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Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining

  • MARIA MONTERO (a1) and JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA (a2)

Abstract

Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.

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Corresponding author

Maria Montero is University lecturer in the School of Economics, University of Nottingham. University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom (maria.montero@nottingham.ac.uk).
Juan J. Vidal-Puga is Associate Professor in the Research Group of Economic Analysis (RGEA) and in the Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Vigo. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Campus A Xunqueira, 36005 Pontevedra, Spain (vidalpuga@uvigo.es).

References

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Ansolabehere Stephen, James M. Snyder, Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting. 2005. Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments. American Journal of Political Science 49 (July): 55063.
Austen-Smith David, and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review 82 (June): 40522.
Baron David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review 87 (December): 3447.
Montero Maria, and Juan-J. Vidal-Puga. 2006. Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games. CeDEx Discussion Paper 2006-11.
Morelli Massimo. 1999. Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining. American Political Science Review 93 (December): 80920.
Morelli Massimo, and Maria Montero. 2003. The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games, Games and Economic Behavior 42 (January): 13755.
Peleg Bezalel. 1968. On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 16 (May): 52732.

Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining

  • MARIA MONTERO (a1) and JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA (a2)

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