spitzer, M. L.. 1985. “Entitlements, Right and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subject's Concepts of Distributive Justice.” Journal of Legal Studies 14(2):259–97.
Hoffrage, U., Gigerenzer, G., Krauss, S., and Martignon, L.. 2002. “Representation Facilitates Reasoning: What Natural Frequencies Are and What They Are Not.” Cognition 84(3):343–52.
Hogarth, R., and Reder, M.. 1987. Rational Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Holt, C. 1989. “The Exercise of Market Power in Experiments.” Journal of Law and Economics 32(2):S107–30.
Holt, C.. 1995. “Industrial Organization.” In Kagel, J. and Roth, A., eds., The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 5.
Holt, C., Langan, L., and Villamil, A.. 1986. “Market Power in Oral Double Auction Experiments.” Economic Inquiry 24:107–23.
Holt, C., and Laury, S.. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” American Economic Review 92(5):1644–55.
Holt, D. 1999. “An Empirical Model of Strategic Choice with an Application to Coordination Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 27:86–105.
Homans, G. C. 1967. The Nature of Social Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
Houser, D. 2003. “Classification of Types of Dynamic Decision Makers.” In Nadel, L., ed., Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, vol. 1. London: Nature Publishing Group, pp. 1020–6.
Houser, D., Bechera, A., Keane, M., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 2005. “Identifying Individual Differences: An Algorithm with Application to Phileas Gage.” Games and Economic Behavior 52:373–85.
Houser, D., Gunnthorsdottir, A., and McCabe, K.. 2006. “Disposition, History and Contributions in a Public Goods Experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Houser, D., Keane, M., and McCabe, K.. 2004. “Behavior in a Dynamic Decision Problem.” Econometrica 72:781–822.
Houser, D., and Kurzban, R.. 2002. “Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Good Experiments.” American Economic Review 92:1062–9.
Houser, D., McCabe, K., and Smith, V. L.. 2004. “Cultural Group Selection, Co-Evolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation: Discussion.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53(1):85–8.
Houser, D., Xiao, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.. 2008. “When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation.” Games and Economic Behavior.
Huck, S., Norman, H., and Oechssler, J.. 2004. “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53:435–46.
Humboldt, A., and A. Bonpland. 1815; 1907. Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent, during the Years 1799–1804. Ross, T., ed. 3 volumes. London: George Bell and Sons.
Hume, D. 1739; 1985. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Penguin.
Hurwicz, L. 1960. “Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes.” In Arrow, K., Karlin, S., and Suppes, P., eds., Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hurwicz, L.. 1973The Design of Mechanism for Resource Allocation.” American Economic Review 63(2):1–30.
Hurwicz, L., Radner, R., and Reiter, S.. 1975. “A Stochastic Decentralized Resource Allocation Process: Part II.” Econometrica 43(3):363–93.
Hussam, R., D. Porter, and V. L. Smith. 2006. “Thar She Blows: Rekindling Bubbles with Inexperienced Subjects.” Working paper, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University.
Insul, S. 1915. Central Station Power Systems. Chicago: Privately published.
Isaac, R., and James, D.. 2000a. “Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse?Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 20:177–87.
Isaac, R., and James, D.. 2000b. “Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction.” Experimental Economics 3(1):31–53.
Isaac, R., Salmon, T., and Zillante, A.. 2007. “A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 62(1):144–64.
Isaac, R. M., and Smith, V. L.. 1985. “In Search of Predatory Pricing.” Journal of Political Economy 93:320–45.
Ishikida, T., J. Ledyard, M. Olson, and D. Porter. 2001. “The Design of a Pollution Trading System for Southern California's RECLAIM Emission Trading Program.” In Isaac, R. M., ed., Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 8. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Jackson, M. O. 2005. “Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions.” Division of Humanities and Social Sciences Working Paper 1241, California Institute of Technology.
Jamal, K., and Sundar, S.. 1991. “Money vs. Gaming: Effects of Salient Monetary Payments in Double Oral Auctions.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 49(1):151–66.
Jevons, W. S. 1871; 1888. The Theory of Political Economy, 3rd edition. London: Macmillan. Available online at
Jung, Y., Kagel, J., and Levin, D.. 1994. “On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game.” Rand Journal of Economics 25:253–79.
