Appendices

Marc P. Berenson

Appendix I: Poland, Russia and Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys 2004–2015 and the Russian Tax Officials Survey 2011

In Poland, the CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre conducted the 2004 survey, designed by this author, on 5–8 November 2004. The sample size was 988 respondents. The method employed was face-to-face PAPI, in which the interviewer filled out a paper questionnaire. The margin of error did not exceed 3.2 per cent. The Polish 2010 survey was conducted in September 2010 on 2,021 Poles nationwide by the PBS DDG Market Research firm, based in Sopot.

For the Russian 2004 survey, carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation on 23–24 October 2004, nationwide home interviews were conducted in 44 regions. The sample size was 1,500 respondents. Additional polls were made of the Moscow population, with a sample of 600 respondents. The margin of error did not exceed 3.6 per cent. The Russian 2010 survey also was carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation on 7–12 July 2010 with a nationwide sample size of 3,000 respondents.

In Ukraine, the survey was carried out nationwide on 3,995 Ukrainians on 20–29 November 2005 by the Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies. The method employed was face-to-face interviews. The response rate was 70.6 per cent. The margin of error did not exceed 2.3 per cent. The Ukrainian 2010 survey was also carried out by the Razumkov Centre on 4,015 Ukrainians nationwide from 10 August to 5 October. The Ukrainian 2012 survey also was carried out by the Razumkov Centre on 2,008 Ukrainians nationwide in April 2012. The Ukrainian 2015 survey also was carried out by the Razumkov Centre on 4,025 Ukrainians nationwide (excluding Crimea and areas of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that were inaccessible to researchers) on 30 October–7 November 2015.

In Russia, the Public Opinion Foundation carried out a survey, also designed by this author, from 15 September to 31 October 2011, of 1,015 public officials, of whom 39.5 per cent, or 401 individuals, were tax officials.

All survey responses are rounded to the closest per cent.

Blank = not asked

1. Do you consider yourself to be a taxpayer?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Yes	83	66	75	61	59	59	60
No	15	30	22	30	35	35	33
Difficult to say	2	4	3	9	6	7	6

2. Who files your personal income taxes?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
I, myself, do	54	22	13	17	7	7	8	9
My employer does	5	44	47	50	46	44	43	43
No one does		6	6	7	13	13	12	12
Somebody else does	19		4	6	6	8	9	7
I don't have to pay taxes	19	6	24	16	17	19	20	18
Other situation	3	22
Difficult to answer	1	2	6	5	11	9	8	10

3. Are there many dishonest people who work in the tax service?

Russian Tax Officials Survey 2011: In present conditions is it difficult for tax service co-workers always to work honestly?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, there are many dishonest tax service employees	21	23	42	35	52	53	55	47	14
No, there are few dishonest tax service employees	43	53	25	32	20	27	21	26	81
There are no such people	2	4	2	2	1	1	1	1
Difficult to say	33	20	31	30	28	20	24	26	5

4. How, in your opinion, do the tax service employees cope with their responsibilities – excellent, good, fair, bad or very bad?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Excellent	2	2	3	2	2	2	1
Good	26	33	15	19	15	16	14
Satisfactorily	27	35	29	42	34	40	35
Bad	17	10	14	9	16	12	17
Very bad	4	3	5	3	4	3	4
Difficult to answer	24	16	33	25	29	27	30

5. Do you think the taxpayers who have had to deal with tax service employees are satisfied or not satisfied with how tax service employees talked and interacted with them?

	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Taxpayers are satisfied	17	21	23
Taxpayers are not satisfied	37	34	34
Difficult to Answer	46	45	43

6. During the past five years, have you had business with employees of the tax service?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Yes	49	38	23	24	15	12	11	19
No	50	61	73	75	82	85	85	79
Difficult to say	1	2	4	1	4	3	4	3

7. What was your impression of the individual contact you had with the tax service employees?

(For those saying ‘Yes’ in question #6.)

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Positive	51	50	30	37	27	30	28	31
Neutral	30	32	38	34	35	38	40	36
Negative	19	17	29	27	31	30	31	32
Difficult to say	0	1	3	2	6	2	2	1

8. Were you satisfied with the results of your meeting with the tax service employees?

(For those saying ‘Yes’ in question #6.)

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Satisfied	76	79	58	66	47	52	56	49
Not satisfied	23	17	33	31	40	41	37	44
Difficult to say	1	4	10	3	13	7	7	6

9. Were you satisfied by how the tax service employees spoke with and treated you?

(For those saying ‘Yes’ in question #6.)

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Satisfied	77	75	63	67	49	54	56	52
Not satisfied	22	21	34	29	41	40	40	42
Difficult to say	1	4	3	4	11	6	4	6

10. Are the procedures and basis of the tax service understandable to you?

(Poland 2010, Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 Surveys: Only asked of those who answered yes to Question #6.)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	48	58	49	24
No	48	38	47	55
Difficult to answer	4	4	5	22

11. Can one always count on the assistance of bureaucrats in the tax office?

(Poland 2010, Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 Surveys: Only asked of those who answered yes to Question #6.)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	64	36	31	25
No	31	54	63	44
Difficult to answer	5	10	7	32

12. Does contact with the tax service take up a lot of time?

(Poland 2010, Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 Surveys: Only asked of those who answered yes to Question #6.)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	37	73	75	37
No	62	23	20	16
Difficult to answer	1	4	5	37

13. Do many or few people evade taxes in your country?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Many	69	65	77	67	70	69	69	72	74
Few	17	21	8	18	14	21	16	16	21
There are no such people	1		0	1	1	0	1	1	0
Difficult to answer	13	14	15	15	16	10	14	11	4

14. What do you think encourages people more to pay taxes: a sense of civic responsibility or fear of punishment for evasion?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
A sense of civic responsibility	27	22	36	40	38	35	40
A fear of punishment	69	73	49	52	49	54	50
Difficult to answer	5	5	15	8	14	11	11

15. Some people believe that tax evasion is unacceptable in any case. Others believe that there are situations in which it is permissible to evade taxes. With which opinion – the first or the second – do you agree?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
With the first	49	53	30	53	47	53	48
With the second	37	35	50	34	33	30	34
Difficult to answer	14	12	20	14	20	17	18

16. Is it possible that you would evade taxes if you were sure that you could get away with it?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	53	47	40	45	34	38	29	39	14
No	34	45	38	40	40	43	47	41	81
Difficult to say	14	8	22	15	26	19	24	20	5

17. Is it possible that you could avoid paying taxes if you knew for sure that you would not receive a serious punishment?

(Ukraine 2005: Is it possible that you could avoid paying taxes if you knew for sure that you would not have to go to jail and would not have to pay a large fine?)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	44	42	30	35	28	36	14
No	49	40	43	47	47	42	81
Difficult to say	8	17	29	19	26	22	4

18. Do you pay taxes only because you know that you will be punished by the state if you don't?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Yes	55	47	38	44	35	43
No	37	39	40	41	43	40
Difficult to say	8	14	22	16	22	17

19. Is it possible that you could avoid paying taxes, if you were sure, that there would be no punishment, but your friends, acquaintances and co-workers would know and wouldn't approve?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	40	36	24	30	25	32	9
No	50	46	45	50	48	45	84
Difficult to say	10	19	31	20	27	23	6

20. Would a majority of people avoid paying taxes, if they thought that they would not receive any punishment?

	Poland 2004	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	88	71	75	63	66	65	73
No	6	14	15	19	21	18	25
Difficult to say	6	15	10	19	14	14	2

21. Should a citizen always follow the tax laws, even if s/he considers them to be unfair?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
A citizen should always follow the tax laws	79	81	71	74	57	64	59	61	91
A citizen should not always follow the tax laws	14	12	17	18	28	24	25	25	7
Difficult to say	7	7	12	8	15	12	16	14	2

22. Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I would follow the tax laws	83	77	53	52	36	44	39	45	75
No, I would not follow the tax laws	6	15	28	30	37	37	36	34	22
Difficult to say	10	18	19	18	27	20	25	22	3

23. Would a majority of taxpayers follow the tax laws even if they did not consider them to be fair?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes									63
No									31
Difficult to say									5

24. Are you confident that the tax service would never try to take more money from you than it should?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Yes	56	40	33	27	24	24
No	31	40	35	51	48	50
Difficult to say	14	20	32	22	28	26

25. How do you suppose, does the ordinary citizen have a possibility to defend his or her interests before the co-workers of the tax service or does he or she not have such a possibility?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	34	37	35	33	20	19
No	53	43	45	45	60	56
Difficult to say	13	19	20	22	20	26

26. Are the tax laws in your country fair?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	21	32	19	16	12	72
No	62	45	61	63	68	18
Difficult to Say	14	23	21	21	20	10

