We designed an experiment to test the robustness of Dana, Weber, and Kuang’s (DWK), 2007 results. DWK observed that, when participants were given a “costless” way — the click of a button — to ignore the consequences of their actions on others’ payoffs, they chose to remain ignorant and fair behavior diminished. By implementing a double-blind experiment together with a design that controls for alternative explanations for the observed behavior, we confirmed DWK’s findings.

Applied to uncertainty communication, politeness theory postulates that when announcing bad news (1) speakers may intend not only to inform, but also to manage (e.g., save) the hearers’ or speakers’ own faces (i.e., face-managing intentions), and (2) speakers may perform face-managing intentions by altering the explicitly communicated probability. Previous research has assumed these two core postulates when explaining various reasoning and judgment phenomena in hearers, but has failed to test them empirically in a comprehensive and direct way: jointly in relation to speakers. To provide this critical evidence, we asked subjects to communicate a predefined numerical probability of two negative outcomes, using a verbal probability scale. Subjects reported their communication intentions afterwards. In line with the first politeness theory postulate, speakers intended not only to be informative but also to tactfully announce bad news or to avoid being blamed in case they made inaccurate (too low or too high) prediction. In line with the second politeness theory postulate, speakers altered their explicitly communicated probability more often and more substantially when adopting face-managing intentions than when adopting informative intentions. We discuss how this evidence corroborates the politeness theory and validates the previous research that focused on hearers.

Intertemporal choices involve tradeoffs between outcomes that occur at different times. Most of the research has used pure gains tasks and the discount rates yielding from those tasks to explain and predict real-world behaviors and consequences. However, real decisions are often more complex and involve mixed outcomes (e.g., sooner-gain and later-loss or sooner-loss and later-gain). No study has used mixed gain-loss intertemporal tradeoff tasks to explain and predict real-world behaviors and consequences, and studies involving such tasks are also scarce. Considering that tasks involving a combination of gains and losses may yield different discount rates and that existing pure gains tasks do not explain or predict real-world outcomes well, this study conducted two experiments to compare the discount rates of mixed gain-loss intertemporal tradeoffs with those of pure gains or pure losses (Experiment 1) and to examine whether these tasks predicted different real-world behaviors and consequences (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 suggests that the discount rate ordering of the four tasks was, from highest to lowest, pure gains, sooner-loss and later-gain, pure losses, and sooner-gain and later-loss. Experiment 2 indicates that the evidence supporting the claim that the discount rates of the four tasks were related to different real-world behaviors and consequences was insufficient.

We conducted an experimental study on social preferences using dictator games similar to Fehr et al. (2008). Our results show that social preferences differ between subjects who receive low-stakes monetary rewards for their decisions and subjects who consider hypothetical stakes. Our findings indicate that, apart from incentives, gender plays an important role for the categorization of different social preferences.

Health care resource allocation is a central moral issue in health policy, and opinions about it have been studied extensively. Allocation situations have typically been described and presented in a positive manner (i.e., who should receive medical aid). On the other hand, the negative valence allocation situation (i.e., who should not receive medical aid) has been relatively neglected. This paper demonstrates how positive versus negative framing of the exact same health care resource allocation situation can affect the perceived fairness of allocation principles. Participants usually perceived non-egalitarian principles (i.e., need, equity and tenure) to be fairer in positively framed situations (i.e., to deliver health care resources to certain patients) than negatively framed situation (i.e., not to deliver health care resources to other patients). However, framing did not affect the perceived fairness of the equality principle (i.e., a random draw). The paper offers a theoretical explanation for the effect of framing on the perceived fairness of health care resource allocation and discusses implications for both researchers and policy makers.

In “The value of nothing: asymmetric attention to opportunity costs drives intertemporal decision making” Read, Olivola and Hardisty (2017) proposed an asymmetric subjective opportunity cost (ASOC) effect to explain and predict why impatience can be detected in intertemporal choice. This work deserves to be replicated and extended for its novel and potentially important findings. The present study aimed to examine the reliability and robustness of the evidence presented by Read et al. by conducting precise replications of their key findings in Study 1. The ASOC effect (Read, et al., 2017) was important for expanding its application and reported to be typically stronger when baseline larger-but-later option (LL) and smaller-but-sooner option (SS) preferences were closer to 50% in the authors’ original condition. Therefore, the present study also aimed to replicate and test the ASOC effect when baseline LL preferences were higher or lower than those in the original condition. We intended to set two additional conditions wherein either LL or SS is more obviously favored (i.e., baseline LL preferences were higher or lower than those in the original condition) by respectively applying the common difference effect (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995) and the unit effect (Burson, Larrick & Lynch Jr., 2009; Pandelaere, Briers & Lembregts, 2011). Having successfully generated two more obviously favored conditions, the ASOC effect was replicated and confirmed under the original condition and one additional condition wherein SS was more obviously favored. However, the ASOC effect was not detected under the other additional condition wherein LL was more obviously favored. The implications of these findings were discussed.

