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We study the resilience of banks to macroeconomic slowdowns in a context of lax microprudential regulations: Colombia during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. We find that numerous banks underperformed during the crisis, as their shareholders and board members tunnelled resources through related lending, loan concentration and accounting fraud. These practices were enabled by power concentration within banks, lax regulation and the expectation of bailouts. We provide evidence for this tunnelling mechanism by comparing the local banks and business groups that failed during the crisis, the local banks and business groups that survived the crisis and the former foreign banks – all of which survived the crisis. The regulatory changes enacted during the crisis also lend support to our proposed mechanism.
En puisant aux études menées sur le « capital génétique » et la politisation des économies animales, cet article examine la façon dont les races animales et leur circulation transnationale deviennent des enjeux géopolitiques dans l’Europe de la fin du xviie et du xviiie siècles. Il s’intéresse notamment aux efforts du gouvernement français, particulièrement intenses après la guerre de Sept Ans (1756-1763), pour imiter la production de laine anglaise et espagnole, et tenter de surmonter l’avantage économique dû à la meilleure qualité des races ovines de ses voisins et concurrents. Alors que l’exportation de moutons vivants était complètement interdite en Angleterre et en Espagne, les Français s’échinaient à améliorer leur cheptel ovin par des importations illicites et des accords diplomatiques. Ces entreprises culminèrent dans les années 1760, lorsque le Bureau du commerce entama une collaboration avec des agronomes, des naturalistes, des diplomates et des contrebandiers afin de faire passer des races ovines de qualité supérieure à travers la frontière maritime franco-britannique et la frontière pyrénéenne avec l’Espagne. Ces projets se développèrent en parallèle de nouvelles conceptions de la stabilité et de la permanence des races, d’après lesquelles les animaux conserveraient leurs propriétés quels que soient les climats et les environnements. Au carrefour de l’histoire économique, agricole, politique et culturelle, le présent article développe le concept de « mercantilisme animal » pour explorer les enjeux géopolitiques inhérents aux différentes conceptions des animaux, de la race et du climat.
David Hume and Adam Smith were friends, but their friendship does not imply that the two authors shared the same ideas, or should have shared the same ideas. Money is an example of a subject of disagreement between David Hume and Adam Smith that has either been ignored or interpreted as a puzzle, given their friendship. I suggest that Smith did not replicate or cite Hume’s exposition of the quantity of money in his Wealth of Nations because Smith thought Hume was wrong. For Smith, Hume fell into the mercantilist fallacy of considering the accumulation of money as wealth. Rather than accumulating money through market restrictions, as other mercantilists would, Hume advocated the accumulation of money through commerce and hoarding, but Hume’s goal was still the accumulation of gold and silver. Smith saw through Hume’s mistakes and addressed each of them, thus rejecting Hume’s theory of money, while maintaining their friendship.
In Colombia, there has been very little discussion about the epidemiological transition in the 20th century, therefore, there are few empirical studies, and this mainly focus on the second half of the 20th century, and on the factors associated with improvements in mortality indicators. In this paper, we define three stages of the epidemiological transition in the country during the period 1918–1998, with special emphasis on changes in mortality rates, causes of death and the contribution of different age groups. Likewise, a co-integration analysis is carried out to model the long-term relationship between the mortality rate and the variables of nutrition, public health, education and economic growth. Finally, we show the results of the structural change tests of the mortality rates for pneumonia and tuberculosis to examine the impact of the arrival of sulphonamides and penicillin in Colombia.