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Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

George A. Quattrone  and
Amos Tversky
George A. Quattrone
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Amos Tversky
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.

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Articles
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American Political Science Review , Volume 82 , Issue 3 , September 1988 , pp. 719 - 736
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988 

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