Stastny and Lehner (2018) compared the accuracy of forecasts in an intelligence community prediction market to comparable forecasts in analysis reports prepared by groups of professional intelligence analysts. To obtain quantitative probabilities from the analysis reports experienced analysts were asked to read the reports and state what probability they thought the reports implied for each forecast question. These were called imputed probabilities. Stastny and Lehner found that the prediction market was more accurate than the imputed probabilities and concluded that this was evidence that the prediction market was more accurate than the analysis reports. In a commentary, Mandel (2019) took exception to this interpretation. In a re-analysis of the data, Mandel found a very strong correlation between readers’ personal and imputed probabilities. From this Mandel builds a case that the imputed probabilities are little more than a reflection of the readers’ personal views; that they do not fairly reflect the contents of the analysis reports; and therefore, any accuracy results are spurious. This paper argues two points. First, the high correlation between imputed and personal probabilities was not evidence of substantial imputation bias. Rather it was the natural by-product of the fact that the imputed and personal probabilities were both forecasts of the same events. An additional analysis shows a much lower level of imputation bias that is consistent with the original results and interpretation. Second, the focus of Stastny and Lehner (2018) was on the reports as understood by readers. In this context, even if there was substantial imputation bias it would not invalidate accuracy results; it would instead provide a possible causal explanation of those results.

The moral dumbfounding phenomenon for harmless taboo violations is often cited as a critical piece of empirical evidence motivating anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making. Moral dumbfounding purportedly occurs when an individual remains obstinately and steadfastly committed to a moral judgment or decision even after admitting inability to provide reasons and arguments to support it (Haidt, 2001). Early empirical support for the moral dumbfounding phenomenon led some philosophers and psychologists to suggest that affective reactions and intuitions, in contrast with reasons or reasoning, are the predominant drivers of moral judgments and decisions. We investigate an alternative reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding: that putatively harmless taboo violations are judged to be morally wrong because of the high perceived likelihood that the agents could have caused harm, even though they did not cause harm in actuality. Our results indicate that judgments about the likelihood of causing harm consistently and strongly predicted moral wrongness judgments. Critically, a manipulation drawing attention to harms that could have occurred (but did not actually occur) systematically increased the severity of moral wrongness judgments. Thus, many participants were sensitive to at least one reason — the likelihood of harm — in making their moral judgments about these kinds of taboo violations. We discuss the implications of these findings for rationalist and anti-rationalist models of moral judgment and decision-making.

Research has identified loss aversion as a strong and robust phenomenon, but has also revealed some moderators affecting the magnitude of its effect on decision making. In the current article, we draw attention to the fact that even the measurement of loss aversion itself may affect its magnitude by inducing a focus on either losses or gains. In three studies, we provide empirical evidence for such a measurement-induced focus. In all studies we used coin-toss gambles—in which there is a 50/50 chance to win or to lose—to assess gain/loss ratios as a measure of loss aversion. Participants either filled out the loss side or the gain side of this gain/loss ratio. The studies consistently showed that—using within- and between-subject designs and anticipated and real coin-toss gambles—the strength of loss aversion depended on the measurement format (fill-in-the-loss versus fill-in-the-gain); filling in the loss side increased loss aversion. Moreover, loss aversion was more affected by the stakes of the gamble in the fill-in-the-loss format than in the fill-in-the-gain format.

When people judge risk or the probability of a risky prospect, single case narratives can bias judgments when a statistical base-rate is also provided. In this work we investigate various methodological and procedural factors that may influence this narrative bias. We found that narratives had the strongest effect on a non-numerical risk measure, which was also the best predictor of behavioral intentions. In contrast, two scales for subjective probability reflected primarily statistical variations. We observed a negativity bias on the risk measure, such that the narratives increased rather than decreased risk perceptions, whereas the effect on probability judgments was symmetric. Additionally, we found no evidence that the narrative bias is solely produced by adherence to conversational norms. Finally, changing the absolute number of narratives reporting the focal event, while keeping their relative frequency constant, had no effect. Thus, individuals extract a representation of likelihood from a sample of single-case narratives, which drives the bias. These results show that the narrative bias is in part dependent on the measure used to assess it and underline the conceptual distinction between subjective probability and perceived risk.

