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The recognition of cultural relativity carries with it its own values, which need not be those of the absolutist philosophies. It challenges customary opinions and causes those who have been bred to them acute discomfort. It rouses pessimism because it throws old formulas into confusion, not because it contains anything intrinsically difficult.
Ruth Benedict (1934)
Debates over the place of science in the American democracy turned in large part on the meanings invested in the terms “science” and “democracy” by the participants. As I have discussed in the preceding chapters, Allport's and the Murphys' definitions of science contained assumptions that placed their views at odds with those of their colleagues. So, too, with their understandings of democracy: if Allport and the Murphys agreed with many of their contemporaries as to what the social, political, and economic facts of democratic life were, their interpretation of what these facts signified could diverge sharply. This was especially true in regard to whether or not the general public could be trusted with the responsibilities required of a democratic citizenry. From within the radically progressive political framework of these scientists' views, the idea of “social control” meant the regulation of economic elites by the public; for many of their peers, the idea of “social control” meant the regulation of an irrational public by administrative elites.
At issue was the question of how far the nation had progressed in its quest to become a truly democratic polity. Activists such as Allport and the Murphys belonged among those who believed that American democracy was to be defined as an aspiration yet to be reached as opposed to a goal that had already been achieved.
The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we can not unify them completely in our minds.
William James (1907)
How to confront the complexity of the natural and the social worlds was one of the most highly charged questions that the generation of Allport and the Murphys faced during the 1930s. Many of their colleagues sought to manage this complexity by reducing the subject matter they studied to the simplest terms possible, whether by searching for clues to the nature of human life in the behavior of rats or pigeons or microscopic worms, or by restricting the form of scientific questions to those that could be answered in the language of statistical regularity. But others, Allport and the Murphys among them, argued for the intellectual, moral, and political benefits of working one's way through complexity, rather than seeking to make it disappear.
As their efforts took shape over the course of the 1930s, these three psychologists produced a diverse body of work from within social and personality psychology that challenged dimensions of scientific life that the discipline's arbiters were striving to present as matters of settled fact. When Lois Barclay Murphy labeled her own work an “exploratory study,” or Allport declared that an aspect of his research represented “a declaration of independence,” or Gardner Murphy spoke of the need to “shut our eyes and jump as far as the structure of the human mind permits,” they were each making plain that they considered the rules of the game to be open to challenge.
These unhappy times call for the building of plans that … put their faith once more in the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1932)
By pressing the scientific claims of individuality, Allport and the Murphys signaled their dissatisfaction with the current state of scientific knowledge-seeking in two ways. The study of individuality was first of all justified as an end in itself, in order to right the lop-sided view of nature that they believed scientists had produced by ignoring particulars in favor of universals. But promoting the study of that which is “individual” as a scientific priority was more than a move to supplement already dominant views, for talk of individuality simultaneously represented other challenges as well: to intellectual practices that minimized diversity, broke apart wholes, feared the taint of the subjective, and banished qualities in favor of quantities. As a symbolic rallying point for those who wished to dissent from the status quo in the sciences, a commitment to foregrounding individuality signified a resistance to perpetuating images of scientific method held dear by science's elite.
The concept of universality possesses a status in the Western intellectual tradition that the idea of particularity lacks. The practices and rhetoric of the sciences incorporate a distaste for the investigation of singularities as singularities, subscribing to the belief that such a path offers little hope of obtaining secure and certain knowledge. As philosopher Jorge Gracia remarks, unlike scholarly attention to “universals,” “discussions of the correlative notion of individuality are not abundant and, by comparison with the number and depth of treatments on universals, may even be considered scarce.”
It is [the] combination of personal values without deep social underpinning which doubtless explains … the fact that we allow economic disorganization, which produces fourteen or fifteen million unemployed and their families to suffer; then, instead of letting them die off, we feel sorry for them to the extent of giving them “relief,” maintaining them at a starvation level. It is a question whether such a combination of emphasis upon and violation of social values can be long sustained.
Lois Barclay Murphy (1937)
As … psychology goes beyond sheer common sense, and becomes dynamite to society, those dominant in society will try to protect themselves against the explosion. It seems to me that this is a sufficient answer to the ivory-tower remark that we should stick to science and let public practice alone. The answer is that public practice will not and cannot let psychology alone.
Gardner Murphy (1939)
To a large degree our division of labor is forced, not free; young people leaving our schools for a career of unemployment become victims of arrested emotional and intellectual development; our civil liberties fall short of our expressed ideal. Only the extension of democracy to those fields where democracy is not at present fully practised – to industry, educational administration, and to race relations for examples – can make possible the realization of infinitely varied purposes and the exercise of infinitely varied talents.
Gordon Allport (1940)
During the 1930s, the United States underwent one of its greatest periods of economic, social, and political crisis, as vocal groups of Americans engaged in intense debate over truths that no longer appeared to be self-evident.