Kachelmeier, S. J., and Shehata, M.. 1992. “Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary Incentives: Evidence from the People's Republic of China.” American Economic Review 82:1120–41.
Kagan, J. 1994. Galen's Prophecy. New York: Basic Books.
Kagan, J., and Lamb, S.. 1987. The Emergence of Morality in Young Children. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kagel, J. H., and Levin, D.. 1986. “The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions.” American Economic Review 76:894–920.
Kagel, J., and Roth, A.. 1995. Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kahneman, D. 2002. Nobel Interview. Available online at
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., and Thaler, R.. 1986. “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market.” American Economic Review 76(4):728–41.
Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. 1991. “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics.” In Thaler, R., ed., Quasi Rational Economics. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A.. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47:263–91.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A.. 1996. “On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions: A Reply to Gigerenzer.” Psychological Review 103:582–91.
Kalai, E., and Lehrer, E.. 1993. “Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium.” Econometrica 61(5):1019–45.
Kaminski, J., Call, J., and Fischer, J.. 2004. “Word Learning in a Domestic Dog: Evidence for ‘Fast Mapping.’” Science 304:16832–3.
Kaplan, H., and Hill, K.. 1985. “Food Sharing among Ache Foragers: Tests of Explanatory Hypotheses.” Current Anthropology 26:223–46.
Ketcham, J., Smith, V. L., and Williams, A.. 1984. “A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions.” Review of Economic Studies 51:595–614.
Klemperer, P. 1998. “Auctions with Almost Common Values: The ‘Wallet Game’ and Its Applications.” European Economic Review 42:757–69.
Klemperer, P., and Meyer, M.. 1989. “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty.” Econometrica 57:1243–77.
Knoch, D., Pascual-Leone, A., Meyer, K., Treyer, V., and Fehr, E.. 2006. “Diminishing Reciprocal Fairness by Disrupting the Right Prefrontal Cortex.” Science 314:829–32.
Knowlton, B., Mangels, J., and Squire, L.. 1996. “A Neostriatal Habit Learning System in Humans.” Science 273(5280):1399–1402.
Koehler, J. J. 1996. “The Base-Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19(1):1–53.
Kroll, Y., Levy, H., and Rapoport, A.. 1988. “Experimental Tests of the Separation Theorem and the Capital Asset Pricing Model.” American Economic Review 78(3):500–19.
Krueger, J. I., and Funder, D. C.. 2004. “Towards a Balanced Social Psychology: Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:313–76.
Krutch, J. 1954. The Voice of the Desert. New York: William Sloane Associates.
Kurzban, R., and Houser, D.. 2005. “An Experimental Investigation of Cooperative Types in Human Groups: A Complement to Evolutionary Theory and Simulation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102:1803–7.
Kwasnica, A. M., Ledyard, J., Porter, D., and DeMartini, C.. 2003. “A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions.” Management Science 51(3):419–35.
Lakatos, I. 1978. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, vol. 1, 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lazzarini, S., G. Miller, and T. Zenger. 2002. “Order with Some Law: Complementarity vs. Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements.” Paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Trust and Reciprocity in Experimental Economics, October 11–12. Washington University, St. Louis.
Leamer, E. 1978. Specification Searches. New York: Wiley.
Ledyard, J. 1986. “The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Theory 39:59–82.
Ledyard, J., Olson, M., Porter, D., Swanson, J. A., and Torma, D. P.. 2002. “The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services.” Interfaces 32(5):4–12.
Ledyard, J., Porter, D., and Rangle, A.. 1997. “Experiment Testing Multi Object Allocation Mechanism.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6:639–75.
Lei, V., Noussair, C., and Plott, C.. 2001. “Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality.” Econometrica 69:831–59.
Levitt, S., and List, J.. 2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Tell Us about the Real World?” University of Chicago prepublication paper, June 15. Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Libet, B. 2004. Mind Time. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
List, J. 2004. “Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace,” Econometrica 72(2):615–25.
List, J., and Cherry, T.. 2002. “Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers.” Experimental Economics 3:11–29.