27. Is your country's tax system simple or complicated?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Simple	18	18	13	7	19
Complicated	72	57	67	70	77
Difficult to Say	10	25	20	23	4

28. If the state does not fulfil its obligations to its citizens, then is tax evasion justified?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	40	44	60	52	47	51	48	23
No	44	44	23	33	31	33	35	69
Difficult to Say	16	12	18	14	21	16	17	7

29. Do you feel that when you pay taxes, the money is returned to you and your close ones through government expenditures?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	45	43	15	41	41
No	46	43		42	40
No answer	9	14		17	19
No/no answer			85

30. Do you feel that when you pay taxes, honestly earned wages are seized from you?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	60		52	19	41	41
No	32		30		40	37
No answer	8		18		19	22
No/no answer		.		81

31. Do you feel that when you pay taxes, you are supporting those who need such money more?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	49	45	14	44	45
No	42	39		40	35
No answer	9	15		15	19
No/no answer			86

32. When you pay taxes, are you proud to be a part of the financial power of the state?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	43	40	12	35	32
No	48	40		45	45
Difficult to answer	10	19		20	23
No/no answer			88

33. When you pay taxes, do you think that all the money will be stolen by bureaucrats anyway?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	39	52	22	52	55
No	52	30		28	24
Difficult to answer	9	18		20	21
No/no answer			76

34. When you pay taxes, do you think that while taxpayers' money is not stolen, it is not distributed as you would like?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Yes	70	61	22	60	53
No	19	19		21	23
Difficult to answer	11	20		19	23
No/no answer			78

35. How satisfied are you with how the state spends taxpayers’ money?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Satisfied	18	18	9	6
Not satisfied	70	61	75	77
Difficult to say	12	21	17	17

36. What is the personal income tax (PIT) rate in your country today?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015
Correct answer^*	22	38	46	9	10	13	13
I don't know	63	21	52	39	73	68	68
Incorrect answer	16	5	3	30	16	20	8
Difficult to say	0	11	0	28	0	0	12
No response		24

^* 13% for Russia in 2004 and 2010 and for Ukraine in 2005. 15% for Ukraine in 2010 and 2012. Either 15% or 20% for Ukraine in 2015 (15% for monthly income not exceeding 10 minimum salaries (UAH 12,180) and 20% for income that exceeds that amount.) For Poland in 2010, responses of 18, 19 or 32% or a combination thereof were considered ‘correct,’ as PIT is progressive with an individual rate of 18% or 32%. Individuals also can choose, under certain conditions, to pay a flat rate of 19% on business income.

37. What is the value-added tax (VAT) rate in your country today?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Correct answer^*	34	12	32	23
I don't know	45	74	63	61
Incorrect answer	22	13	5	5
Difficult to say		0	0	11
No response

^* In 2010, it was 22% in Poland, 18% in Russia and 20% Ukraine. In 2015 it was also 20% in Ukraine.

38. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the personal income tax on individuals?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Need to increase	1	3	2	1
Don't need to modify	30	38	21	15
Need to reduce	48	38	44	52
Need to cancel outright	7	6	6	8
I don't know this tax	6	2	5	6
Difficult to answer	8	13	21	19

39. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the company payroll charges?

(Poland 2010 Survey: ‘Company contributions to social, pension and medical insurance (ZUS)’; Russian 2010 Survey: ‘Company deductions for social, pension and health insurance.’)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Need to increase	7	29	7	6
Don't need to modify	34	40	20	17
Need to reduce	41	12	40	44
Need to cancel outright	6	2	4	6
I don't know this tax	3	2	7	7
Difficult to answer	9	15	22	21

40. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the single tax for individual entrepreneurs?

(Poland 2010 Survey: ‘Uniform tax for individuals engaged in economic activities (PIT 5L).’)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Need to increase	3	15	9	7
Don't need to modify	32	36	27	21
Need to reduce	29	18	32	37
Need to cancel outright	3	2	3	4
I don't know this tax	20	5	6	8
Difficult to answer	13	24	23	23

41. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the corporate income tax (CIT)?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Need to increase	11	18	12	12
Don't need to modify	30	37	21	20
Need to reduce	19	14	31	33
Need to cancel outright	3	2	3	4
I don't know this tax	24	4	8	7
Difficult to answer	13	26	25	25

42. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the value-added tax (VAT)?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Need to increase	1	3	2	1
Don't need to modify	29	31	16	14
Need to reduce	53	23	37	45
Need to cancel outright	6	7	15	15
I don't know this tax	4	6	7	3
Difficult to answer	6	30	23	21

43. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Need to increase	28	37	26	23
Don't need to modify	33	30	22	23
Need to reduce	26	14	28	29
Need to cancel outright	5	3	6	6
I don't know this tax	3	3	3	2
Difficult to answer	7	13	15	17

44. Do you trust the president?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2004	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	56	43	54	63	29	37	18	70
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't		27	29	23	50	45	53	20
No, I don't trust	37	27	13	12	17	16	26	5
Difficult to answer	7	4	4	2	5	3	4	4

45. Do you trust parliament?

(Poland: ‘Sejm’; Russia: ‘State Duma’; Ukraine: ‘Verkhovna Rada.’)

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	17	25	26	16	24	7	55
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't		32	31	64	55	56	27
No, I don't trust	71	40	36	14	18	35	12
Difficult to answer	12	3	7	6	3	3	6

46. Do you trust the upper house of parliament?

(Poland: ‘Senate’; Russia: ‘Federation Council.’)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	31	33	59
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	29	30	23
No, I don't trust	35	21	9
Difficult to answer	5	15	9

47. Do you trust the government?

	Poland 2004	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	21	28	42	18	28	7	62
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't		32	33	36	29	24	23
No, I don't trust	70	37	19	37	39	66	9
Difficult to answer		3	6	8	4	1	6

48. Do you trust the head of the government (premier)?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	34	62	70
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	27	22	20
No, I don't trust	36	13	6
Difficult to answer	3	3	4

49. Do you trust the procuracy?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	33	26	13	6	60
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	26	29	25	19	24
No, I don't trust	29	31	50	69	10
Difficult to Answer	12	14	11	6	6

50. Do you trust the police?

(Poland 2010 Survey: ‘Policja’; Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 and 2015 Surveys: ‘Militsiya’; Russian Tax Officials Survey: ‘Politsiya’)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	44	19	13	8	50
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	28	30	26	23	28
No, I don't trust	24	44	53	64	16
Difficult to answer	3	8	7	6	6

51. Do you trust the state apparatus (bureaucrats)?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	30	11	9	4	53
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	37	27	27	20	29
No, I don't trust	29	51	56	70	12
Difficult to answer	4	10	7	5	6

52. Do you trust the courts?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	41	25	11	6	58
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	27	31	23	17	27
No, I don't trust	26	32	55	72	9
Difficult to answer	6	13	10	5	6

53. Do you trust the regional (oblast, wojewod) state administration?

(Russia 2010 Survey: ‘Leader of your oblast (krai, republic).’)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, I trust	29	42	11	60
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't	29	33	32	24
No, I don't trust	21	19	45	11
Difficult to answer	21	6	12	5

54. How often do you think the government does the right thing?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
Always, almost always	18	26	10	6
Sometimes	62	52	49	43
Almost never, never	15	13	34	34
Difficult to answer	5	10	8	7

55. Does your state fulfil its obligations to its citizens?

(Ukraine 2005: Does your government fulfil its obligations to its citizens?)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	21	24	9	10	12	6	47
Sometimes yes, sometimes no	50	44	35	35	29	29	37
No	26	27	50	52	54	60	14
Difficult to say	4	5	5	3	5	4	2

56. Do you think you can trust your state to do what is right?

(Ukraine 2005: Do you think you can trust your government to do what is right?)

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2005	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	21	26	9	10	11	6	50
Sometimes yes, sometimes no	50	52	32	49	40	43	31
No	26	13	51	34	43	44	7
Difficult to say	4	10	8	8	7	7	11

57. Does the state relate to all citizens in an equal, fair manner?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	21	20	15	15	7	51
No	75	73	81	79	87	45
Difficult to say	4	7	5	7	6	4

58. Does the state protect you?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2012	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	43	42	28	28	23	71
No	43	48	64	63	68	21
Difficult to say	13	10	8	10	9	8

59. Does the state fight against corruption well, poorly or not at all?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015	Russian tax officials 2011
Well	27	17	10	5	47
Poorly	46	51	54	56	34
Not at all	15	23	28	34	10
Difficult to say	12	9	8	4	9

60. How would you assess the current political system in your country? Give your answer on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘7,’ where ‘1’ means that the political system is very bad, and ‘7’ – very good.

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2010	Ukraine 2015
1	11	8	12	27
2	10	8	17	20
3	19	17	24	22
4	35	33	23	15
5	16	16	10	6
6	5	7	6	2
7	1	3	2	1
Difficult to answer	4	9	8	8

61. Generally speaking, do you think the events in your country are developing in the right or wrong direction?

	Poland 2010	Russia 2010	Ukraine 2015
In the right direction	35	48	16
In the wrong direction	51	32	68
Difficult to answer	15	20	17

Appendix II: Russian Public Officials Survey of Tax and Social Welfare Bureaucrats, 2011

In Russia, the Public Opinion Foundation carried out this survey, designed by this author, from 10 August to 25 October 2011, of 1,015 public officials, of whom 39.5 per cent were tax officials. Also surveyed were those working in the government services responsible for childcare benefits (20.9 per cent of those surveyed), unemployment benefits (19.8 per cent) and registration of property (19.8 per cent.)

With respect to the status of the officials, 20–30 per cent were federal officials, heads of regional offices and their deputies or heads of city departments or their deputies, and 70–80 per cent were officials of middle and lower units.

All survey responses are rounded to the closest per cent.

blank = not asked

1. Has the tax pressure on business over the last two to three years on average increased, decreased or not changed?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Increased	31
Decreased	33
Not Changed	23
Difficult to Say	13

2. If an enterprise were to fulfil all the demands of the tax organs, would it be ruined?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	22
No	71
Difficult to Say	7

3. Are inspectors unable to ‘catch out’ those who fail to comply with the requirements of the tax organs?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, they are unable	32
No, they are able	63
Difficult to say	5

4. Is the job of the tax inspectors to replenish the budget at any cost?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	48
No	48
Difficult to say	3

5. Can anyone easily hide his or her income?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Yes	31
No	63
Difficult to say	6

6. With which enterprises, agencies have you most of all had work over the past year?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Small enterprises	38
State agencies	27
Medium-sized, private enterprises	43
Large, private enterprises	26
State enterprises	18
Other	11
I did not have work with enterprises, agencies	9
Difficult to say	1

7. According to which indicators is your work assessed?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Amount of fines, penalties collected	21
Quantity of on-site inspections conducted (considering the size of the enterprise)	20
Effectiveness of on-site inspections conducted	31
Quantity of in-office inspections (desk audits) conducted (considering the size of the enterprise)	20
Effectiveness of in-office inspections (desk audits) conducted	31
Quantity of violations uncovered	30
Quantity of cases opened (prosecutions) regarding administrative violations	14
Amount of taxes collected	44
Another Indicator	29
Difficult to say	11

8. To what extent do these factors reduce the effectiveness of your organization in collecting taxes?

	Russian tax officials 2011
Poor awareness among businesses about the rules and procedures of taxation
Significantly reduces	28
Insignificantly reduces	44
Does not reduce	18
Difficult to say	9
Dishonesty of business in dealing with your organization
Significantly reduces	55
Insignificantly reduces	27
Does not reduce	7
Difficult to say	10

9. Generally, according to which standards is your professional activity assessed? (Any number of answers.)

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Number of fulfilled tasks given by superiors	54	45	51	59	52
Number of documents processed	50	48	42	66	51
Number of clients/visitors served	27	44	43	35	35
Quality of administrative services provided	46	60	61	44	51
Positive evaluations by citizens, clients, visitors	42	54	41	44	45
Timeliness of fulfilled tasks	67	61	64	62	64
Other	12	1	6	2	7
Not assessed by any evaluation standard	2	2	1	2	2
Difficult to say	3	4	1	4	3

10. What methods of encouragement used for employees who excel in your organization? (Any number of answers.)

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Financial incentives, bonuses	89	71	80	76	81
Promotion	57	34	39	35	44
Announcement of gratitude	79	67	74	65	73
Other	1	3	4	3	3
No incentives exist	1	5	6	8	4
Difficult to say	1	4	0	4	2

11. From the factors listed below, please select no more than five that, in your opinion, restrict your organization from working effectively.

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Insufficient level of staffing	53	31	19	47	41
Lack of competence among personnel	18	12	13	18	16
Lack of financial resources	32	36	25	52	35
Lack of understanding among personnel of their duties and functions	3	3	5	3	4
Low salary	52	46	52	64	53
Bad management in the organization	2	6	4	0	3
Too much dependence on internal, immediately superior supervisory bodies	5	11	20	7	10
Lack of equipment and technical support	33	36	18	33	31
Lack of space	11	32	19	29	21
Contradictory instructions within the organization	5	13	16	5	9
Insufficiently quality of legislation	52	41	40	42	45
Prevalence of corruption	4	1	1	1	2
Too strict regulation of personnel's activity	6	3	9	3	6
Other	2	2	2	3	2
Nothing	10	13	14	5	11
Difficult to say	2	3	1	2	2

12. Has your organization been inspected in the last two years by representatives of any of following authorities? (Any number of answers.)

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Internal, immediately-superior supervisory bodies	88	69	84	62	78
Offices of the Public Prosecutor	58	50	72	82	64
Audit Chamber	12	25	20	9	16
Offices of Rosfinnadzor (Federal Finance Inspectorate)	6	26	43	16	20
Inspectorates or offices of finance and budget oversight of the regional administration	11	34	35	13	21
Independent audit	3	3	1	1	3
Internal audit	12	6	4	5	8
Other	1	4	5	0	3
No one	0	1	0	1	1
Difficult to say	4	9	6	7	6

13. Has anyone in your organization been penalized or sanctioned in the last two years for any of the following? (Any number of answers.)

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Unsuitability for the position being occupied	6	3	2	7	5
Non-fulfilment or violation of duties	47	24	30	46	39
Overstepping one's official authority	2	1	1	3	2
Taking bribes	3	0	0	7	3
Other	2	2	3	2	2
No one has been	29	61	52	30	40
Difficult to say	18	10	13	19	16

14. In the organization where I work, all citizens who request services are treated equally.

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Agree	94	89	92	92	92
Disagree	6	8	6	7	7
Difficult to say	0	2	0	0	1

15. The majority of citizens understand how decisions are made in the organization in which I work and in which their requests are reviewed.

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Yes	79	76	88	86	81
No	16	20	9	8	14
Difficult to say	4	4	2	5	4

16. Has the quality of government services provided by your organization increased or decreased over the past five years?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Increased	90	87	86	83	87
Remained the same	5	7	10	10	8
Decreased	2	2	1	1	2

17. How has the level of professionalism of the co-workers of your organization changed over the past five years?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Increased/more operatively	82	66	83	78	78
Remained the same	8	18	8	12	11
Decreased/less operatively	5	10	4	3	5
Difficult to say	6	5	5	7	6

18. What is your job position?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Head of the institution (organization, agency)	5	4	13	8	7
Deputy head of the institution (organization, agency)	19	11	15	13	15
Head of department (or other structural government division) of an institution (organization, agency)	18	25	22	25	22
Deputy head of department (or of a structural unit) of an institution (organizations, agency)	10	10	5	3	8
Assistant (advisor, consultant) of the head of the institution (organization, agency)	0	2	0	3	1
Chief specialist-expert	3	12	4	14	7
Leading specialist-expert	4	10	16	12	9
Specialist-expert	3	10	4	8	6
Chief state inspector	10	0	0	0	4
Senior state inspector	9	0	1	0	4
State inspector	8	0	2	2	4
Senior specialist (specialist 1st category)	6	6	4	4	5
Specialist (specialist 2nd or 3rd category)	3	5	2	5	4
Other position	1	2	8	2	3
Difficult to say	0	0	0	0	0

19. Do you have official job regulations? And if so, are they clear and understandable?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Absolutely unclear, unintelligible	2	1	1	1	2
Largely unclear, unintelligible	1	1	1	1	1
Mostly clear, understandable	26	25	32	26	27
Absolutely clear and understandable	70	70	58	67	67
No official job regulations	0	2	6	2	2
Difficult to say	1	0	1	2	1

20. To what extent is your activity regulated?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Absolutely not regulated	0	0	1	0	0
Largely not regulated	1	2	1	2	2
Mostly regulated	43	50	49	45	46
Absolutely everything is regulated	55	45	44	50	50
Difficult to say	1	2	4	3	2

21. In your opinion, how well developed are the mechanisms for responding to citizen complaints about violations in your office's work?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Weakly	3	4	5	4	4
Strongly	93	89	90	87	90
Difficult to say	4	6	5	9	6

22. Indicate which of the following factors influence your decision to work in the public sector, to be public servants. Choose the most significant factors. (Choose up to five responses.)

