European constitutional identity as an implicit limit to amending EU treaties – General trend towards acknowledging implicit constraints to constitutional amendments as well as empowering supreme courts and constitutional courts to monitor ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendments’ – Substantive limits to revising EU treaties essentially based on Article 2 TEU – Conditionality mechanism rulings as a point of departure for speculating on the emergence of a European constitutional identity – ECJ’s competence to review EU treaty amendments with a self-restrained approach as a last resort mechanism.

Prolonged solitary confinement is inconsistent with international minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners and may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In a series of recent cases, appellate courts in Canada have curtailed the use of prolonged solitary confinement in prisons on the basis that such detention is “grossly disproportionate” and “cruel and unusual.” But these judgments in the penal context have not resulted in comparable regulation of seclusion in forensic psychiatric hospitals. Seclusion in these contexts is often comparable to solitary confinement in prison and carries with it the same serious risks of lasting harm. This article comparatively reviews the legislative and policy framework that regulates the use of seclusion in different provinces in Canada. The article argues that case law on prolonged solitary confinement in the penal context has application to the forensic psychiatric context and that a failure to more closely regulate the use of seclusion may render this type of mental health legislation and treatment unconstitutional.

This article investigates whether environmental planning law can demonstrate ethical responsibility for its role in settler colonialism. Planning law contributes to settler colonialism by diminishing, excluding, and eliminating alternative views of land that are fundamental to First Nations culture, philosophy, and law/lore. The article adopts a transnational legal frame that recognizes and promotes First Nations as sovereign. The investigation is focused primarily on the planning law system in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, while being guided by interpretations and applications of the rights of First Nations peoples by courts in Canada. It is argued that state planning law in NSW fails to give effect to ethical responsibility because its operation continues to dominate and marginalize Aboriginal legal culture by eroding the necessary ontological and epistemic relationships with land. However, there is potential for change. Opportunities to disrupt settler colonialism have emerged through bottom-up litigation, which has promoted interpretations, applications, and implementation of law that can be performed in ways that resonate with Canadian case law. While the absence of treaty or constitution-based rights protection in NSW and Australia means that the transplant is not seamless, the article argues that laws should not be interpreted and applied in ways that perpetuate settler colonialism where alternative interpretations can lead to a different outcome.

Financial redress for victims of occupational diseases can be offered through no-fault compensation schemes. No-fault compensation schemes have an explicit mission in promoting perceived fairness and justice. The objective is to offer a quick, fair and just procedure and outcome, while preventing civil court procedures and restoring trust. However, the question is whether applicants of these no-fault schemes indeed experience perceived fairness and justice. This paper discusses the result of an in-depth interview study with fifty-eight victims involved in no-fault schemes for occupational diseases in the Netherlands. We focus on the role of perceived procedural justice, outcome concerns and trust in the (former) employer.

In September 2023, the trial at Stockholm District Court against Orrön Energy (previously Lundin Energy) and two corporate directors for complicity in war crimes in Sudan between 1999 and 2003, started. The Lundin case is part of a trend of attempts to hold corporations criminally accountable for their alleged involvement in serious human rights abuses and provides a unique opportunity to assess the possibilities of such attempts in relation to the rights of the victims. This article analyzes how human rights obligations and the objectives of reparations for victims are satisfied by Swedish law and practice in the Lundin trial. It shows that while the law allows victims participating in trial to put forward civil claims, it denies this right to the large number of victims not participating, and the decision early in the Lundin proceedings to separate damage claims from the criminal trial has left the participating victims effectively denied reparations.

Addressing climate change is a global priority. There is broad, science-based consensus that efficient environmental policy requires significant and rapid investments aimed at accelerating energy transition and safeguarding biodiversity. Yet, despite valuable improvements such as NextGenerationEU and the ETS, the EU and its Member States are still in search of extra financial resources. Here, we establish the FINE-for-EU mechanism to provide finance for pan-European green investment projects. We propose setting up a Pan-European Climate Fund to create a financial link between the benefits businesses derive from the cross-border legal framework and the specific responsibilities they have towards supporting climate objectives.

Democratic backsliding is becoming increasingly widespread, filtering into not just constitutional law but other areas of substantive Union law. This article explores this phenomenon by focusing on how domestic judicial reforms spread to the day-to-day operation of EU competition law. It references two fundamental principles of Union law – mutual trust and effective judicial protection – before focusing on the European Competition Network, which requires national competition authorities to cooperate when discharging their duties under Union law. Lastly, it discusses the systemic consequences this can have for the operation of EU competition law, the internal market, and EU law more broadly.

Deprivation of national citizenship is one of the strategies used to counter the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, that is, individuals traveling abroad for the purpose of terrorism. This Article begins with a short overview of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the deprivation of citizenship. In these cases, the contestation of the deprivation of citizenship was based on the infringement of the rights to private and family life. We then turn to the limits imposed by EU law on decisions made by national authorities of Member States concerning citizenship deprivation of foreign terrorist fighters. Focusing on recent cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the European citizenship, we address the evolving role that EU law plays in the assessment of the proportionality of Member States’ decisions to strip individuals of national citizenship. We also consider the national practice, focusing on a recent decision in Denmark. In addition, we consider legal issues arising from the repatriation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their children. We argue that EU citizenship thus offers a further layer of protection against the deprivation of citizenship and that Member States are under a positive obligation to repatriate EU citizens who are the children of Foreign Terrorist Fighters on account of the case-law stemming from the Ruiz-Zambrano and X (Thai national) cases. For the moment, no common approach to repatriation of foreign fighters, or their children, is taken by EU member States in the context of the EU.

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between the content of some of the labour-related human rights articulated in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the obligations ascribed to various actors regarding those rights in the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), in particular those ascribed to corporations. Recognizing the inconsistency, I claim, can help us see some of the moral limitations of both familiar public responses to exploitative labour practices and influential philosophical accounts of the wrong of exploitation. In light of these limitations, I argue that there are reasons to accept a more expansive account of the human rights-related obligations of corporations than that found in the UNGPs, and in particular that we should accept that corporations have obligations to actively contribute to lifting people out of poverty.

This article argues that legal proof should be tantamount to justified belief of guilt. A defendant should be found guilty just in case it is justified to believe that the defendant is guilty. My notion of justified belief implies a threshold view on which justified belief requires high credence, but mere statistical evidence does not give rise to justified belief.

This article presents a “glocal” method of comparative constitutional interpretation. In the debate on the judicial use of foreign ideas, transnationalists claim to propose a simultaneously global and local approach. However, they perpetuate the methodological nationalism of globalists and localists by assuming nations as their primary units of analysis. In contrast, this article advances a truly glocal theory of judicial interpretation. The glocal is the product of a constant interplay between the global and the local, from the inception of an idea to its practical judicial application. This approach follows a three-step process. First, it provides a multiscale toolkit to demonstrate that ideas may have never been purely national in the first place but are the result of plural hybridizations. Second, it uncovers the units that generate and disseminate constitutional knowledge: trans-territorial networks united by thematically shared beliefs rather than by nationality or a global mission. Third, it equips judges with the ability to glocalize or customize the idea, not as an exercise of national differentiation but as a strategy to make it epistemically familiar and more politically appealing to the network. In this way, the article critically engages with the debate on constitutional transplants, challenging its nationalist bias.

Historiographic studies of transnational environmental law (TEL) are increasingly relevant as scholars and practitioners search for ways in which to deliver more quickly and efficiently effective regulation that is responsive to global environmental issues. This article uses new and original archival research to better locate the Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa (1900 London Convention) in its legal-scientific historical context. Most of the scholarship on this topic draws on historian John M. MacKenzie's groundbreaking analysis of what he called ‘the hunting cult’ and its role in the imperial advance into India, Africa, and elsewhere. When viewed through the dual lens of legal history and the history of science, the late 19th and early 20th centuries represented a period of transition during which a new science-based perspective advanced by evolutionary biologists was embraced by science-minded policymakers, and expressed in domestic law and foreign policy aimed at the preservation of endangered species and the protection of biodiversity. The 1900 London Convention is an early example of a modern TEL instrument informed by science and by values that today most recognize as being critically important and universal. The new history in this article also resonates as an example of how polarizing political narratives can delay law reform and the importance of maintaining focus on collaborative problem solving and science-based regulation of complex transnational environmental issues.

In intersystemic cases, a court applies the law of a foreign system. Scholars have argued that the court ought to use the interpretive methodology of the foreign system’s courts. I argue against that intuitive position. First, interpretive methodology is not bound up with primary rights and duties such that it constitutes substantive law for conflict of laws purposes. Second, although interpretive methodology has epistemic value and may affect case outcomes, a given methodology might not have the same epistemic value or the same effect on outcomes for differently situated interpreters. Further, the approach that the foreign judges take to interpreting their own law is necessarily anchored to the foreign system’s rule of recognition, which is not true of the approach of external judges. Descriptive facts might align such that external interpreters would have to use the internal methodology to identify the applicable law, but that’s an empirical question the answer to which will vary from case to case.

On May 21, 2024, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the Tribunal) delivered a unanimous advisory opinion on the Request submitted to the Tribunal by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law. This was the first advisory opinion on climate change obligations issued by an international judicial body, and the first of three anticipated advisory opinions on climate change obligations from international judicial bodies. The request had been submitted on December 12, 2022 by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS). Two questions on obligations of states parties under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were posed in the request: (1) what are the specific obligations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment in relation to the deleterious effects that result, or are likely to result, from climate change and ocean acidification, which are caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the atmosphere; and (2) what are the specific obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment in relation to climate change impacts and ocean acidification. A total of 34 states parties to UNCLOS and nine intergovernmental organizations submitted statements, and 33 states parties and four intergovernmental organizations made statements during the oral proceedings.

Portable MRI (pMRI) technology, which promises to transform brain imaging research by facilitating scanning in new geographic areas and the participation of new, diverse populations, raises many ethical, legal, and societal issues (ELSI). To understand this emerging pMRI ELSI landscape, we surveyed expert stakeholder views on ELSI challenges and solutions associated with pMRI research.

There is a growing movement within contemporary medical ethics to blur the boundaries between clinical medicine and clinical research. Some writers now argue that the research-practice distinction is outdated and the importance of distinguishing between research and medicine is no longer as pressing as it once was or seemed to be. Instead, we are now urged to view the health-care system as a dynamic “learning health-care system” in which research components are embedded within standard clinical care. This essay defends the ethical significance of the research-practice distinction while acknowledging the reality and usefulness of integrated health care. A key claim that this essay advances is that the principle of clinical equipoise, which has largely been rejected by research ethicists, can be reinterpreted and repurposed to help distinguish medical practices that call for more demanding forms of informed consent from those that do not.

In clinical trials involving experimental subjects who are also patients, what is supposed to become of the imperative to focus on the patient’s best interest? A second set of policy questions concerns patients who want to die. Are there limits to the imperative to let patients choose for themselves? Is commodification a threat to autonomy? When, if ever, do costs and benefits become decisively important? Can we know what to count as a cost-effective preparation for the next pandemic? When we put procedures in place to protect against abuse, is there any way to prevent such measures from becoming bureaucratic obstacles to accomplishing anything at all?

What is a populist judge, and when do judges embrace populism? Populist judges bypass legal and procedural constraints, seek an unmediated relationship with the public, and claim to represent the public better than political elites. Judicial populism can emerge in response to institutionalized dissonance in the political system. Dissonant institutionalization facilitates contestation between state institutions and can undermine the legitimacy of political institutions. This legitimacy crisis can imbue judges with a belief in their role as representatives of the public interest. In Pakistan, the dissonance caused by unresolved differences between the civil-military bureaucracy and the elected political leadership—differences that were embedded into the constitutional framework, facilitated the rise of judicial populism. I outline the key features of judicial populism and study the dynamics surrounding the rapid expansion of populist jurisprudence between 2005 and 2019 in Pakistan, with a focus on public interest litigation that became the cornerstone of the judiciary’s populist turn. Through case analysis, archival research, and semi-structured interviews, I discuss features of the populist approach to jurisprudence and trace how dissonance within Pakistan’s political system created new opportunities for the judiciary and changed judicial role conceptions within the legal and judicial community.