The idea of a basic liberty is central to Rawls’s theory of justice. Rawls distinguishes basic liberties from other liberties and from liberty in general, and holds that basic liberties – and only basic liberties – are entitled to special protection. They are given special protection in his theory by the principle of equal basic liberty and its “lexical priority” over fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. This means that a basic liberty may be limited only for the sake of a basic liberty, and not to equalize opportunity or wealth. Rawls also speaks more generally of the “priority of liberty,” which means that a basic liberty may be limited only for the sake of a basic liberty, or tomake the system of basic liberty as a whole more secure, and not to promote equality, or the general welfare, or human excellence or perfection.

Rawls formulates the principle of equal basic liberty differently in different places, but the inal formulation is this: each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all (JF 42). Rawls speciies basic liberties by a list, but presents different lists in different places. The following liberties appear on at least one list: freedom of thought; liberty of conscience; freedom of association; freedom of the person (also called “the freedoms speciied by the liberty and integrity of the person” (PL 291)); the freedom to own personal property; political liberty, including the right to vote and to be eligible for public ofice, freedom of political speech, and freedom of assembly; and the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law, including freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure.