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The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces—ERRATUM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2015

R. BLAKE MCMAHON
Affiliation:
University of California–San Diego
BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV
Affiliation:
University of California–San Diego
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Extract

Owing to an editorial oversight, the citation and reference for Piplani and Talmadge (2015) was deleted twice on page 307 of the May 2015 issue of American Political Science Review. The citations should read as follows:

In this context, it is useful to consider the empirical results of two studies that find that the probability of coups is lower if the country is involved in a war (Piplani and Talmadge, 2015) and even in a crisis (Arbatli and Arbatli, 2014). The explanatory mechanisms these studies offer are different (although not necessarily incompatible): Piplani and Talmadge (2015) argue that when the military is engaged in a war there are fewer opportunities for a coup and more uncertainty about who will join it, whereas Arbatli and Arbatli (2014) argue that crises allow rulers to commit credibly to transfers to the military and to generate rally-around-the-flag effects.

Also, owing to a printer's error on page 305, Qaddafi is misspelled as Qaddaf.

We regret these errors.

Type
Erratum
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2015 

Owing to an editorial oversight, the citation and reference for Piplani and Talmadge (Reference Piplani and Talmadge2015) was deleted twice on page 307 of the May 2015 issue of American Political Science Review. The citations should read as follows:

In this context, it is useful to consider the empirical results of two studies that find that the probability of coups is lower if the country is involved in a war (Piplani and Talmadge, Reference Piplani and Talmadge2015) and even in a crisis (Arbatli and Arbatli, Reference Arbatli and Arbatli2014). The explanatory mechanisms these studies offer are different (although not necessarily incompatible): Piplani and Talmadge (Reference Piplani and Talmadge2015) argue that when the military is engaged in a war there are fewer opportunities for a coup and more uncertainty about who will join it, whereas Arbatli and Arbatli (Reference Arbatli and Arbatli2014) argue that crises allow rulers to commit credibly to transfers to the military and to generate rally-around-the-flag effects.

Also, owing to a printer's error on page 305, Qaddafi is misspelled as Qaddaf.

We regret these errors.

References

REFERENCES

Arbatli, Cemal Eren, and Arbatli, Ekim. 2014. “External Threats and Political Survival: Can Dispute Involvement Deter Coup Attempts?” Conflict Management and Peace Science.Google Scholar
McMahon, R. Blake, and Slantchev, Branislav L.. 2015. “The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces.” American Political Science Review 109 (2): 297313. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Piplani, Varun, and Talmadge, Caitlin. 2015. “When War Helps Civil–military Relations: Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. DOI: 10.1177/0022002714567950.Google Scholar