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6 - Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union without Fiscal Union

from Part II - Better Institutions for Better Fiscal Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2017

Ľudovít Ódor
Affiliation:
Council for Budget Responsibility, Slovakia
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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