Lohr, S. 1992. “Lessons from a Hurricane: It Pays Not to Gouge.” New York Times, September 22, p. C2.
Lopes, L. 1991. “The Rhetoric of Irrationality.” Psychology and Theory 1:65–82.
Lucas, R. E. 1986. “Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory.” Journal of Business 56:S401–26.
Lynch, M., R. M. Miller, C. R. Plott, and R. Porter. 1986. “Product Quality, Consumer Information and ‘Lemons’ in Experimental Markets.” In Ippolito, P. and Scheffman, D., eds., Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics. Washington: FTC Bureau of Economics, pp. 251–306.
Lyyken, D. T. 1995. The Antisocial Personalities. Hillsdsale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Majumdar, M. K., and Radner, R.. 1991. “Linear Models of Economic Survival under Production Uncertainty.” Economic Theory 1:13–30.
Majumdar, M. K., and R. Radner. 1992. “Survival under Production Uncertainty.” In Majumdar, M. K., ed., Equilibrium and Dynamics. London: Macmillan, pp. 179–200.
Mandaville, A. 2006. “Look and Learn.” Nature, 441:271–2.
Mandeville, B. 1705; 1924; 2005. “The Grumbling Hive: Or, Knaves Turned Honest.” In Kaye, F. B., ed., The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits, vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, Amen House, pp. 17–37. Available online at
Maquet, P. 2001. “The Role of Sleep in Learning and Memory.” Science 294(5544):1048–52.
Markowitz, H. 1952. “The Utility of Wealth.” Journal of Political Economy 60:151–8.
Mayo, D. 1996. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mazzarello, P. 2000. “What Dreams May Come?Nature 408:523.
McAfee, R. P., and McMillan, J.. 1996. “Analyzing the Airways Auction.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:159–75.
McCabe, K., J. Henrich, W. Albers, R. Boyd, G. Gigerenzer, A. Ockenfels, P. E. Tetlock, and H. P. Young. 2001a. “Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?” In Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R., eds., Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 343–59.
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., and Trouard, T.. 2001b. “A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Exchange.” Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences 98:11832–5.
McCabe, K., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L.. 1989. “Designing ‘Smart’ Computer Assisted Markets.” European Journal of Political Economy 5(2–3):259–83.
McCabe, K., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L.. 1990. “Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions.” American Economic Review 80(5):1276–83.
McCabe, K., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L.. 1991a. “Smart Computer-Assisted Markets.” Science 254:534–8.
McCabe, K., S. J. Rassenti, and V. L. Smith. 1991b. “Testing Vickrey's and Other Simultaneous Multiple Unit Versions of the English Auction.” In Isaac, R. M., ed., Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 4. Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 45–79.
McCabe, K., S. J. Rassenti, and V. L. Smith. 1993. “Designing a Uniform-Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation.” In Friedman, J. and Rust, J., eds., The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence: Proceedings of the Workshop on Double Auction Markets Held June 1991 in Santa Fe, NM. Santa Fe: Perseus, pp. 307–32.
McCabe, K., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L.. 1996. “Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93:13421–8.
McCabe, K., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L.. 1998. “Reciprocity, Trust and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining.” Games and Economic Behavior 24(1–2):10–24.
McCabe, K., M. Rigdon, and V. L. Smith. 2002. “Cooperation in Single Play, Two-Person Extensive Form Games between Anonymously Matched Players.” In Zwick, R. and Rapoport, A., eds., Experimental Business Research. Boston: Kluwer, chapter 3.
McCabe, K., Rigdon, M., and Smith, V. L.. 2003. “Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52(2):267–75.
McCabe, K., Rigdon, M., and Smith, V. L.. 2007. “Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games,” Revised working paper, Economic Journal.
McCabe, K., and Smith, V. L.. 2000. “A Comparison of Naïve and Sophisticated Subject Behavior with Game Theoretic Predictions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97:3777–81.
McCabe, K., and V. L. Smith. 2001. “Goodwill Accounting and the Process of Exchange.” In Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R., eds., Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 319–40.
McCabe, K., Smith, V., and LePore, M.. 2000. “Intentionality Detection and ‘Mindreading’: Why Does Game Form Matter?Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences 97:4404–9.
Mealy, L. 1995. “The Sociobiology of Sociopathy.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18:523–99.
Meardon, S., and Ortmann, A.. 1996. “Self-Command in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments: A Game-Theoretic Re-Interpretation.” Rationality and Society 8:57–80.
Mehler, J., and Bever, T. G.. 1967. “Cognitive Capacity of Very Young Children.” Science New Series 158 (3797):141–2.
Mellers, B., Schwartz, A., and Ritor, I.. 1999. “Emotion-Based Choice.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128:1–14.
Metzger, B., and Murphy, R., eds. 1994. The New Oxford Annotated Bible. New York: Oxford University Press.
Milgrom, P. 2000. “Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction.” Journal of Political Economy 108(2):245–72.
Milgrom, P.. 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Milgrom, P. R., and Weber, R. J.. 1982. “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding.” Econometrica 50:1089–1122.
Mill, J. S. 1848; 1900. Principles of Political Economy, vols. 1–2. London: Colonial Press.
Miller, R. 2002. “Don't Let Your Robots Grow Up to Be Traders.” Working paper, Miller Risk Advisors.
Miller, R., and Plott, C.. 1985. “Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets.” Econometrica 53:837–72.
Miller, R., Plott, C., and Smith, V.. 1977. “Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 91:599–624.
Montes, L. 2003. “Das Adam Smith Problem: Its Origins, the Stages of the Current Debate, and One Implication for Our Understanding of Sympathy.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 25:63–90.
Moser, E. 2006. “Rewinding the Memory Record.” Nature, 440:615–17.
Mullainathan, S., and R. Thaler. 2001. “Behavioral Economics.” In Smelser, N. J. and Baltes, P. B., eds., International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier.
Myerson, R. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Nash., J. F. 1996. Essays in Game Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Nelson, K., and Nelson, R.. 2002. “On the Nature and Evolution of Human Know-How.” Research Policy 31:719–33.
Nelson, L. 2004. “While You Were Sleeping.” Nature 430 (7003):962–4.
Netting, R. 1976. “What Alpine Peasants Have in Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village.” Human Ecology 4:135–46.
Norman, J. 2002. “Two Visual Systems and Two Theories of Perception: An Attempt to Reconcile the Constructivist and Ecological Approaches.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25(1):73–96.
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C.. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Northrup, F. S. C. 1969. “Einstein's Conception of Science.” In Schilpp, P. A., ed., Albert Einstein Philosopher – Scientist. LaSalle: Open Court.
O'Keefe, J., and Nadel, L.. 1978. The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map. London: Clarendon.
Olson, M., Rassenti, S., Smith, V., and Rigdon, M.. 2003. “Market Design and Motivated Human Trading Behavior in Electricity Markets.” Institute of Industrial Engineering Transactions 35(9):833–49.
Ortmann, A. 2005. “Field Experiments: Some Methodological Caveats.” In Carpenter, J., Harrison, G. W., and List, J. A., eds., Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 10: Field Experiments in Economics. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Ortmann, A., Fitzgerald, J., and Boening, C.. 2000. “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Experimental Economics 3(1):81–100.
Ortmann, A., and Rydval, O.. 2004. “How Financial Incentives and Cognitive Abilities Affect Task Performance in Laboratory Settings: An Illustration.” Economic Letters 85:315–20.
Ostrom, E. 1982. Strategies of Political Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Ostrom, E.. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and Walker, J.. 1994. Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Oxoby, R., and Spraggon, J.. 2007. “Mine and Yours: Property Rights in Dictator Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
Pepperberg, I. M. 1999. The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pillutla, M., Malhotra, D., and Murnighan, J. K.. 2003. “Attributions of Trust and the Calculus of Reciprocity.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39(5):448–55.
Pinker, S. 1994. The Language Instinct. New York: William Morrow.
Pinker, S.. 2002. The Blank Slate. New York: Viking.
Pirsig, R. M. 1981. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: Bantam.
Pitchik, C., and A. Schotter. 1984. “Regulating Markets and Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study.” Working Paper No. 84–12. C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
Plott, C. 1988. “Research on Pricing in a Gas Transportation Network.” Technical Report No. 88–2. Washington: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Economic Policy.