The disturbing fact is that any persistent and searching inquiry into the criteria of psychology as science leads inevitably to a discussion of the essential principles of science itself … We cannot afford to forget the ideal of empirical science embodied in the words of Isaac Newton, “In this philosophy, propositions are based on phenomena, and laws are derived by induction.”
Arthur Bills (1938)
By the close of the 1930s, arbiters of the status quo had begun to mount worried defenses of scientific method that sought to rebut what they saw as the pernicious effect of oppositional sensibilities such as those expressed by Allport and the Murphys. Defenders of right thinking such as psychologist Arthur Bills believed that the ground that had been “won by the efforts of Galileo, Bacon, Newton and others” was imperiled by “newer psychological systems which are clamoring for scientific status with all the vigor and scorn for tradition that characterize youthful movements.” C. C. Pratt, in his 1939 text, The Logic of Modern Psychology, defended the reigning orthodoxy, stating that science was “too serious and well established a game to be entered into lightly or altered, unless it can be shown either that a proposed alteration does not upset the essential features of play, or that the new game is better than the old one.” This is why those who “played” science had “a right to insist that it be played according to rule.”
To get the feeling of what it is like to be a creature of the sea requires the active exercise of the imagination and the temporary abandonment of many human concepts and human yardsticks … Time measured by the clock or the calendar means nothing if you are a shore bird or a fish, but the succession of light and darkness and the ebb and flow of the tides mean the difference between the time to eat and the time to fast, between the time an enemy can find you easily and the time you are relatively safe. We cannot get the full flavor of marine life – cannot project ourselves vicariously into it – unless we make these adjustments in our thinking.
Rachel L. Carson (1941)
In their concern with characterizing individuality and social context during the 1930s, Allport and the Murphys shared much with the techniques and goals of naturalists. Practices and values inherent in aspects of the American natural history tradition legitimated dissent from the mechanistic and reductionist values promoted by neobehaviorists, and also offered a scientific framework that carried powerful associations to such politically charged art forms in the 1930s as documentary film and literature. In drawing on the authority of natural history, and in appropriating some of its key constructs and practices, Allport and the Murphys were able to identify conditions under which it would be possible to display and investigate aspects of scientific “reality” that their orthodox colleagues asserted were incapable of “scientific” treatment.
Yehuda Halevi's Kuzari was written in response to the challenge posed to Judaism by a highly spiritual, nondenominational philosophy. Science, especially that embodied in the Hellenistic heritage, was a major component of philosophy; thus, if for no other reason than to make Judaism a serious competitor, Halevi had to show that the Jewish tradition as well possessed a body of scientific knowledge. The superiority of the Jewish teachings was demonstrated chiefly by appeal to the criteria of tradition, consensus, and authority, which, in Halevi's judgement, were in practice the criteria most influential in deciding scientific opinion. Despite the rather unique setting for the book, and the wide range of stances Halevi develops, the Kuzari was rather quickly and smoothly absorbed into the mainstream of Jewish religious thought.
It was commonly accepted in the middle ages that void within or outside the world is impossible. The paper presents a quite unusual conception of void, which is described in Yeda'aya ha-Penini's commentary on Ibn Rushd's epitome on Aristotle's Physics. According to this conception there is a thin layer of void between the water and the inner surface of the container. Ha-Penini describes two versions of this conception. According to one version this void layer is three-dimensional but thin, according to the other it is two-dimensional. The first part of the paper shows how ha-Penini “corrects” the text of Ibn Rushd, putting into it ideas which were unknown to Ibn Rushd. It is argued that, though the two views are rejected by Ibn Rushd, ha-Penini himself partly accepts (his version of) these views. The second part of the paper argues that ha-Penini could not have found these views in the Arabic-Hebrew tradition, and it seems that he relied on Christian sources. If this is indeed so, the paper presents an example of acquaintance of Hebrew scholars in southern France with Scholastic science in the first half of the fourteenth century.
The major part of the mathematical “classics” in Hebrew were translated from Arabic between the second third of the thirteenth century and the first third of the fourteenth century, within the northern littoral of the western Mediterranean. This movement occurred after the original works by Abraham bar Hiyya and Abraham ibn Ezra became available to a wide readership. The translations were intended for a restricted audience — the scholarly readership involved in and dealing with the theoretical sciences. In some cases the translators themselves were professional scientists (e.g., Jacob ben Makhir); in other cases they were, so to speak, professional translators, dealing as well with philosophy, medicine, and other works in Arabic.
In aketshing this portrait of the beginning of Herbrew scholarly mathematics, my aim has been to contribute to a better understanding of mathematical activity as such among Jewish communities during this period.
