In ten studies (N = 9187), I systematically investigated the direction and sizeof seven helping effects (the identifiable-victim effect, proportion dominanceeffect, ingroup effect, existence effect, innocence effect, age effect andgender effect). All effects were tested in three decision modes (separateevaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice), and in their weak form (equalefficiency), or strong form (unequal efficiency). Participants read about one,or two, medical help projects and rated the attractiveness of and allocatedresources to the project/projects, or choose which project to implement. Theresults show that the included help-situation attributes vary in their: (1)Evaluability – e.g., rescue proportion is the easiest to evaluate inseparate evaluation. (2) Justifiability – e.g., people prefer to savefewer lives now rather than more lives in the future, but not fewer identifiedlives rather than more statistical lives. (3) Prominence – e.g., peopleexpress a preference to help females, but only when forced to choose.

Risk and reward are negatively correlated in a wide variety of environments, and in many cases this trade off approximates a fair bet. Pleskac and Hertwig (2014) recently proposed that people have internalized this relationship and use it as the basis for probability estimation and subsequent choice under conditions of uncertainty. Specifically, they showed that risky options with high-value outcomes are inferred to have lower probability than options offering a less valuable reward. We report two experiments that test a simple corollary of this idea. In both studies, participants estimated the magnitude of prizes offered by lotteries with known win-probabilities. The relationship between estimates and probabilities followed the power relationship predicted by the risk-reward heuristic, albeit with a tendency to overestimate outcome magnitude. In addition, people’s estimates predicted their willingness to take the gamble. Our results provide further evidence that people have internalized the ecological relationship between risk and reward in financial lotteries, and we suggest that this relationship exerts a wide-ranging influence on decision-making.

People are more likely to rely on descriptive norms (i.e., what their peers are doing) when deciding whether to take a risk themselves than when deciding whether to recommend others to take a risk. We proposed and found that people also attend to normative information when making risk recommendations to others, but in this case they attend to a different type of normative information — injunctive norms (i.e., whether their peers approve of this behavior). Descriptive norm plays a bigger role in influencing people’s own decisions, whereas injunctive norm plays a bigger role in influencing people’s recommendations to others. This research demonstrates the importance of differentiating descriptive versus injunctive norms in risky decision-making and provides further evidence that perceived norms significantly influence risky decision-making.

In this paper we test two hypotheses regarding magical thinking about theperceived likelihood of future events. The first is that people believe thatthose who “tempt fate” by failing to take necessary precautionsare more likely to suffer negative outcomes. The second is the“protection effect”, where reminding people of precautions theyhave taken leads them to see related risks as less likely. To this end, wedescribe the results from three attempted direct replications of a protectioneffect experiment reported in Tykocinski (2008) and two replications of atempting fate experiment reported in Risen and Gilovich (2008) in which we add atest of the protection effect. We did not replicate the protection effect butdid replicate the tempting fate effect.

Runs of gains and losses are particularly salient to decision makers because of their perceived departure from randomness, as well as their immediate impact on the financial status of the decision makers. Past research has focused on decision making biases that relate to faulty conceptions of chance and luck, such as the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand effect. Participants in the current study bet on the outcomes of a long sequence of simulated coin tosses. Risk preferences were found to change as a function of run valence (i.e., losses vs. gains), run length, and financial status. Individuals were found to differ in the effect of all of these factors, in their responses to runs of gains and losses in sequential risky choice.

Donation requests often convey numerical information about the people in need. In two studies we investigated the effects of numeracy and presentation format on the underlying affective and cognitive mechanisms of donation decisions. In Study 1, participants were presented with information about a victim in need, either in a frequency format or in a percentage format. In Study 2, we manipulated the identifiability and number of target victims. Our results demonstrate that donations of individuals lower in numeracy were more susceptible to changes in numeric presentation format than those higher in numeracy. Importantly, the underlying mechanisms for donations differed by numeracy. Whereas the mental image of the victim influenced donation decisions of less numerate people only, the estimated impact of a donation was positively correlated with donation amounts for both more and less numerate individuals.

In this introduction to the special issue on methodology, we provide background on its original motivation and a systematic overview of the contributions. The latter are discussed with correspondence to the phase of the scientific process they (most strongly) refer to: Theory construction, design, data analysis, and cumulative development of scientific knowledge. Several contributions propose novel measurement techniques and paradigms that will allow for new insights and can thus avail researchers in JDM and beyond. Another set of contributions centers around how models can best be tested and/or compared. Especially when viewed in combination, the papers on this topic spell out vital necessities for model comparisons and provide approaches that solve noteworthy problems prior work has been faced with.

The results of song contests offer a unique opportunity to analyze possible distortions arising from various biases in performance evaluations using observational data. In this study we investigate the influence of contestants’ order of appearance on their ranking. We found that, in the New Wave Song Contest, expert judgments were significantly influenced by the contestant’s running number, an exogenous factor that, being assigned randomly, clearly did not influence the output quality. We also found weaker statistical evidence of such an ordering effect in Eurovision Song Contest finals of 2009–2012.