Plott, C.. 2001. “Equilibrium, Equilibration, Information and Multiple Markets: From Basic Science to Institutional Design.” Paper presented to the Nobel Symposium, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Stockholm, December 4–6.
Plott, C. R., and G. Agha. 1983. “Intertemporal Speculation with a Random Demand in an Experimental Market.” In Tietz, R., ed., Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Plott, C., Sugiyama, A. B., and Elbaz, G.. 1994. “Economies of Scale, Natural Monopoly, and Imperfect Competition in an Experimental Market.” Southern Economic Journal 61(2):261–87.
Plott, C., and Sundar, S.. 1982. “Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models.” Journal of Political Economy 90:663–98.
Plott, C., and Sundar, S.. 1988. “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Securities Markets.” Econometrica 56:1085–118.
Plott, C., and T. Turocy III. 1996. “Intertemporal Speculation under Uncertain Future Demand.” In Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., and Damme, E., eds., Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 475–93.
Plott, C., and Uhl, J.. 1981. “Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen.” Southern Economic Journal 47:1063–71.
Plott, C., and L. Wilde. 1982. “Professional Diagnosis vs. Self-Diagnosis: An Experimental Examination of Some Special Features of Markets with Uncertainty.” In Smith, V. L., ed., Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 2. Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 63–112.
Plott, C., and Zeiler, K.. 2005. “The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,’ Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations.” American Economic Review 95(3):530–45.
Poincaré, H. 1913. Foundations of Science. New York: Science Press.
Polanyi, M. 1962. Personal Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Polanyi, M.. 1969. Knowing and Being. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Porter, D. 1999. “The Effect of Bid Withdrawal in a Multi-Object Auction.” Review of Economic Design 4(1):73–97.
Porter, D., Rassenti, S., Roopnarine, A., and Smith, V.. 2003. “Combinatorial Auction Design.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100(19):11153–7.
Porter, D., S. Rassenti, V. Smith, A. Winn, and W. Shobe. 2005. “The Design, Testing and Implementation of Virginia's NOx Allowance Auction.” Working Paper, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University.
Porter, D., and Smith, V. L.. 1994. “Stock Market Bubbles in the Laboratory.” Applied Mathematical Finance 1:111–27.
Rabin, M. 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American Economics Review 83(5):1281–302.
Radner, R. 1997. “Economic Survival.” In Jacobs, D. P., Kalai, E., and Kamien, M. I., eds., Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory: The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983 –1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Radner, R., and Schotter, A.. 1989. “The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Economic Theory 48:179–220.
Rapoport, A. 1997. “Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form.” International Journal of Game Theory 26:113–36.
Rapoport, A., and Sundali, J. A.. 1996. “Ultimatums in Two Persons Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 25(4):475–94.
Rassenti, S. 1981. “O-1 Decision Problems with Multiple Resource Constraints: Algorithms and Applications.” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Arizona.
Rassenti, S., and Smith, V.. 1986. “Electric Utility Deregulation.” In Pricing Electric Gas and Telecommunication Services. Institute for the Study of Regulation, Proceedings of a Conference, December.
Rassenti, S., Smith, V. L., and Bulfin, R.. 1982. “A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation.” Bell Journal of Economics 13:402–17.
Rassenti, S., V. L. Smith, and B. Wilson. 2002a. “Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand Side Bidding.” Working paper, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University.
Rassenti, S., Smith, V. L., and Wilson, B.. 2002b. “Using Experiments to Inform the Privatization/Deregulation Movement in Electricity.” Cato Journal 21:515–44.
Rassenti, S., Smith, V. L., and Wilson, B.. 2003. “Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-Side Bidding.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100(5):2998–3003.
Rassenti, S., and Wilson, B.. 2004. “How Applicable Is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?Experimental Economics 7(3):271–88.
Reiley, D.. 2000. “Auctions on the Internet: What's Being Auctioned, and How?Journal of Industrial Economics 48(3):227–52.
Reiter, S. 1959; 1981. “A Dynamic Process of Exchange.” In Horwich, G. and Quirk, J., eds., Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics, pp. 3–23. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press. Revised from “A Market Adjustment Mechanism.” Institute Paper No. 1, School of Industrial Management, Purdue University, 1959.
Renshaw, E. 1988. “The Crash of October 19 in Retrospect.” Market Chronicle 22:1.
Rigdon, M. 2002. “Efficiency Wages in an Experimental Labor Market.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99(20):13348–51.
Rizzello, S. 1999. The Economics of the Mind. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Robinson, J. 1979. “What Are the Questions?Journal of Economic Literature 15:1318–39.
Rosenthal, R. 1981. “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store Paradox.” Journal of Economic Theory 25:92–100.
Roth, A., and Sotomayer, M.. 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study of Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothkopf, M. H., Pekec, A., and Harstad, R. M.. 1998. “Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions.” Management Science 44(8):1131–47.
Samuelson, P., and Nordhaus, W.. 1985. Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Satterthwaite, M. 1987. “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms.” In Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., eds., The New Palgrave, vol. 4, pp. 518–20. London: Macmillan.
Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schmitt, P. M. 2003. “On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games.” Experimental Economics 7:49–73.
Schotter, A. and Sopher, B.. 2006. “Trust and Trustworthiness in Games: An Experimental Study of Intergenerational Advice.” Experimental Economics, 9:123–45.
Schotter, A., Wiegelt, K., and Wilson, C.. 1994. “A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects.” Games and Economic Behavior 6:445–68.
Schultz, W. 2000. “Multiple Reward Signals in the Brain.” Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 1:199–207.
Schultz, W.. 2002. “Getting Formal with Dopamine and Reward.” Neuron 36:241–63.
Schwartz, T., and J. S. Ang. 1989. “Speculative Bubbles in the Asset Market: An Experimental Study.” Paper presented at the American Finance Association meeting, Atlanta, December.
Scully, G. W. 1988. “The Institutional Framework and Economic Development.” Journal of Political Economy 96(3):652–62.
Segal, N. 1999. Entwined Lives. New York: Plume.
Segrè, E. 1984. From Falling Bodies to Radio Waves. New York: Freeman.
Selten, R. 1973. “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many.” International Journal of Game Theory 2(2):141–201.
Selten, R.. 1975. “Re-Examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4(1):25–55.
Shaked, Avner. 2005. “The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion.” Available online at
Shepard, G. B. 1995. Rejected. Sun Lakes: Thomas Horton and Daughters.
Shubik, M. 1959. Strategy and Market Structure. New York: Wiley.
Siegel, S. 1959. “Theoretical Models of Choice and Strategy Behavior.” Psychometrika 24:303–16.
Siegel, S.. 1961. “Decision Making and Learning under Varying Conditions of Reinforcement.” Annals of the New York Academy of Science 89(5):766–83.
Siegel, S., and Fouraker, L.. 1960. Bargaining and Group Decision Making. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Siegel, S., and Harnett, D. L.. 1964. “Bargaining Behavior: A Comparison between Mature Industrial Personnel and College Students.” Operations Research March: 334–43.
Simon, H. A. 1955. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69:99–118
Simon, H. A.. 1956. “A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory.” Psychometrika 3:267–72.
Simon, H. A.. 1981; 1996. The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd edition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Singleton, S. 2000. “Will the Net Turn Car Dealers into Dinosaurs?Cato Institute Briefing Papers 58.
Smith, A. 1759; 1982. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by Raaphaet, D. and Mactie, A.. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Smith, A.. 1776; 1981. An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol 1. Edited by Campbell, R. and Skinner, A.. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Smith, H. 2001. Why Religion Matters. New York: HarperCollins.
Smith, K., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., and Pardo, J.. 2002. “Neuronal Substrates for Choice under Ambiguity, Risk, Gains, and Losses.” Management Science 48:711–19.
Smith, V. L. 1962. “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 70:111–37.
Smith, V. L.. 1967. “Experimental Studies of Discrimination versus Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets.” Journal of Business 70:56–84.
Smith, V. L.. 1976. “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory.” American Economic Review Proceedings 66:274–9.
