This paper compares the behavior of individuals playing a classic two-person deterministic prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with choice data obtained from repeated interdependent security prisoner’s dilemma games with varying probabilities of loss and the ability to learn (or not learn) about the actions of one’s counterpart, an area of recent interest in experimental economics. This novel data set, from a series of controlled laboratory experiments, is analyzed using Bayesian hierarchical methods, the first application of such methods in this research domain.

We find that individuals are much more likely to be cooperative when payoffs are deterministic than when the outcomes are probabilistic. A key factor explaining this difference is that subjects in a stochastic PD game respond not just to what their counterparts did but also to whether or not they suffered a loss. These findings are interpreted in the context of behavioral theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity. The work provides a linkage between Bayesian statistics, experimental economics, and consumer psychology.

Across four studies participants (N = 818) rated the profoundness of abstract art images accompanied with varying categories of titles, including: pseudo-profound bullshit titles (e.g., The Deaf Echo), mundane titles (e.g., Canvas 8), and no titles. Randomly generated pseudo-profound bullshit titles increased the perceived profoundness of computer-generated abstract art, compared to when no titles were present (Study 1). Mundane titles did not enhance the perception of profoundness, indicating that pseudo-profound bullshit titles specifically (as opposed to titles in general) enhance the perceived profoundness of abstract art (Study 2). Furthermore, these effects generalize to artist-created abstract art (Study 3). Finally, we report a large correlation between profoundness ratings for pseudo-profound bullshit and “International Art English” statements (Study 4), a mode and style of communication commonly employed by artists to discuss their work. This correlation suggests that these two independently developed communicative modes share underlying cognitive mechanisms in their interpretations. We discuss the potential for these results to be integrated into a larger, new theoretical framework of bullshit as a low-cost strategy for gaining advantages in prestige awarding domains.

We compare and critique two measures of risk perception. We suggest that a single question — “How risky is the situation?” — captures the concept of risk perception more accurately than the multiple-item measure used by Sitkin and Weingart (1995). In fact, this latter measure inadvertently captures notions of attractiveness or expected return, rather than risk perception. We further propose that the error underlying the construction of Sitkin and Weingart’s measure is explained in terms of a top-down model of risk perception, in which perceived risk and perceived return are consequences, rather than determinants, of attractiveness. Two studies compare the validity of the two alternative measures.

We provide systematic evidence for the range and importance of hedonic reversals as a major source of pleasure, and incorporate these findings into the theory of benign masochism. Twenty-nine different initially aversive activities are shown to produce pleasure (hedonic reversals) in substantial numbers of individuals from both college student and Mechanical Turk samples. Hedonic reversals group, by factor analysis, into sadness, oral irritation, fear, physical activity/exhaustion, pain, strong alcohol-related tastes, bitter tastes, and disgust. Liking for sad experiences (music, novels, movies, paintings) forms a coherent entity, and is related to enjoyment of crying in response to sad movies. For fear and oral irritation, individuals also enjoy the body’s defensive reactions. Enjoyment of sadness is higher in females across domains. We explain these findings in terms of benign masochism, enjoyment of negative bodily reactions and feelings in the context of feeling safe, or pleasure at “mind over body”. In accordance with benign masochism, for many people, the favored level of initially negative experiences is just below the level that cannot be tolerated.

How accurate are laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions of events? The economic and psychological literatures provide opposing answers. A classical economic view assumes that ordinary decision makers consult perfect expectations, while recent psychological research has emphasized biases in perceptions. In this work, we test laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions. To establish a ground truth against which accuracy can be assessed, we control the information seen by each subject to establish unambiguous normative answers. We find that laypeople’s statistical intuitions can be highly accurate, and depend strongly upon the elicitation method used. In particular, we find that eliciting an entire distribution from a respondent using a graphical interface, and then computing simple statistics (such as means, fractiles, and confidence intervals) on this distribution, leads to greater accuracy, on both the individual and aggregate level, than the standard method of asking about the same statistics directly.

When faced with a choice, people can normally select no option, i.e., defer choice. Previous research has investigated when and why individuals defer choice, but has almost never looked at these questions when groups of people make choices. Separate reasons predict that groups may be equally likely, more likely, or less likely than individuals to defer choice. We re-analyzed some previously published data and conducted a new experiment to address this question. We found that small groups of people tended to defer choice more often than their members would. Assuming that the groups used a plurality rule but gave additional weight to individual preferences to defer choice allowed the groups’ responses to be predicted quite well. We discuss several possible explanations of these findings.

We consider the wisdom of the crowd situation in which individuals make binary decisions, and the majority answer is used as the group decision. Using data sets from nine different domains, we examine the relationship between the size of the majority and the accuracy of the crowd decisions. We find empirically that these calibration curves take many different forms for different domains, and the distribution of majority sizes over decisions in a domain also varies widely. We develop a growth model for inferring and interpreting the calibration curve in a domain, and apply it to the same nine data sets using Bayesian methods. The modeling approach is able to infer important qualitative properties of a domain, such as whether it involves decisions that have ground truths or are inherently uncertain. It is also able to make inferences about important quantitative properties of a domain, such as how quickly the crowd accuracy increases as the size of the majority increases. We discuss potential applications of the measurement model, and the need to develop a psychological account of the variety of calibration curves that evidently exist.