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Stable employment	79	78	79	75	78
High level of wages	5	5	8	16	8
Social benefits (health care, availability of pre-school facilities, etc.)	24	17	25	20	22
Flexible working hours	2	3	2	3	3
Balance workload	9	19	17	14	13
Good opportunities for personal development	35	36	27	26	32
High social status and prestige	17	16	7	14	14
Power, wide authorities	1	1	0	1	1
Lack of other employment opportunities	11	14	17	14	13
Personal interest and job satisfaction	36	39	46	44	40
Attractiveness of the goals and objectives of the organization	23	18	24	23	22
Possibility of obtaining additional income	0	1	1	0	1
Good team relations	45	48	49	50	47
Provision of housing and/or service car	1	2	0	0	1
Possibility of taking a high position in business in future	2	4	0	1	2
Possibility of being promoted to the state service (as a career post)	28	27	11	22	23
Acquisition of personal connections	5	6	5	3	5
Continuing family tradition	2	2	2	1	2
Other	2	3	3	1	3
Difficult to say	1	2	0	3	1

23. Do you trust the state apparatus (bureaucrats)?

	Russian tax officials 2011	Russian childcare officials 2011	Russian unemployment officials 2011	Russian registry officials 2011	All Russian officials 2011
Yes, I trust	53	57	40	38	48
Sometimes I trust, sometimes I don't trust	29	25	31	38	30
No, I don't trust	12	11	25	15	15
Difficult to say	6	7	4	9	6

Appendix III: Suggested Minimal Tax Compliance Levels for 2010–2015 Surveys

Poland 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

		Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?
		No	Yes
Are the tax laws in your country fair?	No	12%	60%
	No	N = 197	N = 973
	Yes	4%	24%
	Yes	N = 58	N = 395

The table suggests that at least 12 per cent of Poles in 2010 do not have intentions to comply with their country's tax laws. No Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 398 respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.

Russia 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

		Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?
		No	Yes
Are the tax laws in your country fair?	No	21%	36%
	No	N = 423	N = 717
	Yes	15%	28%
	Yes	N = 296	N = 548

The table suggests that at least 21 per cent of Russians in 2010 do not have intentions to comply with their country's tax laws. No Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 1,023 respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.

Ukraine 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

		Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?
		No	Yes
Are the tax laws in your country fair?	No	37%	38%
	No	N = 998	N = 1004
	Yes	15%	10%
	Yes	N = 406	N = 259

The table suggests that at least 37 per cent of Ukrainians in 2010 do not have intentions to comply with their country's tax laws. No Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 1,348 respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.

Ukraine 2012 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

		Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?
		No	Yes
Are the tax laws in your country fair?	No	42%	36%
	No	N = 534	N = 458
	Yes	7%	14%
	Yes	N = 94	N = 177

The table suggests that at least 42 per cent of Ukrainians in 2012 do not have intentions to comply with their country's tax laws. No Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 745 respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.

Ukraine 2015 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

		Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?
		No	Yes
Are the tax laws in your country fair?	No	37%	47%
	No	N = 981	N = 1222
	Yes	6%	10%
	Yes	N = 148	N = 272

The table suggests that at least 37 per cent of Ukrainians in 2015 do not have intentions to comply with their country's tax laws. No Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 1,402 respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.

Russia 2011 Tax Officials Survey

		Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?
		No	Yes
Are the tax laws in your country fair?	No	6%	13%
	No	N = 22	N = 46
	Yes	16%	65%
	Yes	N = 56	N = 226

The table suggests that at least 6 per cent of Russians tax officials in 2011 do not have intentions to comply with their country's tax laws. No Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 37 tax official respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.

Appendix IV: Poland Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)307308

	Poland 2004 (1)	Poland 2004 (1) (Sub. Eff.)	Poland 2004 (2)	Poland 2004 (2) (Sub. Eff.)	Poland 2010 (1)	Poland 2010 (1) (Sub. Eff.)
Deterrence
Evasion OK If could get away with it	−0.27 (0.32)	−0.01	−0.27 (0.32)	−0.01	−0.38^*** (0.14)	−0.05^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹
Trusts president	−0.44 (0.44)	−0.03	−0.42 (0.35)	−0.02	0.46^** (0.18)	0.06^***
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament	−0.32 (0.68)	−0.02	−0.31 (0.68)	−0.02	−0.09 (0.20)	−0.01
Trusts government	1.83^** (0.73)	0.08^***	1.82^** (0.73)	0.08^***	0.32 (0.21)	0.04^*
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	0.04 (0.52)	0.002	0.06 (0.52)	0.002	−0.35 (0.24)	−0.05^*
Many people evade taxes	0.18 (0.50)	0.01	0.17 (0.50)	0.01	−0.29 (0.26)	−0.04
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.30 (0.29)	0.02	0.28 (0.29)	0.02	−0.07 (0.13)	−0.01
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	−0.0005^** (0.0002)	−0.02^**	−0.0006^** (0.0002)	−0.03^***	−0.02 (0.036)	0.03
I file my income taxes myself	0.23 (0.30)	0.01	0.20 (0.30)	0.01	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.01^*
Occupation²			0.70 (0.63)	0.03
Male	−0.50^* (0.27)	−0.03^**	−0.53^* (0.28)	−0.03^**	−0.16^** (0.063)	−0.02^***
Age	0.001 (0.008)	0.002	0.001 (0.008)	0.003	−0.006 (0.004)	−0.03^**
Education	0.73 (0.57)	0.04^*	0.53 (0.59)	0.03	−0.42^* (0.25)	−0.05^*
Constant	2.42^*** (0.80)	–	2.48^*** (0.79)	–	2.60^*** (0.39)	–
N	886	886	886	886	1,861	1,861
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01 See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are changes in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables held even at their mean.

¹ The Trust in the State Scale for the Poland 2010 survey is a composite of trust in the president, the prime minister, the Sejm, the Senate and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and trust in the state to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.

² 2004: specialists, managers, self-employed; 2010: white-collar workers, owners.

	Poland 2010 (2)	Poland 2010 (2) (Sub. Eff.)	Poland 2010 (3)	Poland 2010 (3) (Sub. Eff.)	Poland 2010 (4)	Poland 2010 (4) (Sub. Eff.)
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.39^*** (0.14)	−0.05^***	−0.38^*** (0.14)	−0.05^***	−0.38^*** (0.14)	−0.05^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹			0.29^*** (0.08)	0.04^***	0.29^*** (0.08)	0.04^***
Trusts president	0.46^*** (0.18)	0.06^***
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament	−0.09 (0.20)	−0.02
Trusts government	0.31 (0.21)	0.04^*
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.35 (0.24)	−0.05^*	−0.33 (0.24)	−0.05^*	−0.33 (0.24)	−0.04
Many people evade taxes	−0.29 (0.26)	−0.04	−0.25 (0.26)	−0.03	−0.25 (0.26)	−0.03
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.08 (0.13)	−0.009	−0.05 (0.13)	−0.007	−0.06 (0.13)	−0.007
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	−0.02 (0.04)	0.03	−0.02 (0.04)	0.03	−0.02 (0.04)	0.03
I file my income taxes myself	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.01^**	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.01^*	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.01^*
Occupation²	0.19 (0.17)	0.02			0.18 (0.17)	0.02
Male	−0.15^** (0.06)	−0.02^***	−0.15^** (0.06)	−0.02^***	−0.15^** (0.06)	−0.02^**
Age	−0.007 (0.004)	−0.03^**	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.02	−0.006 (0.004)	−0.03^*
Education	−0.56^** (0.28)	−0.08^**	−0.38^* (0.25)	−0.06^*	−0.52^* (0.28)	−0.07^**
Constant	2.65^*** (0.40)	–	2.84^*** (0.38)	–	2.89^*** (0.38)	–
N	1,861	1,861	1,861	1,861	1,861	1,861
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Note: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

¹ The Trust in the State Scale for the Poland 2010 survey is a composite of trust in the president, the prime minister, the Sejm, the Senate and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and trust in the state to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.

² 2004: specialists, managers, self-employed; 2010: white-collar workers, owners.

