To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Both in the past and the present, literacy has been seen as a gift enabling people to free themselves from the shackles of 'ignorance' and 'erroneous' belief-systems. Trying to establish firm ground on which to reconstruct the nature of popular literature is not made any easier when the framework is being shaken by historians such as Roger Chartier, who repudiate the very concept of the 'popular' in 'popular literature'. The chapbook reached its zenith during the eighteenth century with the expansion of regional publishers, and it remained a hugely popular literary format up until the mid-nineteenth century. Although much of educated society saw the popular belief in witchcraft as foolish, it was also deemed deleterious, and most certainly a delusion not be nourished in any way. By reporting cases of witchcraft and magic, newspapers were attempting to promote public awareness of the continued 'problem' of popular belief in such powers.
In this article, I discuss the inadequacy of the solution to the problem of evil in a God-created world proposed by the African perfect God theists, Kwame Gyekye and Ebunoluwa Oduwole, and highlight the success of the limited God framework of Kwasi Wiredu, J.A.I. Bewaji, and the Chimakonams in accounting for the evil in the world. However, implicit in the limitation thesis is the claim that God did his best at the time he created the world, such that the evil in it cannot be further reduced to allow for a better world. I argue that the limited God view offers a good reason to believe that a limited God can reduce the evil in the world and make it better, once the deity is conceived as a sufficiently powerful, knowledgeable, and good being with the capacity for continuous improvement within the bounds of limitation.
The period of almost 100 years from the Poole project to Whiston's Memoirs was marked by the severing of a connection between the human, natural and spiritual worlds: the providential prodigy. Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume claimed that it would always be more likely that a witness is lying or deceived than that a law of nature be violated. Although this argument is usually treated in the context of the debate on miracles, Hume explicitly declared that it was directed against 'accounts of miracles and prodigies'. From the shadowy producers of the Mirabilis Annus tracts to the natural philosophers of the Royal Society to the Tory journalists of the Exclusion period, a common attitude toward prodigies served as one bond uniting the members of intellectual factions. The fact that prodigies occupied a liminal position between a variety of intellectual realms made them a particularly active site of contention.
Although some social historians have acknowledged the existence of these occult practitioners during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, their social significance and influence has generally been underestimated and often totally neglected. They existed in large numbers because many people relied on them to help them cope with a wide range of personal problems and unfulfilled desires. This chapter examines the role and activities of these occult practitioners to gain new insights into the culture within which they operated. Cunning-folk were important figures in the social landscape of provincial England and Wales. Like the clergy, magistracy and constabulary they held a position of authority in rural communities. While rural cunning-folk and fortune-tellers continued to ply their trade using long-established methods, their urban cousins were more readily influenced by the new trends in pseudo-science and supernatural belief which developed and circulated readily in the towns and cities.
Institutional natural philosophy became a permanent cultural presence, whether as a pastime for aristocratic and even royal virtuosos or as a target for satire, and began to include prodigies under its jurisdiction. This chapter examines the activities of the Royal Society and its fellows from the establishment of the Society in 1661 through to the early eighteenth century, as well as of the societies corresponding with the Royal Society, the Oxford Philosophical Society and the Dublin Philosophical Society. It explores some English natural philosophers who corresponded with the Society, identified themselves with its mission and were published in its journals, but were not fellows, such as Joshua Childrey and Samuel Colepresse. Like other royalist writers of the Restoration, Childrey wanted to draw a firm distinction between God's direct actions and mere unusual occurrences in nature. Monsters and prodigies also played important roles in the emerging field of natural theology.
Providential prodigy interpretation and moral reform were old allies, going back to a time before the Reformation, and linked in sermons, pamphlets and ballads. Moral reform and the struggle against atheism had been part of Mathew Poole's agenda, and, while sectarian and political debate dominated the prodigy literature of the Civil War and the Restoration, the tradition of moralistic prodigy interpretation had certainly never disappeared. This new moralistic prodigy interpretation had been anticipated in 1678 in the attempt by an Anglican divine to save prodigies as divine signs by emphasizing the division between valid private judgements and the invalid application of prodigies to public issues. Most interpretaters of the earthquakes avoided apocalyptic predictions. One exception was Thomas Beverley. His 1693 Evangelical Repentance Unto Salvation not to be Repented Of identified the earthquakes both as apocalyptic signs and as warnings to repent.
Even after the Mirabilis Annus affair many prodigies, particularly comets, continued to be interpreted politically and providentially. One of the last major efflorescences of political prodigy writing in England occurred during the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis from 1678 to 1682. One striking aspect of Restoration providential prodigy writing after the Mirabilis Annus affair is the prominence of comets, or 'blazing stars', as paradigmatic providential signs, rather than as one of a number of prodigious phenomena. Christopher Ness discussed a much smaller number of prodigies than had his predecessors in the Mirabilis Annus tracts. The challenge to the providential interpretation of prodigies posed by the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century posed a specific problem for Ness's work. Although the period from the Restoration to the revolution did not end the political use of providential prodigies in England, it clearly identified such use as intellectually and culturally suspect.
Following Heath White, let ‘divine determinism’ denote the pairing of the following theses: ‘(1) the facts about God’s will entail every other contingent fact, and (2) the facts about God’s will are explanatorily prior to every other fact’. In the article, we develop a theological version of Peter van Inwagen’s so-called Direct Argument and show that, if sound, the Theological Direct Argument leads to the conclusion that divine determinism is incompatible with human moral responsibility. But, the soundness of the argument depends upon two inference rules, one of which, called Rule B, is controversial. So, in the third section of the article, we offer a novel, two-part defence of Rule B. This defence, in the first part, has to do with how truth, in a fairly trivial way, depends on the world. The second part of the defence has to do with the way that the logic of conditionals works. The upshot of this defence is that counter-examples to Rule B are impossible. Even so, should that defence fail, we also consider, in section four, a way of reformulating Rule B that, if successful, circumvents alleged counter-examples to the original statement of Rule B.
This book explores the reasons and justifications for the Chinese state’s campaign to erase Uyghur identity, focusing, in particular, on how China’s manipulation of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) has facilitated this cultural genocide. It is the first book to address this issue in depth, and serves as an important rebuttal to Chinese state claims that this campaign is a benign effort to combat an existential extremist threat. While the book suggests that the motivation for this state-led campaign is primarily China’s gradual settler colonization of the Uyghur homeland, the text focuses on the narrative of the Uyghur terrorist threat that has provided international cover and justification for the campaign and has shaped its ‘biopolitical’ nature. It describes how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was able to successfully implicate Uyghurs in GWOT and, despite a lack of evidence, brand them internationally as a serious terrorist threat within the first year of the war. In recounting these developments, the book offers a critique of existing literature on the Uyghur terrorist threat and questions the extent of this threat to the PRC. Finding no evidence for the existence of such a threat when the Chinese state first declared its existence in 2001, the book argues that a nominal Uyghur militant threat only emerged after over a decade of PRC suppression of Uyghur dissent in the name of counterterrorism, facilitating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ that has served to justify further state repression and ultimately cultural genocide.