The separation of powers identified in the last chapter involves an institutional separation between those unelected institutions primarily concerned with mobilising the facts, evidence and empirical knowledge in public policy-making and those elected bodies primarily concerned with the value judgements that enter into public policy-making. This chapter looks further at the reasons for this separation and at the advantages to the public of entrusting unelected institutions with mobilising facts and making empirical judgements.

At a very general level, the provision of information and knowledge is a service in society and the advantages to the public of the unelected bodies in this area can be seen as part of the general move to more service-oriented economies. But there are two much more compelling reasons examined in this chapter why the public is likely to have seen benefits in the institutional separation of the two streams of judgement. The first relates to public confidence in the empirical information and analysis they are provided with. The second involves the advantages to the public from unbundling different institutional roles and responsibilities for the two streams of judgement. This chapter also examines the objections of those who suggest that such a separation is impossible.

Independent information gatherers

What has transformed the traditional debate from one about how to organise the gathering of information and the mobilisation of empirical knowledge within government, to one about how to organise it outside and independent of government, are the advantages that independent bodies possess as fact gatherers and sources of expert knowledge and judgement.