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Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Steven E. Finkel ,
Edward N. Muller  and
Karl-Dieter Opp
Steven E. Finkel
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
Edward N. Muller
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
Karl-Dieter Opp
Affiliation:
University of Hamburg
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Abstract

We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action—a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action.

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Articles
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American Political Science Review , Volume 83 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 885 - 903
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989

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