Appendix V: Russia Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)310311

	Russia 2004 (1)	Russia 2004 Sub. Eff. (1)	Russia 2004 (2)	Russia 2004 Sub. Eff. (2)	Russia 2010 (1)	Russia 2010 (1) Sub. Eff.	Russia 2010 (2)	Russia 2010 (2) Sub. Eff.	Russia 2010 (3)	Russia 2010 (3) Sub. Eff.
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.97^*** (0.12)	−0.22^***	−0.97^*** (0.12)	−0.22^***	−0.30^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***	−0.30^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***	−0.31^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹
Trusts president	0.58^*** (0.19)	0.13^***	0.58^*** (0.19)	0.13^***					0.11 (0.17)	0.03
Trusts prime minister					0.29^* (0.15)	0.07^**	0.29^* (0.15)	0.07^**
Trusts parliament
Trusts government
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.70^*** (0.21)	−0.15^***	−0.69^*** (0.21)	−0.15^***	−0.61^*** (0.17)	−0.14^***	−0.62^*** (0.17)	−0.14^***	−0.63^*** (0.17)	−0.14^***
Many people evade taxes	0.22 (0.24)	0.05	0.21 (0.24)	0.05	−0.25 (0.17)	−0.06^*	−0.25 (0.17)	−0.06^*	−0.26 (0.17)	−0.06^*
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.19 (0.13)	0.04^*	0.18 (0.13)	0.04^*	0.14 (0.12)	0.03	0.13 (0.10)	0.03^*	0.14 (0.12)	0.03
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.00003 (0.00003)	0.05	0.00003 (0.00003)	0.04	0.002 (0.0014)	0.005	−0.003 (0.014)	−0.01	0.003 (0.0015)	0.001
I file my income taxes myself	0.20 (0.16)	0.04^*	0.21 (0.16)	0.04^*	0.11 (0.12)	0.03	0.11 (0.12)	0.02	0.11 (0.12)	0.02
Occupation (directors, specialists)			0.07 (0.19)	0.01			0.02 (0.21)	0.002
Male	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.004	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.005	−0.18^** (0.09)	−0.04^**	−0.18^** (0.09)	−0.04^**	−0.19^** (0.09)	−0.04^**
Age	0.01^*** (0.003)	0.08^***	0.01^*** (0.003)	0.08^***	0.006^** (0.003)	0.05^**	0.006^** (0.003)	0.05^***	0.006^** (0.003)	0.05^**
Education	0.38 (0.23)	0.09^*	0.36 (0.24)	0.08^*	0.22 (0.22)	0.05	0.23 (0.23)	0.05	0.20 (0.22)	0.04
Constant	0.20 (0.36)	–	0.21 (0.36)	–	0.68^*** (0.26)	–	0.69^** (0.27)	–	0.82^*** (0.27)	–
N	1,637	1,637	1,637	1,637	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their mean.

¹ The Trust in the State Scale for the Russia 2010 survey includes trust in the president, prime minister, parliament (State Duma) and government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.

	Russia 2010 (4)	Russia 2010 (4) Sub. Eff	Russia 2010 (5)	Russia 2010 (5) Sub. Eff.	Russia 2010 (6)	Russia 2010 (6) Sub. Eff	Russia 2010 (7)	Russia 2010 (7) Sub. Eff	Russia 2010 (8)	Russia 2010 (8) Sub. Eff
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.31^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***	−0.30^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***	−0.30^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***	−0.29^*** (0.09)	−0.07^***	−0.29^*** (0.09)	−0.06^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹							0.16^*** (0.06)	0.03^***	0.15^*** (0.06)	0.03^***
Trusts president	0.11 (0.17)	0.03	−0.51^* (0.27)	−0.12^**	−0.51^* (0.27)	−0.11^**
Trusts prime minister			0.41^* (0.25)	0.10^**	0.41^* (0.25)	0.10^*
Trusts parliament			0.54^*** (0.19)	0.12^***	0.54^*** (0.19)	0.12^***
Trusts government
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.63^*** (0.17)	−0.15^***	−0.60^*** (0.17)	−0.14^***	−0.60^*** (0.17)	−0.14^***	−0.59^*** (0.17)	−0.14^***	−0.59^*** (0.17)	−0.13^***
Many people evade	−0.25 (0.17)	−0.06^**	−0.21 (0.17)	−0.05^*	−0.21 (0.17)	−0.05	−0.21 (0.17)	−0.04	−0.21 (0.17)	−0.05
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.13 (0.10)	0.03	0.15 (0.12)	0.03^*	0.14 (0.10)	0.03^*	0.13 (0.12)	0.03	0.14 (0.10)	0.03^*
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	−0.002 (0.014)	−0.009	0.00007 (0.001)	0.0003	−0.001 (0.01)	−0.003	−0.00007 (0.0015)	−0.0005	−0.002 (0.01)	−0.009
I file my income taxes myself	0.11 (0.12)	0.02	0.10 (0.12)	0.02	0.09 (0.12)	0.02	0.10 (0.12)	0.02	0.10 (0.12)	0.02
Occupation (directors, specialists)	0.02 (0.21)	0.001			0.002 (0.21)	0.001			0.007 (0.21)	−0.001
Male	−0.18^** (0.09)	−0.04^**	−0.17^** (0.09)	−0.04^**	−0.17^* (0.09)	−0.04^**	−0.17^** (0.09)	−0.04^**	−0.17^** (0.09)	−0.04^**
Age	0.006^** (0.003)	0.05^**	0.007^** (0.003)	0.05^***	0.007^** (0.003)	0.05^***	0.006^** (0.003)	0.05^***	0.006^** (0.003)	0.05^***
Education	0.21 (0.23)	0.05	0.21 (0.22)	0.05	0.21 (0.23)	0.05	0.23 (0.22)	0.06	0.24 (0.23)	0.06
Constant	0.83^*** (0.28)	–	0.65^** (0.28)	–	0.65^** (0.29)	–	0.81^*** (0.24)	–	0.82^*** (0.25)	–
N	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471	2,471
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable are shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

¹ The Trust in the State Scale for the Russia 2010 survey includes trust in the president, prime minister, parliament (State Duma) and government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.

Appendix VI: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)313314315

	Ukraine 2005 (1)	Ukraine 2005 (1) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2005 (2)	Ukraine 2005 (2) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2005 (3)	Ukraine 2005 (3) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2005 (4)	Ukraine 2005 (4) Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.48^*** (0.08)	−0.12^***	−0.49^*** (0.08)	−0.12^***	−0.47^*** (0.08)	−0.12^***	−0.47^*** (0.08)	−0.12^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹					0.09^** (0.04)	0.02^**	0.09^** (0.04)	0.02^**
Trusts president	0.10 (0.19)	0.03	0.14 (0.19)	0.03
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament	−0.09 (0.21)	−0.02	−0.11 (0.21)	−0.03
Trusts government	0.16 (0.25)	0.04	0.15 (0.25)	0.04
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.43^*** (0.16)	−0.11^***	−0.44^*** (0.16)	−0.11^***	−0.39^** (0.16)	−0.09^***	−0.41^*** (0.16)	−0.10^***
Many people evade taxes	0.12 (0.16)	0.03	0.13 (0.16)	0.03	0.11 (0.16)	0.03	0.12 (0.16)	0.03
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.06 (0.11)	−0.02	−0.04 (0.11)	−0.01	−0.11 (0.11)	−0.03	−0.08 (0.11)	−0.02
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.51^** (0.22)	0.05^**	0.54^** (0.22)	0.05^***	0.46^** (0.22)	0.04^**	0.49^** (0.22)	0.05^**
I file my income taxes myself	−0.32^** (0.15)	−0.08^**	−0.26 (0.16)	−0.07^**	−0.26^* (0.15)	−0.06^**	−0.19 (0.16)	−0.05
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)			−0.24 (0.18)	−0.06			−0.26 (0.18)	−0.06^*
Male	−0.10 (0.08)	−0.03	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.02	−0.06 (0.08)	−0.02	−0.05 (0.08)	−0.01
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.02	0.002 (0.002)	0.02	0.002 (0.002)	0.02	0.002 (0.002)	0.02
Education	0.34^** (0.18)	0.08^**	0.37^** (0.19)	0.09^***	0.42^** (0.18)	0.11^***	0.46^** (0.18)	0.11^***
Constant	−0.08 (0.24)	–	−0.11 (0.24)	–	−0.03 (0.23)	–	−0.06 (0.23)	–
N	2,891	2,891	2,873	2,873	2,891	2,891	2,873	2,873
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their mean.

¹ The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president, parliament and government and of trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.

	Ukraine 2010 (1)	Ukraine 2010 (1) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2010 (2)	Ukraine 2010 (2) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2010 (3)	Ukraine 2010 (3) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2010 (4)	Ukraine 2010 (4) Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.03^*	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.03^*	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.03^*	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.03^*
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹					0.32^*** (0.04)	0.08^***	0.33^*** (0.04)	0.08^***
Trusts president	0.001 (0.21)	−0.0002	0.002 (0.21)	0.001
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament	0.50^** (0.24)	0.13^***	0.51^** (0.24)	0.13^***
Trusts government	0.39 (0.26)	0.09^*	0.39 (0.26)	0.09^*
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.46^*** (0.15)	−0.11^***	−0.46^*** (0.15)	−0.11^***	−0.43^*** (0.15)	−0.10^***	−0.43^*** (0.15)	−0.10^***
Many people evade taxes	0.12 (0.15)	0.03	0.11 (0.15)	0.03	0.11 (0.15)	0.03	0.12 (0.15)	0.03
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.15 (0.11)	−0.04^*	−0.18 (0.12)	−0.04^*	−0.14 (0.11)	−0.04^*	−0.17 (0.12)	−0.04^*
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.21 (0.32)	0.05	0.23 (0.32)	0.05	0.19 (0.32)	0.05	0.21 (0.32)	0.05
I file my income taxes myself	−0.06^** (0.024)	−0.01^***	−0.06^** (0.024)	−0.01^***	−0.06^** (0.02)	−0.01^***	−0.06^** (0.02)	−0.01^***
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)			0.13 (0.17)	0.03			0.12 (0.17)	0.03
Male	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.007	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.008	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.005	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.006
Age	0.0009 (0.002)	0.008	0.0009 (0.002)	0.008	0.0007 (0.002)	0.006	0.0008 (0.002)	0.006
Education	0.16 (0.18)	0.04	0.14 (0.18)	0.04	0.17 (0.18)	0.04	0.15 (0.18)	0.04
Constant	−0.08 (0.22)	–	−0.08 (0.22)	–	0.28 (0.21)	–	0.29 (0.21)	–
N	3,221	3,221	3,212	3,212	3,221	3,221	3,212	3,212
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnote #28 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Note: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their means.

