Alexander is arguing that our responsibility for what we do () is grounded in the fact that a man is the of his own actions (cf. Aristotle, E.N. 3. 1111a21, 1112b31, etc.). The opponents of this view, he says, hold that nothing performed by a man is such that at the time when he does something he also has the possibility of not doing it, (190. 24–6). One who believes this, he argues, cannot make any moral judgements or do any of the things ‘which ought reasonably to be brought about by those who have believed the possibility also of doing each of the things which they do’. My translation has, I hope, shown the need for a negative in the last clause: ‘the possibility also of not doing’ is the point needed; so insert between and . For omission of the negative elsewhere in De fato cf. 165. 1; 179. 21; 189. 6; 195. 26; 202. 12; 207. 19; 211. 18.

Most modern editors adopt one or other of two readings: (1) quot gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit! olim / unus erat etc.; (2) qua gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit, olim / unus erat etc. It is true that a large number of steps leading up to a temple is an indicationof its magnificence; cf. Ovid, Pont. 3. 2. 49 f. templa manent hodie vastis innixa columnis, / perque quater denos itur in ilia gradus. Nevertheless in this context qua is more probable than quot, in view of the local relative clauses in line 1 (quamaxima Roma est) and line 3 (ubi Navali slant sacra Palatia Phoebo).

There is more than enough evidence to show that cock-fighting, quail-fighting, and even partridge-fighting were favourite sports among the Greeks (young and old alike), no matter what part of the mediterranean world they inhabited. Whether Romans ever shared these passions is another question altogether. When Saglio contributed his article on cock-fighting to the Dictionnaire des antiquitis grecques et romaines, he limited himself to the transports it caused the Greeks. For this he was reprimanded, obliquely, by Schneider, asserting—but neglecting to support the assertion in detail—that Romans also took a keen interest in Hahnenkämpfe. Subsequently, Magaldi set out to prove the existence of formal ludi gallinarii at Pompeii, while Jennison mustered such evidence as could be found for all three forms of avian combat in Rome. Hence, apparently, it has become the communis opinio that Romans shared the Greeks' taste for these ‘raffish’ amusements.

At the beginning of the dog's trial the prosecution state the charge and the penalty they propose. It seems to me that there may be a more complicated joke here than is generally realized. The penalty of a collar is appropriate for a dog and in real life was sometimes imposed on a slave or a prisoner (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 11). The epithet applied to the collar is usually translated ‘of figwood’ and taken to be a pun on . Commentators see the same pun earlier in the play at 145, although in that passage the sense may be adequate without the pun; the adjective does not necessarily constitute a joke in itself but is perhaps chosen deliberately to lead into the joke.

In Virgil, as in modern narrative, the act of saying is barely mentioned or left out altogether. At times the transition from indirect to direct speech comes abruptly, without warning (Aen. 2. 657 ff., 675 ff., 10. 825 ff.). On the other hand, the stress falls on the speaker's position within the general narrative. We are thus drawn away from the actuality of speech to a broader frame of reference. The characters seem to be more concerned with the distant implications of the action than with the present moment. Their motivations and fortunes cover the years. They merge, therefore, into legend, history, romance; and the words they speak illustrate their extending roles.

The purpose of the present paper is to examine one way in which divine being or divine existence was expressed in the Ancient World, and to see how in late antiquity the expression of some aspects of divine existence was abandoned, while others survived. The inquiry therefore seeks to contribute to the discussion on change and continuity, and, more specifically, to the problem of what may be understood by conversion from paganism to Christianity in late antiquity.

In the introductory remarks to his Mulierum Virtutes, Plutarch notes the value of comparisons for establishing the diverse manifestations of the same virtue: ‘Achilles was brave in one way, Ajax in another; and the intelligence of Odysseus differed from that of Nestor, nor were Cato and Agesilaus just in the same way, nor was Irene loving of her husband () as Alcestis was, nor Cornelia high-minded in the manner of Olympias’ (243d). All the examples are well known, and quite apposite, except for Irene (). Who is this paragon of wifely love? A search through encyclopedias and mythological handbooks proves fruitless. Wyttenbach in his note ad loc. suggested the courtesan friend of a minor Ptolemy killed at Ephesus (Athen. 13. 593 a-b), yet this extremely obscure figure hardly merits mention in the same breath with Alcestis. The name must be corrupt.

