Preface

China and India are large, rapidly developing countries with the potential to emerge as superpowers in the twenty-first century. The two states share key similarities including large populations, nuclear weapons, rising economic and military power, troubled borders, internal security challenges, domestic inequalities, incomplete economic reforms, and uncertain ambitions. Despite the uncertainties they themselves face, the rise of China and India – in particular the growing relative power of China – has inspired alarm in the United States. Some American political leaders and strategists advocate sharply divergent policies toward China and India. China is viewed as a potential competitor more than a potential partner, whereas the reverse is true of India. Washington “hedges” against Beijing while it seeks to increase Indian power and enlist New Delhi as a partner in that hedging. Yet American choices may not be as simple as defining enemies and allies. Both China and India will present the United States with sustained challenges as well as opportunities in the coming years, and Washington will need nuanced, if distinct, approaches to each.

The purpose of this book is to create a framework for objective assessment of the strategic behavior of the world’s two most important rising powers. The book fills an important gap in the literature on rising Indian and Chinese power and American interests in Asia by presenting a side-by-side comparison of Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior in four areas: (1) strategic culture; (2) foreign policy and use of force; (3) military modernization (including developments in defense spending, doctrine, and force modernization); and (4) economic strategies (including international trade and energy competition). We do not examine the origins of U.S. policy toward India and China, nor do we evaluate the effectiveness of those policies. However, our analysis challenges key arguments that support a recent sharpening divergence in the U.S. approach toward the two countries.

Side-by-side comparisons in the preceding chapters have revealed broad similarities in Indian and Chinese international strategic behavior. Despite some important specific differences that come into focus through structured comparison, neither state can be described as generally more prone than the other to foreign policy realpolitik, the use of force, and a preference for offensive military doctrine. Neither is more intent on modernizing its military forces, pursuing trade protectionism, or working with rogue regimes to secure energy interests. But what of the future? The two states have starkly different domestic regimes – India has a vibrant democracy, China has an adaptive but enduring authoritarian state. Is the difference in regime type a useful predictor of future international strategic behavior? Can projections based on regime type help U.S. leaders determine how the two powers will behave relative to U.S. interests?

In this chapter, we explore two claims made by scholars and policy makers about the relationship between regime type and a state’s international security behavior. The first claim is that democracies are more prone to peace than nondemocracies. The core of this argument is that democracies do not fight wars with one another, although in public and policy debates, the argument is frequently broadened to assert that democracies are more peaceful in general. The second claim is that shared political values (specifically democracy and rule of law) tend to cause the security interests of democratic states to converge. These ideas have broad appeal among both elites and the general public in the United States, and are frequently cited in debates about U.S. policy toward both China and India.