Levi ben Gerson, also known as Gersonides or Leo de Balneolis, was one of the most original Jewish thinkers of the Middle Ages, and he wrote on logic, philosophy, biblical exegesis, mathematics, and astronomy. During the last years of his life he maintained relations with the papal court of Clement VI (1342–52) at Avignon, and collaborated in the translation into Latin of his Sefer Tekhuna (Book of Astronomy). The object of this paper is to establish the main stages of the redaction of the Hebrew and Latin extant versions of his astronomical work. Although Levi declares that the work was finished in 1328,1 argue that this text was the preliminary draft of the preserved one, most of which was composed after 1338. A thorough revision of the work was undertaken at an indeterminate date before 1344. It is also argued that the final form of the work was probably due to the request of solar and lunar tables made to Levi by “great and noble Christians” around 1332.
It is well known that the Tractatus of Peter of Spain (later Pope John XXI) was one of the most popular logic textbooks in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance. Less known is the Tractatus's considerable reputation and diffusion among the Jews, as evidenced by five translations, two commentaries, and what appears to be an abbreviatio — if not of the Tractatus itself, then of a similar work. The present article attempts to understand the phenomenon of the Tractatus's popularity and offers an analysis of the three translations whose authors are known — those by Shemaryah ha-Ikriti (Greece, early to mid-fourteenth century), Abraham Abigdor (late fourteenth century), and Judah b. Samuel Shalom (either Italy or Spain, mid-fifteenth century) — and their subsequent fate. The more popular versions of Abraham Abidgor and Judah Shalom provided Jewish students, many of whom would likely become physicians, with a grounding in logic comparable to that of their Christian counterparts.
On 22 December 1827, a letter was received by the council of the newly founded London University from a ‘Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge ċ desirous of becoming a Candidate for the Mathematical Chair in the University of London’. The letter proceeded ‘to refer the Council to the Tutors of Trinity College, and to his degree in the Tripos of 1827, for testimonials of qualifications &c’. Two months later, the applicant received a brief note ‘informing you that the Council yesterday elected you professor of Mathematics after the most distinguished competition that there has been for any chair’. The recipient was (with the exception of the years 1831–36) to remain in this position for over a third of a century, during which time he would establish and maintain not only the reputation of the fledgling university, but also his own as a highly respected mathematician and logician. His name was Augustus De Morgan.
... and signs and the signs of signs are used only when we are lacking things.
Brother William of Baskerville in The Name of the Rose by Umberto Eco
Recreating, as part of doing history, can be a way of reflecting what creating is as part of science. Discussions revolving around historical understanding of the scientific enterprise have recently included strong commitments to turn scientific practice into one of the main objectives of historical study. One specific methodological approach to face up to this assignment is integrating the reconstruction and reperformance of past experiments into the historical analysis of the doing-part in science. This paper deals with the doing-part in history, that is, with the historiographical consequences that might stem from this reconstruction and reperformance of past experimentation. In the course of a four-month period of research I worked with a replica of the so-called ‘actinometer’, an instrument to measure the intensity of solar radiation, which was invented by John Herschel in 1824. On the basis of this example, I try to trace how recent performances of experimental activities can contribute to historical understanding of human agency in scientific practice.
When the editorial board of the British Journal for the History of Science was considering ways to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the British Society for the History of Science, it was quickly decided that the occasion presented an ideal opportunity for publishing a collection of student essays. For few areas have changed so much over the last fifty years as the actual teaching of the history of science. When the Society began in 1947, the subject was offered in only three universities: Oxford, Cambridge and London. Now, in 1997, it is available in more than twenty-two institutions across the country and in many more worldwide. University teaching has become an essential part of our professional activities – essential and greatly valued. And the work of students today is of a calibre hardly anticipated fifty years ago. By publishing a selection of student papers during this Anniversary year, we aim to celebrate the strengths of our subject at the institutional level.
Historical accounts of the practice of smallpox inoculation in the late eighteenth century invariably make a distinction between the widespread general inoculations carried out within small rural parishes and the partial inoculations in urban centres such as London, Manchester, Newcastle and Leeds. This distinction, moreover, is generally reinforced by concluding that the rural inoculation programmes were ‘highly effective’ or ‘successful’ in contrast with the urban inoculation schemes, which are often seen as ‘marginally effective’ or indeed ‘failing’. Success or failure tends to be judged by the impact which inoculation had upon reducing mortality from smallpox, but as a result of this demographic focus the motives behind the implementation of urban inoculation have been overlooked. My paper readjusts this balance by looking more closely at motives and by judging success in relation to aims. To achieve this I have taken a new approach towards the history of smallpox inoculation as a whole, and portray the basic idea of giving a person smallpox in order to confer subsequent immunity as being modified in the hands of different people throughout the course of the century. Hence it is possible to trace the development of inoculation from a folk practice carried out within the home with the aim of protecting individuals, to large-scale general inoculations of an entire community, which aimed to eradicate the disease altogether.