Trilemma

When bioethical discussion touches on the notion of the person it usually takes the form of an argument which has a decisive character. Such an understanding often forms a simple syllogism: one should not kill a person; X is a person; therefore: one should not kill X with, in the place of X – according to the problem considered – terms such as nasciturus, ‘someone terminally ill who has requested euthanasia,’ ‘someone who's life functions are maintained by medical apparatus’ are employed.

On the other hand, one may also encounter such positions as that noted by Hugo Engelhardt:

We should note that Engelhardt does not question the syllogistic scheme above. He rejects the validity of one of its premises i.e. that a nasciturus or someone who is mentally handicapped is a person. It is not the aim of this paper to establish if the conclusions of this syllogism are true or false. We can state, however, that they are not justified on the basis of the premises assumed. The reason is not that the premises are false but rather that it is unclear what they state.