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Comparing the SPLA’s Role in Sudan’s 1997 and 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreements: To Spoil or Not to Spoil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2014

Keisha S. Haywood
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Abstract:

In 2012, of the ten ongoing intrastate conflicts in Africa, half had seen at least one relapse into violence after an agreement had been signed between warring parties. This statistic tells the story of stalled and failed peace processes on the continent, but it does not point to potential causes for these failures. By comparing the Sudan People’s Liberation Army’s divergent decisions during different peace processes in 1997 and 2005, this article finds that changes in the group’s grievances and cost–benefit analysis influenced its leaders’ decision to participate in or spoil a peace process.

Résumé:

En 2012, sur les dix conflits civils en cours en Afrique, la moitié au moins avait vu au moins une instance de recrudescence de violence après un accord qui avait été signé entre des factions opposées. Cette statistique raconte l’histoire des processus de paix bloqués et échoués sur le continent, mais elle n’explique pas les causes possibles de ces échecs. En comparant des décisions divergentes de l’Armée populaire de libération au Soudan au cours des processus de paix tentés en 1997 et 2005, cet article conclut que l’évolution des réclamations des groupes de rebelles, ainsi qu’une analyse coûts–bénéfices faite par les dirigeants en place, ont eu une influence sur leur décision de participer d’une manière productive ou destructive aux processus de paix en cours.

Keywords

SudanSouth Sudanconflictpeace agreementSudan People’s Liberation ArmySudan People’s Liberation Movementcivil warrebelsecessionHorn of AfricaEast Africa
Type
ARTICLES
Information
African Studies Review , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , December 2014 , pp. 143 - 165
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 2014 

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