Hannibal achieved some measure of success in eliciting defections from among the Samnites, especially in southern and western Samnium (the lands of the Hirpini and Caudini, respectively). Several communities of the Hirpini came over to Hannibal in the immediate wake of the battle of Cannae. According to Livy (23.1.1–3), Hannibal was invited to Compsa, which then fell into his hands peacefully. After this, Hannibal placed part of his army under the command of Mago, whom ‘he ordered either to receive the cities of this region that were then defecting from the Romans, or to compel those to defect that were refusing to’. The passage clearly illustrates that other Hirpinian communities began to fall away from Rome at about the same time as Compsa. In 215 the Romans reportedly conducted raids against the Hirpini in the vicinity of Nola, obviously against towns that had defected. It is likely that they had rebelled in the previous year. Besides Compsa, the names of only a few rebellious Hirpinian towns are known: Vercellium, Vescellium, Sicilinum, Meles and Marmoreae.

Similarly, we hear of the Romans capturing towns that belonged to the Caudini or laying waste to their territory, indicating that several had defected. M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Fabius Maximus conducted campaigns in the vicinity of Caudium in 215 and 214, during which the Romans took Compulteria/Conpulteria, Trebula Balliensis, Austicula and Telesia.

INTRODUCTION

By the summer of 212, with the defection of Thurii, Hannibal had secured the loyalty of the remaining cities of Magna Graecia; most of the communities in the Sallentine peninsula had also come over to the Carthaginians, as well as some southern Lucanian communities. Yet even as these new allies were acquired, his position was already crumbling in other regions of Italy. Rome began to reconquer important rebel cities as early as 214, and by the time Taras revolted Hannibal's situation in both Campania and Apulia was perilous. When Taras fell to the Romans in 209, all of the rebellious Campanian and Apulian cities had already been retaken. By 207 Hannibal was operating in an increasingly restricted territory, mostly limited to Bruttium. When the Romans defeated his brother, Hasdrubal, at the Metaurus River in that same year, the war in Italy was essentially over. It was only a matter of time, barring a military miracle, until the Romans drove Hannibal from Italy and captured and punished the few states that still held out.

This chapter examines the Roman reconquest of southern Italy, from the high-water mark of Hannibal's Italian campaign in 215 and 214, through the fall of the few remaining rebellious cities such as Locri and Thurii in 205 and 204, and Hannibal's retreat from Italy in 203. We will focus on the period before the battle of the Metaurus, when the Italian campaign, although having turned in Rome's favour, still hung in the balance.

INTRODUCTION

For the last regional case study I will focus on ‘eastern Magna Graecia’, the band of Greek cities stretching along the coast of the Gulf of Taranto from Taras to Thurii. This strip equates more or less to the southern portion of Lucania, though Taras lay within the confines of Messapia. Taras was the most powerful city in the region, and it would become one of the most important cities to ally with Hannibal during the Second Punic War, its defection setting in motion a string of revolts by other Greek cities – and perhaps also some Lucanian communities (see Appendix D). Scholars have tended to see the defection of these eastern Italiote cities in terms of a broader, even global phenomenon: an expression of Hellenic identity and an effort by proud Greeks to recapture former glory. Yet Taras, Thurii, Metapontion and Heraclea defected two years after Locri and Croton, while Rhegion and Naples never revolted. The previous chapter discussed the bitter rivalry between Locri and Rhegion, and we will see later in this chapter that Taras and Thurii also harboured a long-standing rivalry. Livy (25.15.7) states explicitly that the Thurians did not revolt out of a common cause with the Tarentines or because of cultural ties with the people of Metapontion. Greek fraternity does not appear, therefore, to explain adequately why only some of these cities revolted, nor why they revolted when they did.

INTRODUCTION

After Cannae, Hannibal waited a few days in Apulia and then proceeded to Samnium; there he gained the loyalty of Compsa as the pro-Roman aristocracy fled the city. At this point Hannibal divided his forces and marched into Campania, leaving part of his army with Mago to secure the loyalty of any remaining pro-Roman settlements ‘of that region’ (regionis eius). Thence, Mago marched into Bruttium to encourage rebellion, and finally returned to Carthage and reported Hannibal's victories to the Carthaginian senate. In the meantime, Hanno took over operations in Bruttium, though his forces did not reach the area until August at the earliest. Most of the Bruttians appear to have come over to the Carthaginians quite readily, though whether they did so before Mago's or Hanno's arrival is not clear. But some Bruttian communities, including the important cities of Petelia and Consentia, remained loyal to Rome, at least initially. It would take nearly a year to capture Petelia and Consentia, and only after these cities capitulated did Hannibal's commanders begin to gain the support of western Italiote cities such as Locri and Croton. Indeed, Hannibal never secured all of Bruttium and western Magna Graecia, because Rhegion, which commanded the Straits of Messina, remained loyal to Rome throughout the war. It served as a base for Roman land and sea operations in the reconquest of Bruttium and the western Italiote cities.