Smith, V. L.. 1980. “Relevance of Laboratory Experiments to Testing Resource Allocation Theory.” In Kmenta, J. and Ramsey, J. B., eds., Evaluation of Econometric Models. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 345–77.
Smith, V. L.. 1982a. “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science.” American Economic Review 72:923–55.
Smith, V. L.. 1982b. “Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the ‘Hayek Hypothesis’.” Economic Inquiry 20:165–79.
Smith, V. L.. 1986. “Experimental Methods in the Political Economy of Exchange.” Science 234:167–73.
Smith, V. L.. 1991. Papers in Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, V. L.. 1992. “Game Theory and Economics: Beginnings and Early Influences.” In Weintraub, E., ed., Toward a History of Game Theory. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 241–82.
Smith, V. L.. 1997. “Experimental Economics: Behavioral Lessons for Microeconomic Theory and Policy.” In Jacobs, D. P., Kalai, E., and Kamien, M. I., eds., Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory: The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983–1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 104–22.
Smith, V. L.. 1998. “The Two Faces of Adam Smith.” Southern Economic Journal 65:1–19.
Smith, V. L.. 2000. Bargaining and Market Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, V. L.. 2002. “Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality.” Experimental Economics 5:91–110.
Smith, V. L.. 2003. “Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics.” Les Prix Nobel. Stockholm: Nobel Foundation. Reprinted in American Economic Review 93:465–508.
Smith, V. L.. 2005a. From Starlight to Stockholm, A Memoir. Manuscript in typescript.
Smith, V. L.. 2005b. “Sociality and Self Interest.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28:833–4.
Smith, V. L.. 2007. Discovery: Starlight to Stockholm (title tentative). Forthcoming.
Smith, V. L., K. McCabe, and S. Rassenti. 1991. “Lakatos and Experimental Economics.” In Marchi, N. and Blaug, M., eds., Appraising Economic Theories. London: Edward Elgar.
Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G., and Williams, A.. 1988. “Bubbles, Crashes and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets.” Econometrica 56:1119–51.
Smith, V. L. and F. Szidarovszky. 2004. “Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Strategic Interactions.” In Augier, M. and March, J., eds., Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A. Simon. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Smith, V. L., and Walker, J.. 1993a. “Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics.” Economic Inquiry April:245–61.
Smith, V. L, and Walker, J.. 1993b. “Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions.” Economic Inquiry April:237–44.
Smith, V. L., and A. Williams. 1982. “An Experimental Comparison of Alternative Rules for Competitive Market Exchange.” In Shubik, M., ed., Auctioning and Bidding. New York: New York University Press, pp. 43–64.
Smith, V. L., Williams, A., Bratton, K., and Vannoni, M.. 1982. “Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions.” American Economic Review 72:58–77.
Smuts, B. 1999. “Multilevel Selection, Cooperation and Altruism: Reflections on Unto Others.” Human Nature 10:156–61.
Sobel, J. 2005. “Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity.” Journal of Economic Literature 42:392–436.
Soberg, M. 2005. “The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Experimental Economics.” Journal of Economic Methodology 12:581–97.
Sopher, B., and Gigliotti, G.. 1993. “Intransitive Cycles: Rational Choice or Random Error.” Theory and Decision 35:311–36.
Spence, M. 2002. “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets.” American Economic Review 92(3):434–59.
Stahl, D. 1993. “Evolution of Smart Players.” Games and Economic Behavior 5:604–17.
Stigler, G. 1957. “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated.” Journal of Political Economy 65:1–17.
Stigler, G.. 1967. “Imperfections in the Capital Market.” Journal of Political Economy June: 287–92.
Stiglitz, J. E. 2002. “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics.” Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, 2001. In Frängsmyr, T., ed., The Nobel Prizes 2001. Stockholm: Nobel Foundation. Reprinted in American Economic Review 92(3): 460–501.
Strathern, P. 1996. Wittgenstein. Chicago: Ivan Dee.
Straub, P., and Murnigan, K.. 1995. “An Experimental Investigation of Ultimatum Games: Information, Fairness, Expectations, and Lowest Acceptable Offers.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27:345–64.