We explore people’s preferences for numbers in large proprietary data sets from two different lottery games. We find that choice is far from uniform, and exhibits some familiar and some new tendencies and biases. Players favor personally meaningful and situationally available numbers, and are attracted towards numbers in the center of the choice form. Frequent players avoid winning numbers from recent draws, whereas infrequent players chase these. Combinations of numbers are formed with an eye for aesthetics, and players tend to spread their numbers relatively evenly across the possible range.

Failures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by adopting policies, technologies, and lifestyle changes have led the world to the brink of crisis, or likely beyond. Here we use Internet surveys to attempt to understand these failures by studying factors that affect the adoption of personal energy conservation behaviors and also endorsement of energy conservation goals proposed for others. We demonstrate an asymmetry between goals for self and others (“I’ll do the easy thing, you do the hard thing”), but we show that this asymmetry is partly produced by actor/observer differences: people know what they do already (and generally do not propose those actions as personal goals) and also know their own situational constraints that are barriers to action. We also show, however, that endorsement of conservation goals decreases steeply as a function of perceived difficulty; this suggests a role for motivated cognition as a barrier to conservation: difficult things are perceived as less applicable to one’s situation.

How do people make everyday decisions in order to achieve the most successful outcome? Decision making research typically evaluates choices according to their expected utility. However, this research largely focuses on abstract or hypothetical tasks and rarely investigates whether the outcome is successful and satisfying for the decision maker. Instead, we use an everyday decision making task in which participants describe a personally meaningful decision they are currently facing. We investigate the decision processes used to make this decision, and evaluate how successful and satisfying the outcome of the decision is for them. We examine how well analytic, attribute-based processes explain everyday decision making and predict decision outcomes, and we compare these processes to associative processes elicited through free association. We also examine the characteristics of decisions and individuals that are associated with good decision outcomes. Across three experiments we found that: 1) an analytic decision analysis of everyday decisions is not superior to simpler attribute-based processes in predicting decision outcomes; 2) contrary to research linking associative cognition to biases, free association generates valid cues that predict choice and decision outcomes as effectively as attribute-based approaches; 3) contrary to research favouring either attribute-based or associative processes, combining both attribute-based and associates best explains everyday decisions and most accurately predicts decision outcomes; and 4) individuals with a tendency to attempt analytic thinking do not make more successful everyday decisions. Instead, frequency, simplicity, and knowledge of the decision predict success. We propose that attribute-based and associative processes, in combination, both explain everyday decision making and predict successful decision outcomes.

Prior research using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) has established that political ideology is associated with self-reported reliance on specific moral foundations in moral judgments of acts. MFQ items do not specify the agents involved in the acts, however. By specifying agents in MFQ items we revealed blatant political double standards. Conservatives thought that the same moral foundation was more relevant if victims were agents that they like (i.e., corporations and other conservatives) but less relevant when the same agents were perpetrators. Liberals showed the same pattern for agents that they like (i.e., news media and other liberals). A UK sample showed much weaker political double standards with respect to corporations and news media, consistent with feelings about corporations and news media being much less politicized in the UK than in the US. We discuss the implications for moral foundations theory.

Regret is one of the most common emotions, but researchers generally measure it in an ad-hoc, unvalidated fashion. Three studies outline the construction and validation of the Regret Elements Scale (RES), which distinguishes between an affective component of regret, associated with maladaptive affective outcomes, and a cognitive component of regret, associated with functional preparatory outcomes. The present research demonstrates the RES’s relationship with distress (Study 1), appraisals of emotions (Study 2), and existing measures of regret (Study 3). We further demonstrate the RES’s ability to differentiate regret from other negative emotions (Study 2) and related traits (Study 3). The scale provides both a new theoretical perspective on regret, and a tool for researchers interested in measuring post-decisional regret.

Conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, which involves a US-led policy to impose sanctions on Iran, is perceived by each side as a preeminent challenge to its own national security and global peace. Yet, there is little scientific study or understanding of how material incentives and disincentives, such as economic sanctions, psychologically affect the targeted population and potentially influence behaviour. Here we explore the Iranian nuclear program within a paradigm concerned with sacred values. We integrate experiments within a survey of 1997 Iranians. We find that a relatively small but politically significant portion of the Iranian population believes that acquiring nuclear energy has become a sacred value, in the sense that proposed economic incentives and disincentives result in a “backfire effect” in which offers of material rewards or punishment lead to increased anger and greater disapproval. This pattern was specific to nuclear energy and did not hold for acquiring nuclear weapons. The present study is the first demonstration of the backfire effect for material disincentives as well as incentives, and on an issue whose apparent sacred nature is recent rather than longstanding.