We compare four different risk-taking propensity measures on their ability to describe and to predict actual risky behavior in the domain of health. The risk-taking propensity measures we compare are: (1) a general measure of risk-taking propensity derived from a one-item survey question (Dohmen et al., 2011), (2) a risk aversion index calculated from a set of incentivized monetary gambles (Holt & Laury, 2002), (3) a measure of risk taking derived from an incentive compatible behavioral task—the Balloon Analog Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002), and (4) a composite score of risk-taking likelihood in the health domain from the Domain-Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT) scale (Weber et al., 2002). Study participants are 351 clients of health centers around Witbank, South Africa. Our findings suggest that the one-item general measure is the best predictor of risky health behavior in our population, predicting two out of four behaviors at the 5% level and the remaining two behaviors at the 10% level. The DOSPERT score in the health domain performs well, predicting one out of four behaviors at the 1% significance level and two out of four behaviors at the 10% level, but only if the DOSPERT instrument contains a hypothetical risk-taking item that is similar to the actual risky behavior being predicted. Incentivized monetary gambles and the behavioral task were unrelated to actual health behaviors; they were unable to predict any of the risky health behaviors at the 10% level. We provide evidence that this is not because the participants had trouble understanding the monetary trade-off questions or performed poorly in the behavioral task. We conclude by urging researchers to further test the usefulness of the one-item general measure, both in explaining health related risk-taking behavior and in other contexts.

Several approaches to judgment and decision making emphasize the effort-reducing properties of heuristics. One prominent example for effort-reduction is the recognition heuristic (RH) which proposes that judgments are made by relying on one single cue (recognition), ignoring other information. Our research aims to shed light on the conditions under which the RH is more useful and thus relied on more often. We propose that intuitive thinking is fast, automatic, and effortless whereas deliberative thinking is slower, stepwise, and more effortful. Because effort-reduction is thus much more important when processing information deliberately, we hypothesize that the RH should be more often relied on in such situations. In two city-size-experiments, we instructed participants to think either intuitively or deliberatively and assessed use of the RH through a formal measurement model. Results revealed that, in both experiments, use of the RH was more likely when judgments were to be made deliberatively, rather than intuitively. As such, we conclude that the potential application of heuristics is not necessarily a consequence of “intuitive” processing. Rather, their effort-reducing features are probably most beneficial when thinking more deliberatively.

Marketing science seeks to prescribe better marketing strategies (advertising, product development, pricing, etc.). To do so we rely on models of consumer decisions grounded in empirical observations. Field experience suggests that recognition-based heuristics help consumers to choose which brands to consider and purchase in frequently-purchased categories, but other heuristics are more relevant in durable-goods categories. Screening with recognition is a rational screening rule when advertising is a signal of product quality, when observing other consumers makes it easy to learn decision rules, and when firms react to engineering-design constraints by offering brands such that a high-level on one product feature implies a low level on another product feature. Experience with applications and field experiments suggests four fruitful research topics: deciding how to decide (endogeneity), learning decision rules by self-reflection, risk reduction, and the difference between utility functions and decision rules. These challenges also pose methodological cautions.

The paper surveys over twenty models of delay discounting (alsoknown as temporal discounting, time preference, timediscounting), that psychologists and economists have put forward toexplain the way people actually trade off time and money. Using little more thanthe basic algebra of powers and logarithms, I show how the models are derived,what assumptions they are based upon, and how different models relate to eachother. Rather than concentrate only on discount functionsthemselves, I show how discount functions may be manipulated to isolaterate parameters for each model. This approach, consistentlyapplied, helps focus attention on the three main components in any discountingmodel: subjectively perceived money; subjectively perceived time; and how theseelements are combined. We group models by the number of parameters that have tobe estimated, which means our exposition follows a trajectory of increasingcomplexity to the models. However, as the story unfolds it becomes clear thatmost models fall into a smaller number of families. We also show how new modelsmay be constructed by combining elements of different models.

The surveyed models are: Exponential; Hyperbolic; Arithmetic; Hyperboloid (Green& Myerson, Rachlin); Loewenstein and Prelec Generalized Hyperboloid;quasi-Hyperbolic (also known as β-δ discounting);Benhabib et al’s fixed cost; Benhabib et al’s Exponential /Hyperbolic / quasi-Hyperbolic; Read’s discounting fractions;Roelofsma’s exponential time; Scholten and Read’sdiscounting-by-intervals (DBI); Ebert and Prelec’s constant sensitivity(CS); Bleichrodt et al.’s constant absolute decreasing impatience (CADI);Bleichrodt et al.’s constant relative decreasing impatience (CRDI);Green, Myerson, and Macaux’s hyperboloid over intervals models;Killeen’s additive utility; size-sensitive additive utility; Yi, Landes,and Bickel’s memory trace models; McClure et al.’s twoexponentials; and Scholten and Read’s trade-off model.

For a convenient overview, a single “cheat sheet” table capturesthe notation and essential mathematics behind all but one of the models.