Sundar, S. 2004. “Market as Artifact: Aggregate Efficiency from Zero Intelligence Traders.” In Augier, M. and March, J., eds., Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A. Simon. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Suppes, P. 1969. “Models of Data.” In Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 24–35.
Suroweicki, J. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds. New York: Doubleday.
Thaler, R. 1980. “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1:39–60.
Thaler, R., and Ziemba, W. T.. 1988. “Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and Lotteries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2(2):161–74.
Thut, G., Schultz, W., Roelcke, U., et al. 1997. “Activation of the Human Brain by Monetary Reward.” NeuroReport 8:1225–8.
Tremblay, L., and Schultz, W.. 1999. “Relative Reward Preference in Primate Orbitofrontal Cortex.” Nature 389:704–8.
Treynor, J. 1987. “Market Efficiency and the Bean Jar Experiment.” Financial Analysts Journal 43:50–3.
Trivers, R. 2004. “Mutual Benefits at All Levels of Life.” Science 304:964–5.
Tullock, G. 1985. “Adam Smith and the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 Supplement:1073–81.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D.. 1983. “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.” Psychological Bulletin 90(4):293–315.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1987. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.” In Hogarth, R. M. and Reder, M. W., eds., Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Umbeck, J. 1977. “The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights.” Explorations in Economic History 14:197–226.
Boening, M., and Wilcox, N.. 1996. “Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster.” American Economic Review 86(3):461–77.
Vickery, W. 1961. “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.” Journal of Finance 16:8–37.
Vickery, W.. 1976. “Auction Markets and Optimal Allocation.” In Amihud, Y., ed., Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 43–64.
Viner, J. 1991. “Adam Smith.” In Irvin, D., ed., Essays on the Intellectual History of Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 248–61.
Winterfeldt, D., and Edwards, W.. 1986. Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wagner, U., Gais, S., Haider, H., Verleger, R., and Born, J.. 2004. “Sleep Inspires Insight.” Nature 427:352–5.
Weber, R. A., and Camerer, C. F.. 2006. “Behavioral Experiments in Economics.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9:187–92.
Wierzbicka, A. 2006. English: Meaning and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, A. 1979. “Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: On Further Experimental Results.” In Smith, V. L., ed., Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 1. Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 225–78.
Williams, A.. 1980. “Computerized Double-Auction Markets: Some Initial Experimental Results.” Journal of Business 53:235–57.
Williams, A., and V. L. Smith. 1986. “Simultaneous Trading in Two Competitive Markets.” Manuscript, Indiana University, Department of Economics.
Williams, A., Smith, V. L., Ledyard, J. O., and Gjerstad, S.. 2000. “Concurrent Trading in Two Experimental Markets with Demand Interdependence.” Journal of Economic Theory 16:511–28.
Williamson, O. 1977. “Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis.” Yale Law Journal December: 284–340.
Wilson, B. 2005. “Language Games of Reciprocity.” Working Paper, Interdisciplinary Center of Economic Science, George Mason University.
Wilson, R. B. 1987. “On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets.” In Feiwel, G., ed., Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory. New York: NYU Press, pp. 375–414.
Wilson, R. B.. 1992. “Strategic Analysis of Auctions.” In Aumann, R. and Hart, S., eds., Handbook of Game Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 227–79.
Wilson, R. B.. 1993. “Design of Efficient Trading Procedures.” In Friedman, J. and Rust, J., eds., The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence: Proceedings of the Workshop on Double Auction Markets Held June 1991 in Santa Fe, NM. Santa Fe: Perseus, pp. 125–52.
Wilson, R. B.. 2002. “Architecture of Power Markets.” Econometrica 70:1299–1340.
Wittgenstein, L. 1963. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L.. 1967. Zettel. Edited by Anscombe, G. and Wright, G.. Translated by G. Anscombe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
Zajac, E. E. 1995. Political Economy of Fairness. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zajac, E. E.. 2002. “What Fairness-and-Denial Research Could Have Told the Florida Supreme Court (and Can Tell the Rest of Us).” Independent Review 6(3):377–97.
Zeaman, D. 1949. Response Latency as a Function of the Amount of Reinforcement. Dissertation Thesis, Columbia University.