To successfully select and implement nudges, policy makers need a psychological understanding of who opposes nudges, how they are perceived, and when alternative methods (e.g., forced choice) might work better. Using two representative samples, we examined four factors that influence U.S. attitudes toward nudges – types of nudges, individual dispositions, nudge perceptions, and nudge frames. Most nudges were supported, although opt-out defaults for organ donations were opposed in both samples. “System 1” nudges (e.g., defaults and sequential orderings) were viewed less favorably than “System 2” nudges (e.g., educational opportunities or reminders). System 1 nudges were perceived as more autonomy threatening, whereas System 2 nudges were viewed as more effective for better decision making and more necessary for changing behavior. People with greater empathetic concern tended to support both types of nudges and viewed them as the “right” kind of goals to have. Individualists opposed both types of nudges, and conservatives tended to oppose both types. Reactant people and those with a strong desire for control opposed System 1 nudges. To see whether framing could influence attitudes, we varied the description of the nudge in terms of the target (Personal vs. Societal) and the reference point for the nudge (Costs vs. Benefits). Empathetic people were more supportive when framing highlighted societal costs or benefits, and reactant people were more opposed to nudges when frames highlighted the personal costs of rejection.

In two experiments, participants decided on each of several trials whether or notto take a risk. If they chose to take the risk, they had a relatively highprobability (from 75% to 95%) of winning a small number of points and arelatively low probability (5% to 25%) of losing a large number of points. Theloss amounts varied so that the expected value of taking the risk was positiveon some trials, zero on others, and negative on the rest. The main independentvariable was whether the probability of losing was communicated using numericalpercentages or icon arrays. Both experiments included random icon arrays, inwhich the icons representing losses were randomly distributed throughout thearray. Experiment 2 also included grouped icon arrays, in which the iconsrepresenting losses were grouped at the bottom of the array. Neither type oficon array led to better performance in the task. However, the random iconarrays led to less risk taking than the numerical percentages or the groupedicon arrays, especially at the higher loss probabilities. In a third experiment,participants made direct judgments of the percentages and probabilitiesrepresented by the icon arrays from Experiment 2. The results supported the ideathat random arrays lead to less risk taking because they are perceived torepresent greater loss probabilities. These results have several implicationsfor the study of icon arrays and their use in risk communication.

We conducted additional analyses of Pennycook et al.’s (2015, Study 2) data to investigate the possibility that there would be ideological differences in “bullshit receptivity” that would be explained by individual differences in cognitive style and ability. As hypothesized, we observed that endorsement of neoliberal, free market ideology was significantly but modestly associated with bullshit receptivity. In addition, we observed a quadratic association, which indicated that ideological moderates were more susceptible to bullshit than ideological extremists. These relationships were explained, in part, by heuristic processing tendencies, faith in intuition, and lower verbal ability. Results are inconsistent with approaches suggesting that (a) there are no meaningful ideological differences in cognitive style or reasoning ability, (b) simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive styles are generally associated with leftist (vs. rightist) economic preferences, or (c) simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive styles are generally associated with extremist (vs. moderate) preferences. Theoretical and practical implications are briefly addressed.

As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in order to create unified theories within the field. These efforts are potentially undermined, however, by variations in wording used by different researchers. The current study sought to determine whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of 4 adjectives: “wrong”, “inappropriate”, “forbidden”, or “blameworthy”. For half of the sample, these adjectives were preceded by the adverb “morally”. Results indicated that people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when “morally” was included. Although some wording differences emerged, effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral judgment with different wordings can legitimately be compared.

Using college student samples, two studies were conducted to validate the Chinese version of the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale. The results replicated important findings reported by Weber et al. (2002) in the Chinese culture. Risk-taking and risk perception were domain-specific, whereas perceived-risk attitudes were relatively stable across domains, supporting the risk-return model of risk taking. Results of both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) showed that the ethical, recreational, health/safety, and gambling domains were preserved in the Chinese version of DOSPERT and that the items from social and investment domains formed one factor. This result may be explained by Weber and Hsee's (1998) cushion hypothesis. Other possible reasons for this cross-cultural difference in the factor structure were also discussed.

The recognition heuristic models the adaptive use and dominant role of recognition knowledge in judgment under uncertainty. Of the several predictions that the heuristic makes, empirical tests have predominantly focused on the proposed noncompensatory processing of recognition. Some authors have emphasized that the heuristic needs to be scrutinized based on precise tests of the exclusive use of recognition. Although precise tests have clear merits, I critically evaluate the value of such tests as they are currently employed. First, I argue that using precise measures of the exclusive use of recognition has to go beyond showing that the recognition heuristic—like every model—cannot capture reality completely. Second, I illustrate how precise tests based on response times can lead to unsubstantiated conclusions if the fact that the recognition heuristic does not model the recognition judgment itself is ignored. Finally, I highlight two key but so far neglected aspects of the recognition heuristic: (a) the connection between recognition memory and the recognition heuristic; and (b) the mechanisms underlying the adaptive use of recognition.