During a late March 2009 interview with al-Hayat newspaper, President Ali Abdallah Salih spoke metaphorically about what it is like to govern Yemen: “it is like dancing on the heads of snakes.” The comment revealed more about his own approach to ruling the country than it did about the countrymen living under his rule. When the president spoke, he still had support from cross-sections of the population. Some praised his long record as leader. Others marveled at his ability to survive times of crisis, seeming always to emerge on top of his rivals. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, most influential actors had grown tired of the president’s perpetual grip on power. They refused to consider any possibility that the president’s son might replace him in office. The fact Salih wanted his sons and nephews to play more active roles in national affairs created space for ever more violent forms of opposition, and the consequent breakdown of law and order.

In truth, there are a number of reasons for the breakdown of the Yemeni state during the last half of the decade. In 2003 state revenues from oil started to decline because of falling levels of production. Not only did this deepen the country’s economic crisis, but it diminished the president’s ability to buy off contenders for political power. Since Yemenis had lived with economic crisis for many years, this factor alone could not account for the country’s implosion. Backlash from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the public rejected Salih’s close alliance with the Bush administration in Washington, was clearly a contributing factor. The suspicious deaths of moderate nationalist figures, Jarallah Omar, Yahya al-Mutawakkil, and Mujahid Abu Shawarib, produced heightened cynicism. The absence of these three men’s voices of reason, and their skills at negotiating compromise, left a void on the political stage. This was undoubtedly an important factor in Yemen’s breakdown. More important was the spread of regional factionalism across broad stretches of the country.