Magical beliefs about contagion via contact (Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989) may emerge when people overgeneralize real-world mechanisms of contamination beyond their appropriate boundaries (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). Do people similarly overextend knowledge of airborne contamination mechanisms? Previous work has shown that very young children believe merely being close to a contamination source can contaminate an item (Springer & Belk 1994); we asked whether this same hyper-avoidant intuition is also reflected in adults’ judgments. In two studies, we measured adults’ ratings of the desirability of an object that had made contact with a source of contamination, an object nearby that had made no contact with the contaminant, and an object far away that had also made no contact. Adults showed a clear proximity effect, wherein objects near the contamination source were perceived to be less desirable than those far away, even though a separate group of adults unanimously acknowledged that contaminants could not possibly have made contact with either the nearby or far-away object (Study 1). The proximity effect also remained robust when a third group of adults was explicitly told that no contaminating particles had made contact with the objects at any time (Study 2). We discuss implications of our findings for extending the scope of magical contagion effects beyond the contact principle, for understanding the persistence of intuitive theories despite broad acceptance of science-based theories, and for constraining interpretations of the developmental work on proximity beliefs.

In two studies, time preferences for financial gains and losses at delays of up to 50 years were elicited using three different methods: matching, fixed-sequence choice titration, and a dynamic “staircase” choice method. Matching was found to create fewer demand characteristics and to produce better fits with the hyperbolic model of discounting. The choice-based measures better predicted real-world outcomes such as smoking and payment of credit card debt. No consistent advantages were found for the dynamic staircase method over fixed-sequence titration.

According to Karl Popper, we can tell good theories from poor ones by assessing their empirical content (empirischer Gehalt), which basically reflects how much information they convey concerning the world. “The empirical content of a statement increases with its degree of falsifiability: the more a statement forbids, the more it says about the world of experience.” Two criteria to evaluate the empirical content of a theory are their level of universality (Allgemeinheit) and their degree of precision (Bestimmtheit). The former specifies how many situations it can be applied to. The latter refers to the specificity in prediction, that is, how many subclasses of realizations it allows. We conduct an analysis of the empirical content of theories in Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) and identify the challenges in theory formulation for different classes of models. Elaborating on classic Popperian ideas, we suggest some guidelines for publication of theoretical work.

For two decades, researchers have investigated the correlates and consequences of individual differences in maximizing, the tendency to pursue the goal of making the best possible choice by extensively seeking out and comparing alternatives. In this time, many different conceptualizations of maximizing have been proposed, including several that incorporate a construct called “decision difficulty.” We propose that including decision difficulty in measures of maximizing is problematic because the tendency to experience difficulty when making decisions is a separate individual difference construct already studied independently of maximizing — namely, indecisiveness. Across two studies (total N = 639), we find that scales measuring decision difficulty and indecisiveness are strongly correlated (r’s ≥ .85), load on the same component in a principal component analysis, and show a very similar pattern of correlations with related variables. Moreover, decision difficulty and indecisiveness scales both show a divergent pattern of correlations when compared to measures of maximizing. We argue that decision difficulty scales are best interpreted as tapping the same underlying tendency as indecisiveness scales, and conclude that the tendency to experience difficulty in decision making is best conceptualized not as a component of maximizing, but rather a cause or consequence of it.

The endowment effect is a well-documented decision phenomenon, referring to a tendency that people price a commodity higher when selling it than when buying it. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a sort of inertia, an unwillingness to make a change, or in other words an attachment to the status-quo. People with autism dislike social interaction, and are thus probably less willing to buy and sell items and more attached to the status quo. Previous research revealed that T-carriers of a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) of the dopamine beta-hydroxylase (DBH) gene, rs1611115 (C-1021T), are associated with autism and difficulty in social interaction. Therefore, rs1611115 may modulate the endowment effect. In the current study, the subjects sold and bought lotteries with various probabilities of winning money and provided saliva for genotyping. We found that T-carriers (people of CT genotype in this study) exhibited greater endowment effects compared to people of CC genotype. We discuss another two possible explanations of our results: empathy and loss aversion. This is the first attempt to research the endowment effect from the perspective of genes. The result indicates that an SNP of genes (an innate factor) can exert an observable effect on human market activities.

Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their choices withoutbeing able to communicate. One way to achieve this is through team-reasoning,asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just assessingone’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been suggestedthat team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged to think ofthose they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an in-group. In twostudies, we examined the effects of group identity, measured by the‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance innondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but nodescriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from theothers apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online experiment,our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected effect, but wefound a correlation of .18 between IOS and team-reasoning-consistent choosing.Similarly, in self-reported strategies, those who reported trying to pick anoption that stood out (making it easier to coordinate on) also reported higherIOS scores than did those who said they tended to choose the option with thelargest potential payoff. In a follow-up study in the lab, participants playedeither with friends or with strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationshipbetween IOS and team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead,friends’ behavior was related to their expectations of what theirpartners would do. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% ofstrangers played a team reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. Wesuggest that the strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning butfriends may have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to tryto predict their strategy.