In the Severan period the proconsulship of Africa or Asia was normally held some 15 to 17 years after die consulship. Although there are comparatively few consuls in this period whose ages can be firmly established, what evidencethere is suggests that the consulship was normally held in the early forties, on occasions as early as the mid thirties: a consularis could, therefore, hope to attain a premier proconsulship aged about 60. Thus the future emperor P.Helvius Pertinax, who was born on 1st August 126, held the proconsulship of Africa, probably in 188/9, at the age of 62. M. Didius Julianus, the imperial successor to Pertinax, also succeeded him in Africa aged about 56. C. Vettius Sabinianus was born before 136 and his proconsulship fell about 192/37 whenhe was at least 56 years old.

A states the phenomenon that requires to be explained. B explains it. C justifies B. D is the furthest reach of the argument and explains C. E. begins the way back, stating the consequence of D and therefore balancing C. F is the inference from E and corresponds to B, and G brings us back to A. The logic is closely knit. And it is pointed by repeats and correspondences. In A the fire is liquidus; in E profundant, in F profundunt. In B the clouds must contain permulta seeds of fire; in D they must conceive multa from the light of the sun, and the repeat of necessest, necessust hammers home the argument.

The setting of this epigram is the komos sequence explored by Copley in his important book. The speaker is about to set forth in the dark, since he requires some means of lighting his way. A companion offers him a torch. It is refused as unnecessary because of the flame of love which burns in his breast.

So far as I know, the manuscripts' fraternis in Prop. 2. 34. 52 ‘aut cur fraternis Luna laboret equis’ has never been doubted. I offer an emendation of it in this note.

Luna laboret ought to allude to lunar eclipse, but you cannot see it through the fog of fraternis equis. In C.Q.xliii (1949), 26–7, Shackleton Bailey dealt with the traditional claim for it, that the moon is eclipsed, not by the sun, by the presence of her brother's horses, but by their absence, just as in Virgil the sea and Ixion's wheel stand still when the winds' presence is no longer felt: ‘cum placidum ventis staret mare’ (Ecl. 2. 26), ‘Ixioni vento rota constitit orbis’ (G. 4. 484.). Simply, he saw no parallel between the unambiguous absence of those winds’ blasts and the alleged absence of the sun's horses here.

The interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images.

I quote the Oxford translation of 462a15–24 (by J. I. Beare): ‘From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream.

In 1824 Eduard Gans, in the course of a study of inheritance law, had occasion to deal with the class of women known in Athens as epikleroi—daughters of a deceased man who, in the absence of sons, were married to their nearest relative, with the estate of the deceased passing to the son or sons of the new union. ‘For these,’ he wrote, ‘… the basic concept throughout is not that, in the absence of descendants, they themselves appear as inheritors, but rather that they are inherited along with the property by the collaterals.’

In a vigorously argued passage of the oration Pro L. Flacco, Cicero defends his client L. Valerius Flaccus against the charge that he had acted improperly during his governorship of Asia three years previously in claiming as heres legitimus the estate of one Valeria, wife of Sextilius Andro, who had died intestate in the province. This section of the speech involves Cicero in a brief display of his knowledge of the civil law concerning tutela, the forms of acquiring manus in marriage by usus and coemptio and inheritance ah intestate, and it is described by the scholiast as ‘negotialis quaestiuncula’. The passage is regularly cited in the handbooks to illustrate those features of the civil law which Cicero treats, but the Valeria in question is otherwise wholly obscure.

In the opening sentence of 2.6, which is of key significance, the meanings or references of are disputed, rendering the whole passage difficult. In the most widely established version, while —‘Evidence for the statement that Athens grew morethan other places because of migration is provided by the following, viz. that...’ This is consistent with taking either Athens or the other places as the subject of the infinitive, ‘Athens grew more’ or ‘the other places grew less’. If recapitulates the end of 2.2, appears to refer to those migrations; but since it is a rare word, abnormal in that sense, and is obscure, Ullrich (Beitr. z. Erkl. des Th., 169 ff.) proposed , which makes a straight reference to migration, disposes of the obscurity, and provides an explicit subject for the infinitive. Gomme accepts this. I disagree, but yet believe that the established version, though capable of much improvement, is the best to date.