LOCAL CONDITIONS REVISITED: A BRIEF SUMMARY

The previous five chapters have brought the Second Punic War into focus from the perspective of the Italian states and suggest that Hannibal's lack of success as a diplomat was an important component of his overall defeat in the Italian theatre of the war. Because Rome enjoyed a significant manpower advantage, Hannibal needed to elicit massive allied revolts in a short period of time. Rome's Italian allies were willing to come over to Hannibal's side, but only on their own terms, and Hannibal struggled to get all the communities in any given region to revolt at the same time. Moreover, it was difficult for Hannibal to maintain the loyalty of the Italian communities that did revolt. The arguments presented in this book reveal that local conditions and motivations significantly influenced the decisions of various Italian states to remain loyal to Rome, thus shaping the course and ultimately the outcome of the Second Punic War. In short, Hannibal's failure resulted from military disadvantage that he could not overcome through diplomatic means because of local, circumstantial factors.

Why was Hannibal unable to unify the Italians against Rome, or even to keep his new Italian allies unified during the eventual war of attrition? Goldsworthy has stated that the communities that did join Hannibal lacked a sense of common identity or purpose. This was indeed the case, though it is perhaps more accurate to say that there were too many mutually exclusive identities and agendas.

The rebellion of the Greek cities of eastern Magna Graecia was followed by the ambush and death of the proconsul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. An exact chronology is difficult to establish, but Livy places Gracchus' death after the defection of Thurii, which occurred in May 212 (see Appendix C). Livy also reports that he was ambushed as he planned to return from Lucania to Beneventum; the consuls had marched from Beneventum to Capua as the crops were ripening in Campania, perhaps in early May; so they may have returned in the late spring or early summer. I will estimate some time in June, though the date is far from secure.

Some Lucanian aristocrats who were still loyal to Rome, led by a certain Flavus (Flavius, according to Appian), decided to seek the favour of the Carthaginians. They met with Mago and negotiated a treaty by which the Lucanians would live as free men under their own laws in friendship (amicitiam) with the Carthaginians; in return, the Lucanians promised to deliver Gracchus. Flavus and his party lured Gracchus into their trap by promising that they could secure the surrender of all the Lucanians who had previously sided with Hannibal. The whole episode again underscores the personal nature of politics and, at times, diplomacy during the Second Punic War. According to Livy (25.16.6, 15, 23), Flavus was a guest-friend (hospes) of Gracchus, and the proconsul so trusted the Lucanian that he met Flavus with only a token bodyguard.

Immediately following the capture of Consentia and Petelia, Carthaginian forces moved against the Greek cities of Bruttium, attacking first Rhegion then Locri. Polybius records that the siege of Petelia lasted eleven months, and this date is followed by Frontinus, while Livy mentions only an unspecified number of months. Walbank (1970: II.30–1) argues that the siege would have ended late in the summer of 215, perhaps in September, assuming (1) a couple of months passed from the battle at Cannae until the investment of Petelia, and (2) the Roman calendar was in line with the solar calendar.

This position is difficult to reconcile with Livy's claim that Carthaginian forces landed at Locri, which fell after Petelia, then marched to Hannibal in Campania and finally returned to Bruttium by the end of the campaign season. If Locri fell a few weeks after Petelia, then the reinforcements could not have arrived until late September or early October. Hanno would not have reached Hannibal with the reinforcements until mid- or late October, and he would not have returned to Bruttium until (probably) sometime in November. Even if the Roman calendar were running well ahead of the seasons, by a month or even six weeks (Derow 1976), then Hanno would have returned to Bruttium in October, still very late in the campaign season. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that the Carthaginians conducted operations so late in the year.

PROLOGUE

At the end of a single, fateful day in the middle of the summer of 216 BC – 2 August according to one Roman tradition, but perhaps sometime in early July if the Roman calendar was running ahead of the solar months – near the small Apulian town of Cannae, Hannibal stood seemingly on the brink of victory over the Roman Republic. He had just exacted a crushing defeat upon the largest Roman field army mustered to that day. At least fifty thousand Roman and allied soldiers lay dead on the field of battle; thousands more were captured. One consul perished, while the second managed to gather survivors and seek refuge in the neighbouring city of Canusium. Perhaps most importantly, within a few days a significant number of communities in southern Italy, hitherto allied with and loyal to Rome, began to defect. The battle of Cannae was indeed a major turning point in the Second Punic War, marking the end of its first stage, typified by large-scale clashes between Hannibalic and Roman armies in Italy, and the beginning of its second stage, a war of attrition whose outcome hung in the balance at least until 211, when the tide of war turned decidedly against Hannibal.

Viewed in a broader context, the battle of Cannae and the subsequent defection and reconquest of Rome's Italian allies can also be understood as a significant point of transition in a much longer development.