The pursuit of unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking or binge drinking, not only carries various downside risks, but also provides pleasure. A parsimonious model, used in the literature to explain the decision to pursue an unhealthy activity, represents that decision as a tradeoff between risks and benefits. We build on this literature by surveying a rural population in South Africa to elicit the perceived riskiness and the perceived pleasure for various risky activities and to examine how these perceptions relate to the pursuit of four specific unhealthy behaviors: frequent smoking, problem drinking, seatbelt nonuse, and risky sex. We show that perceived pleasure is a significant predictor for three of the behaviors and that perceived riskiness is a significant predictor for two of them. We also show that the correlation between the riskiness rating and behavior is significantly different from the correlation between the pleasure rating and behavior for three of the four behaviors. Finally, we show that the effect of pleasure is significantly greater than the effect of riskiness in determining drinking and risky sex, while the effects of pleasure and riskiness are not different from each other in determining smoking and seatbelt nonuse. We discuss how our findings can be used to inform the design of health promotion strategies.

This special issue on recognition processes in inferential decision making represents an adversarial collaboration among the three guest editors. This introductory article to the special issue’s third and final part comes in three sections. In Section 1, we summarize the six papers that appear in this part. In Section 2, we give a wrap-up of the lessons learned. Specifically, we discuss (i) why studying the recognition heuristic has led to so much controversy, making it difficult to settle on mutually accepted empirically grounded assumptions, (ii) whether the development of the recognition heuristic and its theoretical descriptions could explain some of the past controversies and misconceptions, (iii) how additional cue knowledge about unrecognized objects could enter the decision process, (iv) why recognition heuristic theory should be complemented by a probabilistic model of strategy selection, and (v) how recognition information might be related to other information, especially when considering real-world applications. In Section 3, we present an outlook on the thorny but fruitful road to cumulative theory integration. Future research on recognition-based inferences should (i) converge on overcoming past controversies, taking an integrative approach to theory building, and considering theories and findings from neighboring fields (such as marketing science and artificial intelligence), (ii) build detailed computational process models of decision strategies, grounded in cognitive architectures, (iii) test existing models of such strategies competitively, (iv) design computational models of the mechanisms of strategy selection, and (v) effectively extend its scope to decision making in the wild, outside controlled laboratory situations.

As individuals from different nations increasingly interact with each other, research on national in-group favoritism becomes particularly vital. In a cross-national, large-scale study (N = 915) including representative samples from four Latin American nations (Chile, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela) and the USA, we explore differences regarding nationality-based in-group favoritism. In-group favoritism is assessed through differences in prosocial behavior toward persons from the own nation as compared to persons from other nations in fully incentivized one-shot dictator games. We find strong evidence for national in-group favoritism for the overall sample, but also significant differences among national subsamples. Latin Americans show more national in-group favoritism compared to US Americans (interacting with Latin Americans). While US Americans mainly follow an equal split norm (for both in- and out-group interactions), Latin Americans do so only in in-group interactions. The magnitude of in-group favoritism increases with social distance toward the out-group.

The Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFVs) – a recently developed set of brief scenarios depicting violations of various moral foundations – enables investigators to directly examine differences in moral judgments about different topics. In the present study, we adapt the MFV instrument for use in the Portuguese language. To this end, the following steps were performed: 1) Translation of the MFV instrument from English to Portuguese language in Brazil; 2) Synthesis of translated versions; 3) Evaluation of the synthesis by expert judges; 4) Evaluation of the MFV instrument by university students from Sao Paulo City; 5) Back translation; and lastly, 6) Validation study, which used a sample of 494 (385f) university students from Sao Paulo city and a set of 68 vignettes, subdivided into seven factors. Exploratory analyses show that the relationships between the moral foundations and political ideology are similar to those found in previous studies, but the severity of moral judgment on individualizing foundations tended to be significantly higher in the Sao Paulo sample, compared to a sample from the USA. Overall, the present study provides a Portuguese version of the MFV that performs similarly to the original English version, enabling a broader examination of how the moral foundations operate.

Two experiments examined moral judgments about a decision-maker’s choices when he chose a sure-thing, 400 out of 600 people will be saved, or a risk, a two-thirds probability to save everyone and a one-thirds probability to save no-one. The results establish a moral echoing effect — a tendency to credit a decision-maker with a good outcome when the decision-maker made the typical choices of the sure-thing in a gain frame or the risk in a loss frame, and to discredit the decision-maker when there is a bad outcome and the decision-maker made the atypical choices of a risk in a gain frame or a sure-thing in a loss frame. The moral echoing effect is established in Experiment 1 (n=207) in which participants supposed the outcome would turn well or badly, and it is replicated in Experiment 2 (n=173) in which they knew it had turned out well or badly, for judgments of moral responsibility and blame or praise. The effect does not occur for judgments of cause, control, counterfactual alternatives, or emotions.