¹ The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president and parliament and in government and trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.

	Ukraine 2015 (1)	Ukraine 2015 (1) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2015 (2)	Ukraine 2015 (2) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2015 (3)	Ukraine 2015 (3) Sub. Effects	Ukraine 2015 (4)	Ukraine 2015 (4) Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.40^*** (0.08)	−0.10^***	−0.39^*** (0.08)	−0.09^***	−0.40^*** (0.08)	−0.10^***	−0.39^*** (0.08)	−0.10^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale¹			0.21^*** (0.05)	0.05^***			0.21^*** (0.05)	0.05^***
Trusts president	0.74^*** (0.20)	0.18^***			0.74^*** (0.20)	0.18^***
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament	−0.37 (0.28)	−0.09^*			−0.36 (0.28)	−0.09
Trusts government	0.23 (0.26)	0.05			0.22 (0.26)	0.05
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.43^*** (0.14)	−0.11^***	−0.42^*** (0.14)	−0.10^***	−0.45^*** (0.14)	−0.11^***	−0.44^*** (0.14)	−0.11^***
Many people evade taxes	0.69^*** (0.15)	0.17^***	0.71^*** (0.15)	0.17^***	0.68^*** (0.15)	0.17^***	0.71^*** (0.15)	0.17^***
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.03 (0.10)	0.006	0.03 (0.10)	0.006	0.02 (0.10)	0.004	0.02 (0.10)	0.004
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.44^* (0.25)	0.10^**	0.45^* (0.25)	0.11^**	0.43^* (0.25)	0.10^*	0.44^* (0.25)	0.10^**
I file my income taxes myself	0.08 (0.13)	0.02	0.08 (0.13)	0.02	0.06 (0.14)	0.02	0.06 (0.14)	0.01
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)					−0.007 (0.19)	−0.004	0.006 (0.19)	0.002
Male	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.02	−0.08 (0.07)	−0.02	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.02	−0.08 (0.07)	−0.02
Age	0.004^* (0.002)	0.04^**	0.005^** (0.002)	0.04^**	0.005^** (0.002)	0.04^**	0.005^** (0.002)	0.04
Education	0.09 (0.18)	0.02	0.09 (0.18)	0.02	0.11 (0.18)	0.03	0.11 (0.18)	0.02
Constant	−0.36 (0.22)	–	−0.18 (0.21)	–	−0.35 (0.22)	–	−0.18 (0.21)	–
N	3,157	3,157	3,157	3,157	3,134	3,134	3,134	3,134
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their means.

¹ The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president, in parliament and in government and trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.

Appendix VII: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys – By Region Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered to Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)317318319320321322323324325

