Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods

  • CRAIG VOLDEN (a1) and ALAN E. WISEMAN (a1)
Abstract

We develop a bargaining model in which a legislature divides a budget among particularistic and collective goods. By incorporating both private and public goods in a unified model, we uncover nonmonotonic relationships between legislative preferences for collective spending and the amount of the budget actually allocated to collective goods. Put simply, policy proposers can exploit coalition partners' strong preferences for public goods to actually provide fewer public goods in equilibrium while directing more private goods to themselves. These results explain why policy reforms to limit special interest spending often fail. This unified model also sheds new light on when legislatures prefer open or closed amendment rules and when coalitions take different sizes and shapes.

Copyright
Corresponding author
Craig Volden is Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1373 (volden.2@osu.edu).
Alan E. Wiseman is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1373 (wiseman.69@osu.edu).
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

AnsolabehereStephen, James M.SnyderJr., Aaron B.Strauss, and Michael M.Ting. 2005. “Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.” American Journal of Political Science49(July): 55063.

Austen-SmithDavid, and JeffreyBanks. 1988. “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.” American Political Science Review82(June): 40922.

BanksJeffrey S., and JohnDuggan. 2000. “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice.” American Political Science Review94(March): 7388.

BanksJeffrey S., and JohnDuggan. 2005. “A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science1(January): 4985.

BaronDavid P. 1991. “Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control.” American Journal of Political Science35(February): 5790.

BaronDavid P., and DanielDiermeier. 2001. “Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems.” Quarterly Journal of Economics116(August): 93367.

BaronDavid P., and JohnFerejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review83(December): 11811206.

BattagliniMarco, and StephenCoate. 2005. “Inefficiency in Legis- lative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis.” Unpublished Manuscript, Princeton University.

CarrubbaClifford J., and CraigVolden. 2000. “Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science44(April): 26177.

CrombezChristophe. 1996. “Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems.” European Journal of Political Research29(January): 129.

EvansDiana. 1994. “Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives.” American Journal of Political Science38(November): 894917.

EvansDiana. 2004. Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press.

HuberEvelyne, and John D.Stephens. 2001. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

JacksonMatthew O., and BoazMoselle. 2002. “Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game.” Journal of Economic Theory103(March): 4987.

JacobyWilliam G., and Saundra K.Schneider. 2001. “Variability in State Policy Priorities: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Politics63(May): 54468.

KrehbielKeith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

LeblancWilliam, James M.SnyderJr., and MickyTripathi. 2000. “Majority-Rule Bargaining and the Under Provision of Public Investment Goods.” Journal of Public Economics75(January): 2147.

LeeFrances E. 2000. “Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics.” American Political Science Review94(March): 5972.

LizerriAlessandro, and NicolaPersico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives.” The American Economic Review91(March): 22539.

VoldenCraig, and Clifford J.Carrubba. 2004. “The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science48(July): 52137.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

American Political Science Review
  • ISSN: 0003-0554
  • EISSN: 1537-5943
  • URL: /core/journals/american-political-science-review
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Altmetric attention score