In four experiments we showed that investors are not only interested in maximizing returns but have non-financial goals, too. We considered what drives the decision to invest ethically and the impact this strategy has on people’s evaluation of investment performance. In Study 1, participants who chose a moral portfolio (over an immoral one) reported being less interested in maximizing their gains and more interested in being true to their moral values. These participants also reported feeling lower disappointment upon learning that a different decision could have yield a better outcome. In Studies 2 and 3, we replicated these findings when investors decided not to invest in immoral assets, rather than when they choose to invest morally. In Study 4, we found similar results using the same industrial sector in both the moral and the immoral conditions and providing participants with information about the expected return of the portfolio they were presented with. These findings lend empirical support to the conclusion that investors have both utilitarian (financial) goals and expressive (non-financial) ones and show how non-financial motivations can influence the reaction to unsatisfactory investment performance.

An experimental test of the descriptive adequacy of the restated diversification principle is presented. The principle postulates that risk-averse utility maximizers will pool risks for their mutual benefit, even if information is missing about the probabilities of losses. It is enough for people to assume that they face equal risks when they pool risks. The results of the experiment support the principle.

According to the Selective Accessibility Model of anchoring, the comparison question in the standard anchoring paradigm activates information that is congruent with an anchor. As a consequence, this information will be more likely to become the basis for the absolute judgment which will therefore be assimilated toward the anchor. However, if the activated information overlaps with information that is elicited by the absolute judgment itself, the preceding comparative judgment should not exert an incremental effect and should fail to result in an anchoring effect. The present studies find this result when the comparative judgment refers to a general category and the absolute judgment refers to a subset of the general category that was activated by the anchor value. For example, participants comparing the average annual temperature in New York City to a high 102 °F judged the average winter, but not summer temperature to be higher than participants making no comparison. On the other hand, participants comparing the annual temperature to a low –4 °F judged the average summer, but not winter temperature to be lower than control participants. This pattern of results was shown also in another content domain. It is consistent with the Selective Accessibility Model but difficult to reconcile with other main explanations of the anchoring effect.

Punishment is an important method for discouraging uncooperative behavior. We use a novel design for a public goods game in which players have explicit intended contributions with accidentally changed actual contributions, and in which players can apply costly fines or ostracism. Moreover, all players except the subject are automated, whereby we control the intended contributions, actual contributions, costly fines, and ostracisms experienced by the subject. We assess subject’s utilization of other players’ intended and actual contributions when making decisions to fine or ostracize. Hierarchical Bayesian logistic regression provides robust estimates. We find that subjects emphasize actual contribution more than intended contribution when deciding to fine, but emphasize intended contribution more than actual contribution when deciding to ostracize. We also find that the efficacy of past punishment, in terms of changing the contributions of the punished player, influences the type of punishment selected. Finally, we find that the punishment norms of the automated players affect the punishments performed by the subject. These novel paradigms and analyses indicate that punishment is flexible and adaptive, contrary to some evolutionary theories that predict inflexible punishments that emphasize outcomes.

Taxation policy is driven by many factors, including public opinion, but little research has examined the strength and stability of the public’s taxation preferences. This paper demonstrates one way in which preferences for progressiveness depend on the framing of the question asked. Participants indicated how they would share a fixed tax burden between two individuals who earned different amounts of money, either by adjusting the amount of tax paid by the two individuals, or by adjusting the amount of post-tax income retained. The units in which tax was described — amount of money or percentage tax rate — were manipulated orthogonally. There was a strong metric effect: Participants favored progressiveness more when tax was described as a percentage rather than amount. However, there was also a clear interaction: for amounts, participants favored progressiveness significantly more when considering post-tax money retained rather than tax paid; for percentages, no such effect was found.

Prior research has found mixed evidence for the long-theorized link between religiosity and pro-social behavior. To help overcome this divergence, I hypothesize that pro-social behavior is linked not to religiosity per se, but rather to the salience of religion and religious norms. I report a field experiment that examined when auction participants will respond to an appeal to continue bidding for secular charitable causes. Religious individuals are more likely than non-religious individuals to respond to an appeal “for charity” only on days that they visit their place of worship; on other days of the week, religiosity has no effect. Notably, the result persists after controlling for a host of factors that may influence bidding, but disappears when the appeal “for charity” is replaced by an appeal to bid for other (i.e., competitive) reasons. Implications for the link between religion and pro-social behavior are discussed.

Three experiments (N = 550) examined the effect of an interval construction elicitation method used in several expert elicitation studies on judgment accuracy. Participants made judgments about topics that were either searchable or unsearchable online using one of two order variations of the interval construction procedure. One group of participants provided their best judgment (one step) prior to constructing an interval (i.e., lower bound, upper bound, and a confidence rating that the correct value fell in the range provided), whereas another group of participants provided their best judgment last, after the three-step confidence interval was constructed. The overall effect of this elicitation method was not significant in 8 out of 9 univariate tests. Moreover, the calibration of confidence intervals was not affected by elicitation order. The findings warrant skepticism regarding the benefit of prior confidence interval construction for improving judgment accuracy.