	Catholic Ukraine 2005	Catholic Ukraine 2005 Sub. Effects	Non-Catholic Ukraine 2005	Non-Catholic Ukraine 2005 Sub. Effects	West Ukraine 2005	West Ukraine 2005 Sub. Effects	Far West 2005	Far West 2005 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.54^* (0.29)	−0.13^**	−0.46^*** (0.09)	−0.12^***	−0.38^** (0.18)	−0.10^**	−1.02^*** (0.25)	−0.25^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−0.84 (0.76)	−0.16	0.05 (0.20)	0.01	−0.12 (0.43)	−0.03	−1.82^*** (0.60)	−0.41^***
Trusts parliament	2.68^*** (0.82)	0.54^***	−0.27 (0.22)	−0.07^*	1.20^** (0.47)	0.29^***	1.83^*** (0.63)	0.41^***
Trusts government	−1.43 (0.99)	−0.30^*	0.25 (0.26)	0.06	−0.39 (0.57)	−0.10	−0.11 (0.78)	−0.03
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	0.17 (0.59)	0.05	−0.52^*** (0.17)	−0.13^***	−0.38 (0.33)	−0.09	0.29 (0.45)	0.06
Many people evade taxes	−0.57 (0.68)	−0.11	0.16 (0.17)	0.04	0.55 (0.38)	0.13^*	0.62 (0.52)	0.15
Contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.40 (0.50)	0.08	−0.06 (0.11)	−0.01	−0.05 (0.26)	−0.01	0.26 (0.38)	0.06
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	−1.30 (0.80)	−0.11^*	0.66^*** (0.23)	0.06^***	−0.20 (0.47)	−0.02	−0.59 (0.61)	−0.06
I file my income taxes myself	−0.70 (0.57)	−0.16	−0.29^* (0.15)	−0.07^**	−0.28 (0.32)	−0.07	−0.45 (0.42)	−0.10
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.27 (0.26)	−0.06	−0.09 (0.08)	−0.02	−0.28^* (0.16)	−0.07^**	−0.29 (0.21)	−0.07^*
Age	−0.01 (0.009)	−0.10^*	0.003 (0.002)	0.03^*	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.03	−0.004 (0.007)	−0.03
Education	−0.52 (0.68)	−0.11	0.36^* (0.19)	0.09^***	−0.17 (0.39)	−0.04	−0.69 (0.51)	−0.16^*
Constant	2.59^** (1.01)	–	−0.18 (0.25)	–	0.14 (0.58)	–	0.95 (0.77)	–
N	279	279	2618	2618	643	643	417	417
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	47.37	–	34.57	–	36.43	–	37.18	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	Far West Catholic 2005	Far West Catholic 2005 Sub. Effects	Far West Non-Catholic 2005	Far West Non-Catholic 2005 Sub. Effects	Center 2005	Center 2005 Sub. Effects	Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2005	Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2005 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−1.33^*** (0.39)	−0.32^***	−0.50 (0.36)	−0.11^*	−0.63^*** (0.14)	−0.16^***	−0.42 (0.34)	−0.09
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−1.95^** (0.98)	−0.39^**	−1.89^** (0.84)	−0.41^***	0.28 (0.32)	0.07	0.14 (0.71)	0.04
Trusts parliament	2.54^*** (0.97)	0.53^***	0.49 (0.93)	0.12	−0.19 (0.38)	−0.05	−1.69^* (0.88)	−0.36^**
Trusts government	−0.40 (1.27)	−0.08	0.22 (1.09)	0.03	0.60 (0.43)	0.04	2.66^** (1.07)	0.48^***
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	1.03 (0.75)	0.24	−1.14^* (0.65)	−0.27^**	−0.09^** (0.26)	−0.15^***	−0.32 (0.63)	−0.07
Many people evade taxes	−0.46 (0.85)	−0.10	2.39^*** (0.83)	0.44^***	−0.12 (0.26)	−0.02	−1.33^** (0.65)	−0.23^**
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.63 (0.60)	0.13	0.23 (0.57)	0.06	−0.12 (0.18)	−0.03	0.41 (0.49)	0.07
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	−0.61 (0.98)	−0.06	−0.66 (0.88)	−0.05	0.98^** (0.38)	0.09^***	1.43 (0.96)	0.12^*
I file my income taxes myself	−1.27^* (0.72)	−0.28^**	0.17 (0.58)	0.05	−0.71^*** (0.25)	−0.17^***	−1.45^** (0.69)	−0.32^**
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.31 (0.31)	−0.07	−0.49 (0.32)	−0.11^*	−0.008 (0.13)	−0.003	0.16 (0.31)	0.03
Age	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.13^*	0.007 (0.009)	0.06	0.002 (0.004)	0.02	0.002 (0.01)	0.02
Education	−1.08 (0.84)	−0.24^*	−1.36^* (0.75)	−0.30^**	0.36 (0.32)	0.09	0.54 (0.72)	0.11
Constant	2.32^* (1.31)	–	0.36 (1.07)	–	0.10 (0.44)	–	0.51 (1.12)	–
N	206	206	209	209	993	993	235	235
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	44.57	–	29.60	–	36.39	–	46.87	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	East 2005	East 2005 Sub. Effects	Donbas 2005	Donbas 2005 Sub. Effects	South 2005	South 2005 Sub. Effects	Crimea 2005	Crimea 2005 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.41^*** (0.16)	−0.10^***	−0.32 (0.26)	−0.08	−0.68^*** (0.26)	−0.16^***	−0.56 (0.47)	−0.13
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	0.46 (0.39)	0.11	1.67^** (0.72)	0.34^**	0.07 (0.65)	0.01	−1.57 (1.24)	−0.31
Trusts parliament	−0.74^* (0.40)	−0.18^**	1.28 (0.84)	0.28^*	−0.86 (0.65)	−0.19^*	−1.37 (1.39)	−0.27
Trusts government	−0.41 (0.47)	−0.10	−4.57^*** (0.98)	−0.76^***	1.83^** (0.84)	0.41^**	2.53^** (1.29)	0.54^**
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.24 (0.31)	−0.06	−0.99^** (0.48)	−0.24^**	−0.13 (0.51)	−0.03	−1.22 (1.02)	−0.28
Many people evade taxes	0.14 (0.32)	0.04	0.14 (0.48)	0.03	0.20 (0.60)	0.05	−0.19 (0.80)	−0.04
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.34 (0.23)	−0.09^*	−0.84^** (0.41)	−0.20^**	0.47 (0.32)	0.12^*	0.16 (0.62)	0.04
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.33 (0.41)	0.03	0.48 (0.60)	0.05	0.56 (0.71)	0.05	1.03 (1.42)	0.09
I file my income taxes myself	−0.06 (0.29)	−0.01	0.60 (0.54)	0.13	0.16 (0.49)	0.04	−0.11 (0.75)	−0.02
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.08 (0.15)	−0.02	0.008 (0.22)	0.05	0.18 (0.25)	0.04	−0.41 (0.41)	−0.10
Age	0.004 (0.005)	0.04	0.02^** (0.007)	0.13^**	0.0006 (0.007)	0.008	0.006 (0.01)	0.05
Education	0.38 (0.36)	0.09	0.85 (0.58)	0.20^*	1.18^** (0.58)	0.28^**	0.41 (1.01)	0.08
Constant	0.11 (0.43)	–	0.11 (0.64)	–	−1.38^* (0.78)	–	0.08 (1.23)	–
N	803	803	389	389	320	320	132	132
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	37.61	–	42.60	–	32.35	–	26.00	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	Catholic Ukraine 2010	Catholic Ukraine 2010 Sub. Effects	Non-Catholic Ukraine 2010	Non-Catholic Ukraine 2010 Sub. Effects	West Ukraine 2010	West Ukraine 2010 Sub. Effects	Far West 2010	Far West 2010 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.11 (0.28)	−0.02	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.03^*	0.10 (0.17)	0.02	−0.22 (0.22)	−0.05
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−1.29 (0.83)	−0.28^*	0.15 (0.22)	0.04	−0.47 (0.44)	−0.12	−0.15 (0.58)	−0.04
Trusts parliament	1.33 (0.90)	0.25^*	0.40 (0.25)	0.10^*	1.27^** (0.55)	0.29^**	0.61 (0.72)	0.13
Trusts government	−0.51 (0.86)	−0.13	0.48^* (0.27)	0.12^**	−0.15 (0.53)	−0.04	0.04 (0.69)	0.01
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	0.64 (0.53)	0.15^*	−0.58^*** (0.15)	−0.14^***	−0.02 (0.33)	−0.005	0.15 (0.42)	0.03
Many people evade taxes	0.17 (0.50)	0.05	0.10 (0.15)	0.03	0.06 (0.32)	0.02	0.39 (0.41)	0.09
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.36 (0.35)	−0.08	−0.16 (0.11)	−0.04^*	−0.68^*** (0.21)	−0.17^***	−0.74^*** (0.27)	−0.18^***
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	1.49 (1.26)	0.25	0.20 (0.34)	0.05	0.85 (0.78)	0.19	0.92 (0.92)	0.16
I file my income taxes myself	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.02	−0.06^** (0.03)	−0.01^***	−0.07^* (0.04)	−0.02^**	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.009
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.06 (0.25)	−0.01	−0.04 (0.08)	−0.01	0.18 (0.16)	0.05	−0.002 (0.20)	0.0003
Age	−0.004 (0.008)	−0.03	0.001 (0.002)	0.01	0.003 (0.005)	0.03	−0.001 (0.006)	−0.01
Education	−0.08 (0.64)	−0.02	0.12 (0.19)	0.03	−0.03 (0.40)	−0.01	−0.13 (0.50)	−0.03
Constant	0.22 (0.75)	–	−0.11 (0.23)	–	−0.33 (0.47)	–	0.02 (0.59)	–
N	306	306	2924	2924	696	696	453	453
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	48.18	–	43.04	–	42.61	–	47.43	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	Far West Catholic 2010	Far West Catholic 2010 Sub. Effects	Far West Non-Catholic 2010	Far West Non-Catholic 2010 Sub. Effects	Center 2010	Center 2010 Sub. Effects	Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2010	Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2010 Sub. Effects
Substantive Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.42 (0.35)	−0.09	−0.02 (0.31)	−0.005	0.62^*** (0.13)	0.15^***	0.50^* (0.28)	0.12^**
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−0.45 (1.24)	−0.09	0.61 (0.69)	0.16	0.59 (0.40)	0.14^*	0.16 (0.86)	0.03
Trusts parliament	1.19 (1.14)	0.21	−0.79 (1.01)	−0.19	−1.08^** (0.47)	−0.26^***	−3.43^*** (1.20)	−0.65^***
Trusts government	−0.71 (1.23)	−0.18	1.00 (0.91)	0.23	0.84 (0.52)	0.20^*	2.90^** (1.29)	0.52^***
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	0.59 (0.68)	0.13	−0.39 (0.56)	−0.09	−0.89^*** (0.26)	−0.22^***	−1.41^*** (0.52)	−0.32^***
Many people evade taxes	0.21 (0.65)	0.06	0.62 (0.56)	0.14	−0.29 (0.24)	−0.07	−0.44 (0.47)	−0.10
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.61 (0.41)	−0.14^*	−0.83^** (0.37)	−0.19^**	0.05 (0.19)	0.01	−0.17 (0.39)	−0.04
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	1.22 (1.54)	0.17	−0.47 (1.25)	−0.10	1.36^** (0.58)	0.30^***	1.93^* (1.06)	0.38^**
I file my income taxes myself	0.04 (0.13)	0.009	−0.06 (0.08)	−0.01	−0.12^*** (0.05)	−0.03^***	−0.96^** (0.47)	−0.23^**
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.12 (0.30)	−0.02	0.17 (0.29)	0.04	−0.09 (0.12)	−0.02	−0.45^* (0.26)	−0.11^**
Age	0.001 (0.01)	0.01	−0.0007 (0.008)	−0.006	0.004 (0.004)	0.04	0.003 (0.008)	0.02
Education	−0.23 (0.78)	−0.05	−0.27 (0.70)	−0.07	0.42 (0.30)	0.10^*	−0.05 (0.61)	−0.02
Constant	0.28 (0.93)	–	−0.19 (0.80)	–	−0.28 (0.36)	–	0.90 (0.80)	–
N	224	224	229	229	1137	1137	300	300
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	52.69	–	41.89	–	43.96	–	49.71	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	East 2010	East 2010 Sub. Effects	Donbas 2010	Donbas 2010 Sub. Effects	South 2010	South 2010 Sub. Effects	Crimea 2010¹	Crimea 2010 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.41^*** (0.15)	−0.10^***	−0.69^*** (0.22)	−0.17^***	−1.38^*** (0.26)	−0.31^***	−1.69^*** (0.51)	−0.33^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−0.05 (0.40)	−0.01	−0.50 (0.69)	−0.12	−0.33 (0.74)	−0.06	−9.14^** (3.95)	−0.66^***
Trusts parliament	1.09^*** (0.41)	0.26^***	2.14^*** (0.73)	0.48^***	−0.54 (0.82)	−0.11	9.43^*** (3.27)	0.94^***
Trusts government	0.47 (0.44)	0.12	0.15 (0.85)	0.04	1.85^* (0.98)	0.38^**	0.79 (3.06)	0.22
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.57^* (0.30)	−0.14^**	−0.27 (−0.44)	−0.07	−0.48 (0.45)	−0.11	1.13 (0.87)	0.18
Many people evade taxes	0.24 (0.32)	0.06	0.04 (0.51)	0.01	1.72^*** (0.52)	0.40^***	0.40 (0.95)	0.08
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.22 (0.22)	0.05	−0.28 (0.34)	−0.06	−0.36 (0.38)	−0.09	–	–
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.60 (0.61)	0.14	0.44 (0.84)	0.09	−2.38^* (1.35)	−0.48^**	−2.46 (2.52)	−0.44
I file my income taxes myself	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.02	−0.25^* (0.13)	−0.06^**	−0.13^* (0.07)	−0.03^**	0.02 (0.11)	0.004
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.06 (0.14)	−0.01	−0.02 (0.21)	−0.004	0.05 (0.25)	0.01	−0.59 (0.46)	−0.10
Age	−0.008^* (0.004)	−0.07^**	−0.003 (0.006)	−0.03	0.008 (0.008)	0.06	0.02 (0.01)	0.09
Education	−0.07 (0.37)	−0.02	−0.26 (0.57)	−0.06	−1.16^* (0.62)	−0.25^**	2.51^** (1.21)	0.39^**
Constant	−0.13 (0.45)	–	0.02 (0.73)	–	0.65 (0.77)	–	−0.82 (1.21)	–
N	888	888	428	428	347	347	153	153
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	39.06	–	47.20	–	48.97	–	56.78	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

¹ In the Crimea 2010 regression, bureau contact dropped out in the original regression, as only 1 of 199 had such contact.

	Catholic Ukraine 2015	Catholic Ukraine 2015 Sub. Effects	Non-Catholic Ukraine 2015	Non-Catholic Ukraine 2015 Sub. Effects	West Ukraine 2015	West Ukraine 2015 Sub. Effects	Far West 2015	Far West 2015 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.07 (0.28)	−0.02	−0.42^*** (0.08)	−0.10^***	−0.32^* (0.17)	−0.08^**	0.13 (0.21)	0.03
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−0.92 (0.65)	−0.23^*	0.96^*** (0.21)	0.22^***	0.43 (0.39)	0.10	−0.93^* (0.49)	−0.22^**
Trusts parliament	2.13^** (0.99)	0.41^**	−0.66^** (0.30)	−0.16^**	−0.41 (0.61)	−0.10	0.41 (0.74)	0.08
Trusts government	−0.27 (0.94)	−0.07	0.27 (0.28)	0.07	0.55 (0.60)	0.13	1.15 (0.71)	0.24^*
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−0.75 (0.51)	−0.18^*	−0.40^*** (0.15)	−0.10^***	−0.35 (0.33)	−0.08	−0.70^* (0.39)	−0.17^**
Many people evade taxes	0.07 (0.52)	0.02	0.75^*** (0.16)	0.18^***	0.37 (0.33)	0.09	0.68^* (0.40)	0.16^*
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	0.03 (0.33)	0.006	0.05 (0.10)	0.01	0.07 (0.22)	0.01	0.04 (0.27)	0.006
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.21 (0.98)	0.05	0.45^* (0.26)	0.11^**	0.73 (0.60)	0.16	0.17 (0.72)	0.05
I file my income taxes myself	0.38 (0.50)	0.08	0.06 (0.13)	0.01	0.25 (0.28)	0.06	0.46 (0.35)	0.10
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.19 (0.26)	−0.05	−0.08 (0.08)	−0.02	−0.25 (0.16)	−0.06^*	−0.26 (0.19)	−0.06^*
Age	0.005 (0.008)	0.04	0.005^** (0.002)	0.04^**	0.002 (0.005)	0.02	0.0004 (0.006)	0.002
Education	0.68 (0.64)	0.16	0.05 (0.19)	0.01	0.21 (0.40)	0.05	0.06 (0.47)	0.01
Constant	−0.03 (0.77)	–	−0.44^* (0.23)	–	−0.17 (0.48)	–	0.15 (0.58)	–
N	278	278	2882	2882	687	687	477	477
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	46.33	–	44.46	–	46.27	–	49.82	–

^* ≤ 0.10, ^** ≤ 0.05, ^*** ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the —-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	Far West Catholic 2015	Far West Catholic 2015 Sub. Effects	Far West Non-Catholic 2015	Far West Non-Catholic 2015 Sub. Effects	Center 2015	Center 2015 Sub. Effects	Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2015	Kyiv & Kyiv Oblast 2015 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	0.14 (0.34)	0.03	0.23 (0.29)	0.05	−0.49^*** (0.14)	−0.12^***	−0.99^*** (0.26)	−0.24^***
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	−1.55^** (0.79)	−0.36^**	−0.22 (0.68)	−0.06	0.78^** (0.33)	0.18^**	0.18 (0.66)	0.04
Trusts parliament	2.33^* (1.28)	0.43^**	−0.97 (1.06)	−0.22	−0.99^** (0.44)	−0.24^**	−0.12 (0.91)	−0.04
Trusts government	0.02 (1.21)	0.005	1.80^* (1.01)	0.33^**	0.05 (0.41)	0.01	0.76 (0.79)	0.17
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	−1.23^* (0.65)	−0.28^**	−0.25 (0.52)	−0.06	−0.91^*** (0.24)	−0.22^***	−1.23^** (0.51)	−0.28^***
Many people evade taxes	0.13 (0.63)	0.03	1.41^** (0.57)	0.33^***	0.94^*** (0.24)	0.23^***	0.70 (0.49)	0.17^*
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.67 (0.42)	−0.16^*	0.70^* (0.42)	0.15^**	0.16 (0.16)	0.04	0.19 (0.31)	0.05
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	0.64 (1.24)	0.12	−0.65 (0.95)	−0.15	−0.06 (0.44)	−0.02	−0.79 (0.74)	−0.18
I file my income taxes myself	1.67^** (0.72)	0.30^**	−0.01 (0.44)	−0.006	−0.19 (0.24)	−0.05	−1.05^* (0.59)	−0.25^**
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.34 (0.31)	−0.08	−0.22 (0.26)	−0.05	0.008 (0.13)	0.0007	0.39 (0.24)	0.09^*
Age	0.002 (0.01)	0.02	0.004 (0.008)	0.03	0.007^* (0.004)	0.06^**	0.008 (0.008)	0.07
Education	0.36 (0.76)	0.09	−0.15 (0.65)	−0.03	0.16 (0.32)	0.04	−1.14^** (0.58)	−0.26^**
Constant	0.55 (0.89)	–	−0.61 (0.82)	–	−0.12 (0.38)	–	1.25^* (0.73)	–
N	210	210	267	267	1119	1119	335	335
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	48.37	–	50.95	–	45.86	–	44.44	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

	East 2015	East 2015 Sub. Effects	Unoccupied Donbas 2015	Unoccupied Donbas 2015 Sub. Effects	South 2015	South 2015 Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it	−0.38^*** (0.14)	−0.09^***	0.21 (0.30)	0.05	−0.25 (0.23)	−0.06
Quasi-voluntary
Trusts president	0.40 (0.40)	0.09	0.12 (0.80)	0.02	2.42^*** (0.70)	0.51^***
Trusts parliament	0.27 (0.56)	0.06	2.88^** (1.30)	0.47^**	0.10 (1.10)	0.02
Trusts government	0.64 (0.51)	0.14	−0.87 (1.06)	−0.20	−1.19 (1.09)	−0.27
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats	0.08 (0.25)	0.02	0.30 (0.57)	0.07	−0.40 (0.47)	−0.10
Many people evade taxes	0.75^*** (0.29)	0.17^***	1.23^** (0.62)	0.29^**	−0.38 (0.54)	−0.09
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats	−0.18 (0.18)	−0.04	−0.17 (0.38)	−0.04	0.24 (0.28)	0.06
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income	1.31^*** (0.46)	0.29^***	2.19^** (0.92)	0.41^**	−1.04 (0.69)	−0.25^*
I file my income taxes myself	0.04 (0.26)	0.008	−0.79 (0.51)	−0.19^*	0.43 (0.29)	0.10^*
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)
Male	−0.11 (0.14)	−0.03	−0.36 (0.27)	−0.08^*	−0.16 (0.22)	−0.04
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.02	0.003 (0.009)	0.02	0.01^* (0.008)	0.13^**
Education	0.14 (0.34)	0.04	0.74 (0.71)	0.17	−0.46 (0.52)	−0.11
Constant	−0.88^** (0.42)	–	−2.39^** (0.94)	–	0.09 (0.64)	–
N	980	980	279	279	371	371
Missing observations	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace	Mean replace
% would obey	44.21	–	42.50	–	39.13	–

^*p ≤ 0.10, ^**p ≤ 0.05, ^***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.

Book contents

Appendices

Appendix I: Poland, Russia and Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys 2004–2015 and the Russian Tax Officials Survey 2011

Appendix II: Russian Public Officials Survey of Tax and Social Welfare Bureaucrats, 2011

Appendix III: Suggested Minimal Tax Compliance Levels for 2010–2015 Surveys

Poland 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

Russia 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

Ukraine 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

Ukraine 2012 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

Ukraine 2015 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey

Russia 2011 Tax Officials Survey

Appendix IV: Poland Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)307308

Appendix V: Russia Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)310311

Appendix VI: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)313314315

Appendix VII: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys – By Region Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered to Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)317318319320321322323324325

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