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Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

William T. Bianco  and
Robert H. Bates
William T. Bianco
Affiliation:
Duke University
Robert H. Bates
Affiliation:
Duke University
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Abstract

We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function).

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 133 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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