In RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the Court added an exclamation point to a long term trend in its jurisprudence. It believes, this trend indicates, that private civil suits pose specific foreign relations issues, at least when the targets are foreign transactions and actors, to which the Court will respond by erecting barriers. To this general point the case adds an unsurprising, but still important codicil: These problems don’t go away when foreign states take advantage of the U.S. civil litigation system by acting as plaintiffs.

For the past twenty-five years, the presumption against extraterritoriality has been the Supreme Court’s principal tool for determining the geographic scope of federal statutes. In 2010, Morrison v. National Australia Bank used the presumption to decide the scope of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits securities fraud. Morrison approached the question in two steps. First, it looked for a “clear indication of extraterritoriality” to rebut the presumption and found none. Second, it looked to see if application of the statute would be domestic or extraterritorial by examining the “focus” of the provision. Plaintiffs argued that applying Section 10(b) would be domestic because the alleged fraud occurred in the United States, although they had bought their shares in Australia. The Court disagreed, holding that application of Section 10(b) would be extraterritorial because “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States,” and in this case the transaction occurred abroad.

The judge-made presumption against extraterritoriality has recently become a motley patchwork of eccentric and sometimes contradictory doctrines seemingly stitched together for one, and only one, mission: to deprive plaintiffs the right to sue in U.S. courts for harms suffered abroad. It lumbers along, blithely squashing precedent, principle, statutory text, and legislative intent—all to heed its abiding and single-minded obsession. The Supreme Court has so far mangled the scope of the Securities Exchange Act and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and, in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, has placed another statute—The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)—on the chopping block. The major surgery performed was amputating RICO’s private right of action for extraterritorial offenses and replacing it with a much stubbier appendage limited to injuries suffered on U.S. territory.

Last year in the Stanford Law Review, I described an emerging trend in U.S. courts: litigation isolationism. Through developments in personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, international comity, and the presumption against extraterritoriality, I argued, courts have developed increasingly strong tools for avoiding transnational litigation. Decisions advancing litigation isolationism often fail to accomplish their stated goals—typically promoting separation of powers, avoiding interstate friction, and protecting defendants from the inconvenience of U.S. litigation. They also undermine important U.S. interests, often by excluding or dismissing cases that have close ties to the United States. At the end of that article, I cautioned against the continuation of the trend.

In RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial application of U.S. law for the third time in six years—in this case examining the geographic scope of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The decision consolidates and in certain respects expands upon the test for analyzing extraterritoriality issues that the Court had introduced in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and refined in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. It also provides further evidence of the Court’s continuing quest to identify categorical, territory-based rules governing the application of U.S. statutes in cases involving significant foreign elements. As I will argue, however, like other recent decisions, RJR raises doubt as to the sufficiency of such rules to address the messy and often unpredictable patterns of transnational economic activity.

In response to the 1991 Supreme Court decision resuscitating the presumption against extraterritoriality [hereinafter “PAE” or “presumption”], EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), Larry Kramer described the presumption as an anachronism—a throwback to the strict territorialist approach to choice of law that prevailed before the mid-Twentieth Century but has been mostly abandoned since then. The title of his scathing article, Vestiges of Beale, referred to Joseph Beale, the Harvard Law professor and reporter of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, whose since-discredited theories underlay that Restatement’s approach to choice of law. In the cases since Aramco, the Court has strengthened and expanded the presumption. With its decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, it is fair to say, the Court has out-Beale’d Beale.

The decision of the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco v. European Community is the culmination of sixteen years of litigation, preceded by years of investigation. From a European perspective, the decision can only be read as a disappointment: “we” tried, “we” lost. But beyond the frustration with the outcome, this European take on the RJR decision will focus on two questions: (i) why did the European Community decide to bring proceedings in the United States in the first place; and (ii) what would happen in the reverse scenario, if a foreign public authority or a private plaintiff were to bring suit in the European Union? Answering these two questions casts RJR in a slightly different light and offers an interesting picture of the wider political and regulatory context in the European Union.