Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013


Matthew Soberg Shugart
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego

Abstract

Presidents often lack legislative majorities, but situations of opposition-party majorities (“divided government”) are much less common outside the United States. The president's party's share of seats tends to increase in early-term elections but decline in later elections. Thus opposition majorities often result after midterm elections. Opposition majorities rarely occur in elections held concurrently with the presidential election but are more likely to do so if legislators enjoy electoral independence from their parties due to features of electoral laws.


Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Alesina, Alberto, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1989. “Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy.” American Political Science Review 83:373–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Archer, Ron. 1990. “Paralysis of Reform: Political Stability and Social Conflict in Colombia.” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
Born, Richard. 1990. “Surge and Decline, Negative Voting, and Midterm Loss Phenomenon: A Simultaneous Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 34:615–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cain, Bruce, Ferejohn, John, and Fiorina, Morris. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, Angus. 1960. “Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change.” Public Opinion Quarterly 24:397418.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, John M., and Shugart, Matthew S.. N.d. “Incentives To Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 13:4. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Conaghan, Catherine M. 1994. “Loose Parties, ‘Floating’ Politicians, and Institutional Stress: Presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979–1988.” In The Failure of Presidentialism Democracy, ed. Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and Kernell, Samuel, eds. 1991. The Politics of Divided Government. Boulder: Westview.Google Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and Shugart, Matthew S.. N.d. “In the Absence of Vote Pooling: Nomination and Allocation Errors in Colombia.” Electoral Studies. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Cruz-Coke, Ricardo. 1984. Historia electoral de Chile, 1925–1973. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Jurídica de Chile.Google Scholar
Cutler, Lloyd N. 1980. “To Form a Government.” Foreign Affairs 59:126–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Duverger, Maurice. 1980. “A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government.” European Journal of Political Research 8:165–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, Leon. 1967. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.Google Scholar
Erickson, Robert S. 1988. “The Puzzle of Midterm Loss.” Journal of Politics 50:1011–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P. 1988. “The Reagan Years: Turning to the Right or Groping Toward the Middle?” In The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies, ed. Cooper, Barry, Kornberg, Allan, and Mishler, William. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Google Scholar
Fiorina, Morris. 1992. Divided Government. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. “Democratic Institutions as a Bargain among Self-interested Politicians.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.Google Scholar
Gil, Federico. 1966. The Politimi System of Chile. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Hinckley, Barbara. 1967. “Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's ‘Expected’ Loss of Seats.” American Political Science Review 61:694700.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ingberman, Daniel, and Villani, John. 1993. “An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 37:429–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988. Boulder: Westview.Google Scholar
Jones, Mark P. 1994. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan.Google Scholar
Kernell, Samuel. 1977. “Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party.” American Political Science Review 71:4466.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems in Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1:5169.Google Scholar
Linz, Juan J. 1994. “Democracy, Presidential or Parliamentary: Does It Make a Difference?” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, ed. Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
McCubbins, Mathew D. 1991. “Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits.” In Parallel Politics, ed. Kernell, Samuel. Washington: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
Mackie, Thomas T., and Rose, Richard. 1992. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.Google Scholar
Mainwaring, Scott. 1991. “Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics, October, pp. 2143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination.” Comparative Political Studies 26:198228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–1990. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Nogueira Alcala, Humberto. 1986. El régimen semiprecidencial: Una nueva forma de gobierno democrática! Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andante.Google Scholar
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 1993. Enciclopedia electoral Latinoamericana y del Caribe. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos.Google Scholar
Palmer, Matthew S. R. 1993. Constitutional Design and Law: The Political Economy of Cabinet and Congressional Government. J.S.D. diss., Yale University.Google Scholar
Philippines Republic of. Commission of Elections. Various years. Report of the Commission of Elections on Elections to the President of the Philippines and the Congress. Manila: Bureau of Printing.Google Scholar
Pierce, Roy. 1990. “The Executive Divided against Itself: France 1986–1988.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.Google Scholar
Pinckney, Thomas M. 1971. Third Parties in the Philippines. Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee.Google Scholar
Powell, G. Bingham Jr., 1989. “Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1:107–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rae, Douglas W. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Robinson, Donald L., ed. 1985. Reforming American Government: The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System. Boulder: Westview.Google Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S. 1988. Duverger's Rule, District Magnitude, and Presidentialism. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine.Google Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S., and Carey, John M.. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S., and Mainwaring, Scott. N.d. “Conclusion: Varieties of Presidentialism.” In Presidential Democracy in Latin America, ed. Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew S.. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Shugart, Matthew S., and Taagepera, Rein. 1994. “Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a Double Complement Rule.” Comparative Political Studies 27:323–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sours, Martin H. 1970. “Philippine Political Parties: A Background Analysis in Political Development.” Philippine Journal of Public Administration 14:384–96.Google Scholar
Strøm, Kaare. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Suleiman, Ezra N. 1994. “Presidentialism and Political Stability in France.” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, ed. Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Sundquist, James L. 1986. Constitutional Reform and Effective Government. Washington: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
Sundquist, James L. 1988. “Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States.” Political Science Quarterly 103:613–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taagepera, Rein, and Shugart, Matthew S.. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Tufte, Edward R. 1975. “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 69:812–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Valenzuela, Arturo. 1994. “Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government.” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, ed. Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Zupan, Mark A. 1991. “An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting.” Journal of Law and Economics 34:343–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Altmetric attention score


Full text views

Full text views reflects PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 47 *
View data table for this chart

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 5th December 2020. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Hostname: page-component-b4dcdd7-xrv4g Total loading time: 0.483 Render date: 2020-12-05T13:38:57.526Z Query parameters: { "hasAccess": "0", "openAccess": "0", "isLogged": "0", "lang": "en" } Feature Flags last update: Sat Dec 05 2020 13:00:32 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) Feature Flags: { "metrics": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "peerReview": true, "crossMark": true, "comments": true, "relatedCommentaries": true, "subject": true, "clr": false, "languageSwitch": true }

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response


Your details


Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *