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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
The submission of proposals for the abolition of the state senate to the people of Oregon at the two preceding general elections is occasion for a summary of considerations in reference to the bicameral system of legislation.
The bicameral system has been so long and so widely prevalent that until very recently its “necessity” has been almost universally regarded as “a demonstrated truth.” The British legislature, “the mother of parliaments,” is a development from the assembly of “estates.” Five distinct “estates” were present in the “Model Parliament” of 1295, but through the consolidation of interests, the organization of two legislative chambers, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, was soon evolved. The origin of the bicameral system was thus “not owing to any conviction that two houses would work better than either one or three, but was a matter of sheer accident,” and was not “the invention of any clever constitution-maker.” The bicameral system of legislation, generally based upon English precedent, has usually followed the extension of constitutional government, and at present most national legislatures consist of two chambers.
1 DeToqueville, , Democracy in America, Reeve's, trans., vol. 1, p. 87Google Scholar; Esmein, , Droit Constitutionnel, 5th ed., p. 90.Google Scholar
2 Freeman, , Comparative Politics, pp. 21–22, 234.Google Scholar See also Esmein, , Droit Constitutionnel, 5th ed., p. 90.Google Scholar “This theory, which was unknown to the republics of antiquity—which was introduced into the world almost by accident, like so many other great truths…. is at length become an axiom in the political science of the present age.” DeToqueville, , Democracy in America, Reeve's, trans., vol. I, p. 87.Google Scholar
3 The exceptions are Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Greece, Honduras, Luxemburg, Monaco, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Salvador and Servia. The reëstablishment of the council of state in Greece effects an approach to the bicameral system. In Norway the legislature divides itself into two chambers for legislation, but conflicts between the two chambers are finally settled by joint session.
4 Cromwell's Parliament consisted of a single house.
5 For information on South American conditions indebtedness has been incurred to Prof. William R. Shepherd of Columbia University.
6 Lieber, , Civil Liberty and Self-Government, ed., 1874, p. 194.Google Scholar
7 There have been some movements toward the abolition of the upper chamber of Nova Scotia. In the South African Union conflicts between the two houses are finally settled by the combination of the two houses in joint session.
8 Moran, , Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Thirteenth Series, pp. 211–58Google Scholar; Morey, , Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 4, pp. 211–15 (1894).Google Scholar
9 Morey, , Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 4, p. 215 (1894).Google Scholar
10 Senatorial Term, American Law Review, vol. 4, p. 18 (1869).
11 Habberly, Bandon (Ore.) Recorder, October 13, 1914.
12 Oberholtzer, , Referendum, Initiative, and Recall, 2d ed., pp. 71–72.Google Scholar
13 Lieber was in error: “The bicameral system accompanies the Anglican race like the common law…. No instance illustrating this fact is perhaps more striking than the meeting of settlers in Oregon territory, when Congress had neglected to provide for them…. The people met for the purpose of establishing some legislature for themselves, and at once adopted the principle of two houses. It is to us as natural as the jury.” Civil Liberty and Self-Government, ed. 1874, p. 194.
14 Oregon, Referendum Pamphlet, 1912, no. 362, art. 4, sec. 2, p. 212.Google Scholar
15 Oregon Senate Joint Resolution, no. 21, Senate Journal, 1913, pp. 381, 485–486. A similar proposition failed at the session of 1915.
16 “The senate and the office of senator in the legislative assembly of Oregon are hereby abolished. All provisions of the constitution and laws of Oregon in conflict with this section are hereby abrogated and repealed in so far as they conflict therewith. This section is in all respects self-executing and immediately operative.” Oregon, Referendum Pamphlet, 1914, no. 350, p. 82.Google Scholar
17 Cf. Morgan, , Contemporary Review, vol. 97, pp. 533–534 (1910).Google Scholar
18 Duguit, , Droit Constitutionnel, vol. 1, p. 367.Google Scholar
19 Story, , Commentaries, vol. 1, sec. 559.Google Scholar “The proposal for the abolition of the Oregon senate has been derided by its opponents generally as a ‘freak measure.’”
20 Bentham, , Works, Bowring's, ed., vol. 4, p. 445.Google Scholar
21 Gill, , Pacific Grange Bulletin, May 1913, p. 123.Google Scholar See also People's Power League, Referendum Pamphlet, 1912, p. 221.Google Scholar
22 McCormick, Medill, reported in Oregon Journal, July 27, 1913, sec. 5, p. 5, col. 6.Google Scholar
23 Hodges, Message to Kansas Legislature, reprinted in Oregon Journal, June 3, 1913, p. 8, col. 3. Sec also, especially, East Oregonian, May 10, 1913, p. 4, col. 1.
24 People's Power League, Referendum Pamphlet, 1912, p. 221.Google Scholar
25 Wilson, , Elliot's, Debates, vol. 5, p. 197.Google Scholar
26 Story, , Commentaries, vol. 1, sec. 558.Google Scholar See also ibid, sec. 551; Mill, Representative Government, ch. 13; Marion County Taxpayers' League, Oregon, Referendum Pamphlet, 1912, p. 223.Google Scholar
27 Burgess, , Political Science, vol. 2, pp. 107–108Google Scholar; Esmein, , Droit Constitutionnel, 5th ed., pp. 105–106.Google Scholar “Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real danger to the American constitutions.” Madison, , Elliot's, Debates, vol. 5, p. 345.Google Scholar
28 Vol. 1, pp. 160–161.
29 Cooley, , Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 125–126.Google Scholar
30 Mathews, , American Political Science Review, vol. 6, pp. 220–221 (1912).Google Scholar
31 Rogers, , North American Review, vol. 88, p. 323 (1908).Google Scholar
32 Thayer, , Legal Essays, p. 40.Google Scholar
33 Oberholtzer, , Referendum, Initiative, and Recall, 2d ed., pp. 71–72.Google Scholar See also Morgan, , Contemporary Review, vol. 97, p. 544 (1910)Google Scholar; Dealey, , Our State Constitutions, p. 9Google Scholar; Croly, , Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, vol. 8, pp. 122–32 (1911).Google Scholar
34 Ford, , North American Review, vol. 194, p. 691 (1911).Google Scholar
35 Even where the action of the convention is final there is no division of organization.
36 Spence and others, Medford (Ore.), Tribune, October 27, 1914.
37 Story, , Commentaries, vol. 1, sec. 699.Google Scholar See also ibid., sec. 554.
38 Bryce, , American Commonwealth, ed. 1913, vol. 1, p. 186.Google Scholar
39 Morgan, , Contemporary Review, vol. 97, p. 543 (1910).Google Scholar See also Woodburn, , American Republic, p. 201, note.Google Scholar
40 Cf. Munro, , Government of American Cities, p. 185.Google Scholar
41 Cf. Morgan, , Contemporary Review, vol. 97, p. 544 (1910).Google Scholar
42 Sidgwick, , Elements of Politics, 2d ed., p. 467.Google Scholar See also Story, , Commentaries, vol. 1, sec. 556.Google Scholar
43 East Oregonian, May 16, 1914, p. 4, col. 1.
44 People's Power League, Oregon, Referendum Pamphlet, 1912, p. 221.Google Scholar “About the only purpose I have ever been able to see for the two-house system is that it enables the legislator to fool his constituents by getting a measure demanded or promised them through his branch of the legislature, and then using every effort to have it killed in the other branch.” Hodges, , Governors' Conference Proceedings, 1913, p. 258.Google Scholar
45 Bentham, , Works, Bowring's, ed., vol. 9, p. 115.Google Scholar
46 Story, , Commentaries, sec. 568.Google Scholar “I see in the greatest number [of the American States] an unreasonable imitation of the usages of England. Instead of merging all the authorities into one, that of the nation, they have established different bodies, a House of Representatives, a council, a governor, because England has a House of Commons, a House of Lords, and a King. They undertake to balance these different authorities, as if the same equilibrium of powers which has been thought necessary to balance the enormous preponderance of royalty could be of any use in republics, founded upon the equality of all the citizens; and as if every article which constitutes different bodies was not a source of divisions. By striving to escape imaginary dangers, they have created real ones.” Turgot, in Adams, John, Works, vol. 4, p. 279.Google Scholar See also Bentham, , Works, Bowring's, ed., vol. 2, p. 307Google Scholar; vol. 4, pp. 425–426; vol. 9, pp. 114–115; Temperly, , Upper Chambers, pp. 140–141.Google Scholar
47 Bryce, , American Commonwealth, ed., 1913 vol. 1, p. 185.Google Scholar
48 Woolsey, , Political Science, vol. 2, p. 312.Google Scholar
49 Garner, , Political Science, pp. 428–429Google Scholar; Kent, , Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 222.Google Scholar This argument has been much used in Oregon.
50 Orth, , Atlantic Monthly, vol. 94, p. 734 (1904).Google Scholar “The good effects ascribed or ascribable to the two-house system, may be resolved into this, namely, its acting as a remedy against precipitation. In this case … the alleged good is mere matter of presumption; of actually existing good, not a particle does the observation adduce.” Bentham, , Works, Bowring's, ed. vol. 9, p. 116.Google Scholar
51 Hodges, , Governors' Conference Proceedings, 1913, pp. 259–260.Google Scholar
52 Pacific Grange Bulletin, April 1914, p. 107. “I do not deem it necessary that the members of this house should spend valuable time in discussing this bill. It has been thoroughly gone over in the senate and its provisions have been declared fair and satisfactory to every one concerned.” Latourette, , Oregon House of Representatives, Eugene Guard, February 12, 1913, p. 2, col. 1.Google Scholar
53 Cf. Amos, , Science of Politics, p. 239.Google Scholar “The senate checks and kills good measures more often than bad ones. The demand of the age is for efficiency. The people of Oregon want to know how to do, instead of how not to do.” Spence, and others, Oregon Referendum Pamphlet, 1914, p. 83.Google ScholarContra: “I am convinced that more damage comes from bad bills slipping through than from good bills being killed. In case of the bad bills they will be subject to the referendum, and the good bills cannot be killed, for they will keep coming up until they are passed.” Malarkey, , quoted in Oregonian, March 1, 1914, p. 10, col. 3.Google Scholar
54 Jefferson, , Works, Federal, ed., vol. 4, p. 19.Google Scholar
55 Dunraven, , Nineteenth Cnetury, vol. 61, pp. 353–354 (1907).Google Scholar See also Story, Commentaries, vol. 1, sec. 554.Google Scholar
56 Stubbs, , Constitutional History of England, vol. 2, ch. 15.Google Scholar
57 “The senates have survived the real purpose for which they existed under monarchial institutions and the aristocratic and plutocratic tendencies which still lived after the yoke of monarchy was removed.” Eastmond, , Shall the People Rule?, p. 3Google Scholar, reprinted from Trend Magazine, February 1913.
58 Lieber, , Civil Liberty and Self-Government, ed. 1874, p. 199.Google Scholar
59 Senatorial Term, American Law Review, vol. 4, pp. 18–30 (1869).
60 Amos, , Science of Politics, pp. 239–240, 245–246.Google Scholar “Each assembly would be deprived of a part of the knowledge it would have possessed in a state of union. The same reasons are not presented in the two houses with the same force. The arguments which have decided the votes in the one may not be employed in the other.” Bentham, , Works, Bowring's, ed., vol. 2, p. 307.Google Scholar
61 Bagehot, , English Constitution, p. 175.Google Scholar
62 “The state senate of the Oregon legislature is a useless when not positively a mischievous body.” Resolution of State Grange, Oregon Journal, January 22, 1914, p. 3, col. 3.Google Scholar
63 Cf. Bryce, , American Commonwealth, Ed. 1913, vol. 1, pp. 185–186.Google Scholar
64 Cf. Hodges, , Governors' Conference Proceedings, 1913, p. 259Google Scholar; Spence, and others, Pacific Grange Bulletin, March 1914, p. 90.Google Scholar
65 E. g. People's Power League, Oregon, Referendum Pamphlet, 1912, p. 221Google Scholar; Resolution of State Grange, Oregon Journal, January 22, 1914, p. 3, col. 3.Google Scholar
66 Pacific Grange Bulletin, April 1914, p. 107.
