Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- 1 The Enlightenment and idealism
- 2 Absolute idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism
- 3 Kant’s practical philosophy
- 4 The aesthetic holism of Hamann, Herder, and Schiller
- 5 All or nothing
- 6 The early philosophy of Fichte and Schelling
- 7 Hölderlin and Novalis
- 8 Hegel’s Phenomenology and Logic
- 9 Hegel’s practical philosophy
- 10 German realism
- 11 Politics and the New Mythology
- 12 German Idealism and the arts
- 13 The legacy of idealism in the philosophy of Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Absolute idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 May 2006
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- 1 The Enlightenment and idealism
- 2 Absolute idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism
- 3 Kant’s practical philosophy
- 4 The aesthetic holism of Hamann, Herder, and Schiller
- 5 All or nothing
- 6 The early philosophy of Fichte and Schelling
- 7 Hölderlin and Novalis
- 8 Hegel’s Phenomenology and Logic
- 9 Hegel’s practical philosophy
- 10 German realism
- 11 Politics and the New Mythology
- 12 German Idealism and the arts
- 13 The legacy of idealism in the philosophy of Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Hegel on the sources of Kantian dualism
Absolute idealism, the philosophical movement that culminated with the work of Hegel, defined itself by its attempt to transcend the various dualisms that pervaded the philosophy of Kant. In Hegel's only complete, even if highly schematic, exposition of his system, the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817, further editions in Hegel's lifetime in 1827 and 1830), Hegel defined absolute idealism by contrast to what he called the “subjective idealism ” of Kant, which he described thus:
Objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to a certain sense subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are only our thoughts - separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism , pp. 37 - 56Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000
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