INTRODUCTION

Campania, from the revolt of Capua in 216 to its surrender to the Romans in 211, was a decisive theatre of the Second Punic War. For Hannibal, the region would showcase his Italian strategy of eliciting allied revolts. He was able to win over the region's most important city, Capua, as well as a number of smaller towns. Moreover, since the Capuans possessed civitas sine suffragio, Hannibal managed to win over Roman citizens instead of exclusively allied peoples, as he had in Apulia. He also captured an important stronghold where the Via Appia crossed the Volturnus River (at Casilinum), allowing him potentially to march north into Latium. Even at the height of his power, however, Hannibal achieved only partial success, as a number of Campanian cities (including Naples, Cumae and Nola) remained loyal to Rome. Meanwhile, the Romans committed vast resources, usually four or six legions, to hold the line in Campania. Upon its recapture, Capua's punishment was severe, and Hannibal's ultimate failure to defend the city undermined his legitimacy vis-à-vis his remaining Italian allies and marked a major turning point in the war.

Rome's military response – its yearly commitment of multiple legions to Campania and the strategic placement of garrisons in key Campanian cities – accounts in large part for why Hannibal was unable to build on his initial success in the region.

The defection of Taras set off a string of revolts, including Metapontion, Heraclea and Thurii. Unfortunately, the sources for the Tarentine revolt contain a certain amount of confusion. Polybius' full narrative of the Tarentine revolt (8.24–34) is located in a fragmentary book and lacks reference to specific dates. Livy's fuller account (25.7.10–11.20) places the revolt after the beginning of the consular year 212 (25.3.1) and possibly before 26 April 212 (25.12.1). He also states, however, that most of his sources dated the event to 212, but some placed it in 213 (25.11.20). He later mentions that the Roman garrison commander in Taras held the citadel for five years (27.25.4), and since the city was recaptured in 209 (27.12.1–3, 27.15.4–16.9), this also suggests that the revolt fell in 213. Appian (Hann. 35) also implies that Taras revolted in 213, placing it in the year before Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus died, which occurred in 212 (Liv. 25.16). Polybius' Book 8 covered Olympic years 141.1–141.4, which included both the consular years 214/13 and 213/12. Hannibal besieged the citadel of Taras during the winter (Polyb. 8.34.13), and he probably captured it sometime late in winter.

It is possible that (a) he captured Taras in the winter of 213/12 but before the beginning of consular year (15 March) 212/11, or (b) if the Roman calendar was running about a month ahead of the solar calendar and 15 March (Roman) fell around 15 February (solar), then Taras could have fallen just after the start of the consular year 213 but still late in the winter season.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the application of the Hannibalic strategy in Apulia, its mixed results in the summer of 216 and Hannibal's ultimate strategic failure in the region. Apulia in the Second Punic War is an interesting case study because Hannibal did in fact enjoy a great deal of success there. He won over the most powerful city in the region, Arpi, as well as many smaller communities including Salapia, Herdonia, Aecae and probably Ausculum. It was in Apulia, moreover, where Hannibal's strategy first began to produce results, as these revolts occurred immediately after the battle of Cannae and before Hannibal departed for Samnium and Campania. Yet he was not completely successful in eliciting allied revolts in Apulia, even though the battle of Cannae took place there and should therefore have had the most dramatic effect in undermining Rome's reputation among nearby communities. Two Latin colonies remained Roman strongholds, Luceria and Venusia. More interestingly, a few Apulian communities remained loyal to Rome, including Teanum Apulum and Canusium, the latter situated very close to where the battle of Cannae was fought. Ultimately, of course, Hannibal failed to hold Apulia; in fact, Arpi fell to the Romans within only a few years, in 213, making it the first of Hannibal's important allies to be recaptured. Since Rome had maintained control of Luceria, Venusia, Teanum Apulum and Canusium, Hannibal's Apulian allies were essentially isolated, and since he was unable to protect them, the Romans slowly but surely reconquered all of the rebellious cities.

This chapter is entitled “Sources of Roman Law” in contrast to the next chapter on “Sources for Roman Law.” The difference is that this chapter takes an ancient point of view. If you were an ancient Roman, where did the laws you had to live by come from? As the previous chapter noted, the Romans did not have a Congress or state legislatures or city councils to pass laws. Nor, for much of their history, did they have a king or other single dictator who could just issue decrees. How then were laws made? The next chapter will take up a modern perspective. How can we find out today what the law was then? Historians today must sort through often obscure, ambiguous, and contradictory evidence to answer almost any question about the ancient world. Where in particular do we need to look to find out about Roman law?

THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF LAW

Although Roman political institutions were different from those of the modern United States, the sources of law in both systems can be put into the same three general categories: “statute” law (law enacted by a legislative body), administrative rules, and judicial interpretation. This section will outline the Roman versions of these three types, noting changes in them tied to the transformations of the Roman government. I will point out similarities to and differences from modern practice. The next section will look at how the different sources interacted with each other.