We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2023
Countries across the world expanded digital surveillance strategies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the pandemic occurred contemporaneously with a global trend toward greater digital repression, commentators advanced the notion that China would use the health crisis to promote a technology-enabled form of authoritarian governance abroad. This article surveys the evidence for these claims by first examining the literature on the increase of digital surveillance associated with China and then presenting three case studies from developing countries with varying responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The selected countries – Brazil, South Africa and Vietnam – used surveillance technology as part of their pandemic response and have either been influenced by Chinese approaches or adopted Chinese technology in recent years. Examining these case studies allows us to better understand claims regarding China's role in the general spread of digital surveillance and the interplay between Chinese state objectives and local political environments. Crucially, we illustrate how China's engagement in digital governance abroad is heavily contingent on domestic environments. Against a backdrop of China's growing influence in global digital governance, the effects observed in these case studies of Chinese surveillance models and technology proliferating through pandemic management are diffuse and contextualised by local factors.
Yenching Scholar, Peking University; LLM candidate, University of São Paulo; Research Assistant, Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS); Research Associate at the University of Oxford. This article has benefitted from discussions within the China, Law and Development (CLD) project. The authors thank Matthew Erie and the CLD Research Associates for their comments on earlier drafts. The authors also thank Victoria Hayman for her contributions. All errors are the authors’.
JD, Harvard Law School; LLM, University of Cambridge.
JD, University of Wisconsin; Research Associate, China, Law, and Development Project, University of Oxford.
PhD candidate and Meta Research PhD Fellow, Harvard University; Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School; Cybersecurity Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School; Fellow, Atlantic Council; Scholar-in-Residence, Electronic Privacy Information Center; Research Associate, Oxford University.
1 Laura Spinney, ‘How Elimination Versus Suppression Became Covid's Cold War’ (The Guardian, 3 Mar 2021) <https://bit.ly/3p8SuW2> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
2 See eg, The Lancet, ‘Contact tracing: digital health on the frontline’ (2020) 2 The Lancet Digital Health e561Google Scholar <https://bit.ly/3h9KMXi> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
3 Whitelaw, Sera et al, ‘Applications of digital technology in COVID-19 pandemic planning and response’ (2020) 3 The Lancet Digital Health 435Google Scholar <https://bit.ly/3p8PSHE> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
4 For a comprehensive database of digital tracking and physical surveillance tools deployed around the world, see Samuel Woodhams, ‘Covid-19 Digital Rights Tracker’ (Top 10 VPN, 25 Mar 2021) <https://bit.ly/3t2WCI3> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
5 See eg, Tufekci, Zeynep, ‘Engineering the public: Big data, surveillance and computational politics’ (2014) 19 First MondayGoogle Scholar <https://bit.ly/3h9sd5C> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Lyon, David, Surveillance after Snowden (Polity Press 2015)Google Scholar; Zuboff, Shoshana, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (Public Affairs 2019)Google Scholar
6 Adrian Shahbaz & Alie Funk, ‘Freedom on the Net 2020: The Pandemic's Digital Shadow’ (Freedom House, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3IeTa3s> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
7 See eg, Feldstein, Steven, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance (Oxford University Press 2021) 277–279CrossRefGoogle Scholar (showing that not only authoritarian governments but also liberal democracies pursued digital surveillance during the pandemic); Deborah Brown & Amos Toh, ‘Technology is Enabling Surveillance, Inequality During the Pandemic’ (Human Rights Watch, 4 Mar 2021) <https://bit.ly/3h9sTba> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (finding that government reliance on intrusive technologies with risky outcomes to human rights has also been the case in several liberal democracies).
8 See eg, Richard Ghiasy & Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, ‘China's Digital Silk Road and the Global Digital Order’ (The Diplomat, 13 Apr 2021) <https://bit.ly/3p7yhQp> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
9 See eg, Lydia Khalil, ‘Digital Authoritarianism, China and Covid’ (Lowy Institute Analysis, 2 Nov 2021) <https://bit.ly/3JQWO4d> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Greitens, Sheena C, ‘Surveillance, Security, and Liberal Democracy in the Post-Covid World’ (2020) 74(S1) International Organization E169CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Aidan Powers-Riggs, ‘Covid-19 is Proving a Boon for Digital Authoritarianism’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 Aug 2020) <https://bit.ly/3LV2QCw> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Emily de La Bruyère & Nathan Picarsic, ‘China's next plan to dominate international tech standards’ (TechCrunch, 11 Apr 2020) <https://tcrn.ch/35lbRE3> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
10 See Greitens (n 9) E174–E178 and E186–E187 (arguing that the CCP could eventually spread its model of pandemic response abroad, although diffusion was not a foregone conclusion).
11 See Emily de La Bruyère, ‘A New Type of Geopolitical Power: China's Competitive Strategy for the Digital Revolution’, in Emily de La Bruyère, Doug Strub & Jonathon Marek (eds), China's Digital Ambitions: A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order (National Bureau of Asian Research, Mar 2022).
12 See eg, Walker, Christopher, Kalathil, Shanthi & Ludwig, Jessica, ‘The Cutting Edge of Sharp Power’ (2020) 31 Journal of Democracy 124, 129–132CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘Understanding and Rolling Back Digital Authoritarianism’ (War on the Rocks, 17 Feb 2020) <https://bit.ly/3IbEVN6> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
13 Iginio Gagliardone, ‘The Impact of Chinese Tech Provision on Civil Liberties in Africa’ (South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 99, Dec 2020) <https://bit.ly/3t1sgG8> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
14 Erie, Matthew S & Streinz, Thomas, ‘The Beijing Effect: China's ‘Digital Silk Road’ as Transnational Data Governance’ (2021) 54 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 3Google Scholar.
15 See Samantha Hoffman, ‘China's Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism: Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on “China's Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political Control”’ (16 May 2019) <https://bit.ly/3v5N7e5> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (advancing the idea that the CCP is deliberately seeking to influence data governance models abroad due to its state objectives).
16 See eg, Wnuk, Anna, Oleksy, Tomasz & Maison, Dominika, ‘The acceptance of Covid-19 tracking technologies: The role of perceived threat, lack of control, and ideological beliefs’ (2020) 15(9) PLoS OneCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed <https://bit.ly/3IeO2wv> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (a case study showing how the pandemic has positively shifted perceptions of surveillance technologies among Polish citizens).
17 Since the COVID-19 outbreak in late 2019, states have dramatically strengthened their surveillance tools and techniques mainly through partnerships with private companies selected within a global market notably characterised by the presence of Chinese technology companies. See eg, Steven Feldstein, ‘The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 Sep 2019) <https://bit.ly/3Hj0SbS> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
18 See generally de La Bruyère, Strub & Marek.
19 See eg, Gagliardone, Iginio, China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet (Zed Books 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (analysing Chinese ICT companies engagement with Africa); Erie & Streinz (n 14) 63–83 (presenting a case study on the impacts of China's DSR on Pakistan, including aspects of digital surveillance); Feldstein (n 7) chs 4, 5, and 6 (examining Chinese digital repression in Thailand, Ethiopia, and the Philippines); Joshua Kurlantzick et al, ‘Assessing China's Digital Silk Road Initiative’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 18 Dec 2020) <https://on.cfr.org/3HfC4Bg> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (highlighting aspects of Chinese investments in digital infrastructure in Ecuador, Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
20 An example being large-n analyses evaluating the statistical correlation of Chinese exports and technology presence with measurements of the erosion of democratic institutions.
21 Rob Kitchin, The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures & their Consequences (SAGE Publications 2014) (examining how the data landscape is rapidly changing with remarkable social, political and ethical consequences).
22 See eg, Cloves Norris & Dean Wilson (eds), Surveillance, Crime and Social Control (Routledge 2006) <https://bit.ly/3va3pm> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (exploring how new digital technologies that enhance data collection and processing are ultimately changing the political economies of societies); Dan Ciuriak, ‘The Economics of Data: Implications for the Data-Driven Economy’, in Centre for International Governance Innovation, ‘Data Governance in the Digital Age’ (5 Mar 2018) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3118022> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (arguing that the new data-driven economy has distinct characteristics of previous economic systems, with relevant impacts to the design of regulatory frameworks).
23 Didier Bigo, ‘Digital Surveillance and Everyday Democracy’, in Leanne Weber, Elaine Fishwick & Marinella Marmo (eds), The Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights (Routledge 2007) 125–135 (describing the political and technological context of how surveillance practices became increasingly common in modern societies, with a particular attention on the role of the United States’ government and companies).
24 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), ‘Mapping China's Tech Giants’ (2021) <https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/map> accessed 20 Feb 2022 (showing how Chinese ICT companies have spread across a considerable part of the world).
25 Global internet freedom has been declining since 2010 and China still ranks as the worst environment for internet freedom. See Adrian Shahbaz & Allie Funk, ‘Freedom on the Net 2021: The Global Drive to Control Big Tech’ (Freedom House, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3BGB73Z> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
26 See eg, Stanford Cyber Policy Center, ‘Countering the Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, China, AI, and Human Rights’ (Nov 2020) <https://bit.ly/3t1fqYd> accessed 1 Dec 2022; US Senate Democratic Staff, ‘The New Big Brother: China and Digital Authoritarianism’ (Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 21 Jul 2020) <https://bit.ly/3BIxsCG> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Tiberiu Dragu & Yonatan Lupu, ‘Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights’ (2021) 75 International Organization 991; Alina Polyakova & Chris Meserole, ‘Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models’ (Brookings, Aug 2019) <https://brook.gs/35isUH9> accessed 1 Dec 2022; The President of the United States, ‘United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China’ (2020) 5 <https://bit.ly/3H5zw8Z> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
27 ibid.
28 See eg, Xiao Qing, ‘Chinese Digital Authoritarianism and Its Global Impact’ 43 POMPEPS Studies 35 <https://bit.ly/3IsOyHr> accessed 1 Dec 2022; James Leibold, ‘Surveillance in China's Xinjiang Region: Ethnic Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement’ (2020) 29 Journal of Contemporary China 46 <https://bit.ly/3I8saCO> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
29 See text and sources cited in (n 26).
30 See eg, Lindsay Maizland & Andrew Chatzky, ‘Huawei: China's Controversial Tech Giant’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 6 Aug 2020) <https://on.cfr.org/3s95YmA> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (describing the influence from the Chinese party-state on Huawei).
31 Eva Dou, ‘Documents link Huawei to China's surveillance programs’ (The New York Times, 14 Dec 2021) <https://wapo.st/3VYxvmU> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
32 Axel Dreher et al, ‘Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset’ (AidData Working Paper no 46, 10 Oct 2017) <https://bit.ly/3BKF8Va> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (finding that Chinese financial aid is usually less concessional and more commercially-oriented than those from Western donors and lenders).
33 Steven Feldstein, ‘Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Hearing on China's Strategic Aims in Africa’ (8 May 2020) 9–10 <https://bit.ly/3hclYBr> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
34 Greitens (n 9) E180.
35 Feldstein (n 7) 48–55.
36 Benjamin Tsui, ‘Do Huawei's Training Programs and Centers Transfer Skills to Africa?’ (China Africa Research Initiative Policy Brief no 14, Jul 2016) <https://bit.ly/3paEgUF> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (explaining Huawei's efforts to train local workforce on ICT matters in Africa); Adrian Shahbaz, ‘The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism – Freedom of the Net 2018’ (Oct 2018) 2–10 <https://bit.ly/36yj6JD> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (highlighting that representatives from at least 36 countries have attended Chinese trainings and seminars on media and information management in the last decade).
37 See Maizland & Chatzky (n 30); Maya Wang, ‘China's Techno-Authoritarianism Has Gone Global’ (Foreign Affairs, 8 Apr 2021) <https://fam.ag/3LQosjv> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (arguing that the Chinese government is gaining influence on global data due to unclear legal limits to state control over its multinational companies).
38 See eg, Laura HC Howells, ‘Digital Authoritarianism in China and Russia: A Comparative Study’ (Honors thesis, Bowdoin College 2021) <https://bit.ly/3Isy3et> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Afef Abrougui, ‘Digital Authoritarianism in the GCC and its Broader Regional Consequences’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 Oct 2021) <https://bit.ly/3v9OtnX> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
39 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, ‘Dealing with Demand for China's Global Surveillance Exports’ (Brookings, Apr 2020) 2 <https://brook.gs/3BGaT1k> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
40 ASPI (n 24).
41 One of the reasons given for this broad market is that the price difference of Chinese surveillance equipment can be 10 times smaller than some of its competitors. For example, Axis’ cameras (Sweden) cost an average of USD 372, while Hikvision's cameras cost around 37 USD. See later Gordon (n 95).
42 See eg, Greitens (n 9); Feldstein (n 7); Erie & Streinz (n 14).
43 Chinese influence on technology governance abroad was discussed within a push/pull framework at least as early as April 2020. See Greitens (n 39) 5–6.
44 Erie & Streinz (n 14).
45 For more detailed discussion of the Brussels Effect, see Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1 (posing that companies gravitate towards European law even when they are not legally required to do so due to the EU's major global status, benefits of global regulatory uniformity and high economic costs for non-compliance).
46 Erie & Streinz (n 14) 26–31.
47 ibid.
48 ibid. See also Jonathan E Hillman, ‘Statement before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission: A “China Model?” Beijing's Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards’ (13 Mar 2020) <https://bit.ly/3HbO072> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (arguing that China's promotion of alternative global norms and standards happens in a three-fold process: creating alternative institutions, working within existing institutions, and promoting its own global development initiatives).
49 Feldstein chooses to use the term ‘digital repression’ rather than ‘digital authoritarianism’ as he notes that repressive tools and techniques are not used exclusively by authoritarian regimes. See Feldstein (n 7) 25.
50 Feldstein (n 7) 14; 273–277.
51 ibid.
52 Chris Alden & Cristina Alves, ‘History & identity in the construction of China's Africa policy’ (2008) 35 Review of African Political Economy 43, 43–45.
53 Samantha Hoffman, ‘Securing the Foundation: Building the Physical Infrastructure of the Digital World’, in Emily de la Bruyère, Doug Strub & Jonathon Marek (eds), China's Digital Ambitions: A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order (National Bureau of Asian Research, Mar 2022) 11–22; Emily La Bruyère, ‘Setting the Standards: Locking in China's Technological Influence’, in Emily de la Bruyère, Doug Strub & Jonathon Marek (eds), China's Digital Ambitions: A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order (National Bureau of Asian Research, Mar 2022) 49–72; Nigel Cory ‘Writing the Rules: Redefining Norms of Global Digital Governance’, in Emily de la Bruyère, Doug Strub & Jonathon Marek (eds), China's Digital Ambitions: A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order (National Bureau of Asian Research, Mar 2022) 73–88.
54 See Woodhams (n 4).
55 Reports highlight that at least 120 contact tracing apps were developed in 71 countries, while 20 governments have undertaken measures to collect data from mobile networks. See Woodhams (n 4).
56 Bethania de Araujo Almeida et al, ‘Personal data usage and privacy considerations in the COVID-19 global pandemic’ (2020) 25 Ciência & Saúde Coletiva [Science and Public Health] 2487 <https://bit.ly/35leuWr> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
57 Human Rights Watch, ‘Joint Civil Society Statement: States use of digital surveillance technologies to fight pandemic must respect human rights’ (2 Apr 2020) <https://bit.ly/3sb6FM1> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
58 Emily Weinstein, ‘China's Use of AI in its COVID-19 Response’ (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Data Brief, Aug 2020) <https://bit.ly/3VVqdjv> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
59 Alex Jingwei He, Yuda Shi & Hongdou Liu, ‘Crisis governance, Chinese style: distinctive features of China's response to the to the Covid-19 Pandemic’ (2020) 3 Policy Design and Practice 242.
60 See eg, Rob Kitchin, ‘Civil liberties or public health, or civil liberties and public health? Using surveillance technologies to tackle the spread of COVID-19’ (2020) 24 Space and Polity 362; Weinstein (n 58); ‘To curb covid-19, China is using its high-tech surveillance tools’ (The Economist, 27 Feb 2020) <https://econ.st/3JNJkWI> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
61 One of the most notable public-private collaborations was the ‘Alipay Health Code’ application, introduced as a project of the local government of Hangzhou in February 2020, with the help of Ant Financial, and latter officially endorsed by the State Council. The application connects to local government's platforms and automatically tracks and updates users’ information in real time by surveilling their social network and mobility data, and tracking users’ interaction with other high-risk individuals and their past visits to areas defined as high-risk. Users that use the app through WeChat and Alipay do so by obtaining a code that registers their account with local authorities, including connecting facial recognition technology. See ‘全国版健康码，来了！ [The national health code is here!]’ (Alipay, 16 Feb 2020). <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/amB7fBxLw8KSR9DcUsbTWg> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
62 ‘To curb covid-19, China is using its high-tech surveillance tools’ (n 60).
63 Weinstein (n 58).
64 Several countries known for extensive surveillance in managing the pandemic relied on such pre-existing, often commercial, data streams. Israel and Pakistan, for instance, repurposed counterterror tools that analyse mobile location meta-data records from data already being generated by telecommunications networks. South Korea also extensively used pre-existing data streams from mobile phone records and electronic payments data. See, respectively, Moran Amit et al, ‘Mass-surveillance technologies to fight coronavirus spread: the case of Israel’ (2020) 26 Nature Medicine 1167; Zuha Siddiqui, ‘Pakistan Is Using a Terrorism Surveillance System to Monitor the Pandemic’ (Slate, 15 Jul 2020) <https://bit.ly/3LStzzL> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Justin Fendos, ‘How surveillance technology powered South Korea's COVID-19 response’ (Brookings, 29 Apr 2020) <https://brook.gs/3P9n3q8> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
65 Qianer Liu et al, ‘China, Coronavirus and Surveillance: the Messy Reality of Personal Data’ (Financial Times, 2 Apr 2020) <https://on.ft.com/3BKFHhK> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
66 Marcella Siqueira Cassiano, Kevin D Haggerty & Ausma Bernot, ‘China's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Surveillance and Autonomy’ (2021) 19 Surveillance & Society 94.
67 See text and sources cited in (n 9).
68 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health?’ (2021) 8–13 <https://bit.ly/3LSbe5I> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
69 The decline is seen both through V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index and The Economist's Democracy Index methodologies. See V-DEM, ‘V-Dem Liberal democracy Index 2020’ (Our World in Data, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3sa74OM> accessed 1 Dec 2022; ‘Democracy Index 2020’ (n 68) 22–25.
70 ‘Internet Freedom Scores’ (Freedom House, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3h5Uo5h> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
71 Steven Feldstein, ‘Digital Repression Index 2010-19’ (Mendeley Data, 10 Dec 2020) <https://bit.ly/3Y67tQc> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
72 Between March 2020 and December 2020, 253 initiatives involving the use of technologies collecting some type of personal data were mapped at the national, state and municipal levels in Brazil. These have been developed by a multifaceted network of public and private actors. See Eduardo G Andrade et al, ‘Dados Virais: Legado da COVID-19 nas aquisições de tecnologia pelo Poder Público’ (Data Privacy BR, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3FyPY47> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
73 Law No 13,979 (6 Feb 2020) (Brazil) <https://bit.ly/3sa7dli> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
74 Ministério da Saúde (Ministry of Health), ‘Rede Nacional de Dados em Saúde’ <https://bit.ly/3v9ruJD> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
75 Rafa Santos, ‘Uso de dados telefônicos pessoais para combate à Covid-19 gera dúvidas’ (Consultor Jurídico, 2 Apr 2020) <https://bit.ly/3s9AbSh> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
76 Simone Kafruni, ‘Bolsonaro veta geolocalização da população por celular’ (Correio Braziliense, 13 Apr 2020) <https://bit.ly/3BVNhWV> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
77 The government alleged that this information would allow the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) to correctly measure the economic and social impacts of COVID-19, which would support public planning. See Provisional Measure No 954 (17 Apr 2020, revoked) (Brazil) <https://bit.ly/3sbUheY> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Ken Silva, ‘Covid-19: Brazil's top prosecutor defends telecoms data collection scheme’ (Global Data Review, 4 May 2020) <https://bit.ly/3LQp60p> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
78 Federal Court of Justice (STF), Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade No 6,390/DF (7 May 2020) <https://bit.ly/3p7BAah> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
79 Catalin Cimpanu, ‘Personal data of 16 million Brazilian COVID-19 patients exposed online’ (ZDNet, 26 Nov 2020) <https://zd.net/3v4jg5I> accessed 1 Dec 2022; TBR Newsroom, ‘Hack crashes health systems and Brazil postpones restrictions on travelers’ (10 Dec 2021) <https://bit.ly/3FtYIs1> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
80 See Law No 13,709 (Brazil), art 6 <https://bit.ly/3LWURFk> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
81 See Andrade et al (n 72) 34–36.
82 Google, ‘COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports’ (Feb 2022) <https://bit.ly/3IcEeCZ> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
83 See Incognia's homepage: Incognia, ‘Home Page’ <https://www.incognia.com> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
84 Serviços e Informações do Brasil, ‘Coronavírus-SUS’ <https://bit.ly/3h7hXhO> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
85 Apple and Google jointly developed an API that allowed authorised health officials to create Bluetooth-enabled contact tracing applications. See Apple & Google, ‘Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing’ <https://apple.co/3FwxssN> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
86 Jéferson Campos Nobre et al, ‘On the Privacy of National Contact Tracing COVID-19 Applications: The Coronavírus-SUS Case’ (Anais da XIX Escola Regional de Redes de Computadores, 27 Oct 2021) <https://bit.ly/3uxfQHe> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
87 ibid 5.
88 See eg, La Vanguardia, ‘Río de Janeiro usa drones con altavoces para dispersar las aglomeraciones durante la pandemia’ (Efe, 15 Apr 2020) <https://bit.ly/3h5IhFx> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (showing the use of drones in the city of Rio de Janeiro).
89 See eg, Flavia Albuquerque, ‘Setor de Segurança tem alta de 40% na busca por tecnologia inteligente’ (Agência Brasil, 13 Jul 2020) <https://bit.ly/3BHwTsI> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (underscoring that demand for FRCs increased by 12.3% during the first five months of the pandemic); BNAmericas, ‘Pandemic accelerates thermal camera sales in LatAm’ (21 Apr 2020) <https://bit.ly/3KQmOwY> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
90 Amanda Lemos, ‘Reconhecimento facial cresce no Brasil; vídeo explica como isso afeta você’ (Folha de São Paulo, 7 Aug 2021) <https://bit.ly/3Ih9a5a> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (describing how FRCs are becoming a common tool in the toolkit of local policies); Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública, ‘Portaria n° 793’ (24 Oct 2019) <https://bit.ly/33MUtYI> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (federal legislation providing public incentives for the use of facial recognition software to combat crime).
91 Huawei has been a major technology provider in Brazil for the past 22 years. The country's biggest cellphone operator, Vivo, reportedly uses Huawei's 3G and 4G technology in 65% of its networks. Claro, the second largest operator, acquires 55% of its equipment from Huawei, and Oi, the third largest, 60%. See Felipe Junqueira, ‘Operadoras brasileiras pedem transparência e participação da Huawei no 5G’ (Canaltech, 29 Nov 2020) <https://bit.ly/3IePsXR> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Maurício Renner, ‘Huawei reforça nuvem no Brasil’ (Baguete, 29 Jan 2021) <https://bit.ly/35iTRKu> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
92 Poder 360, ‘Portaria permite Huawei no leilão do 5G, mas governo exige rede exclusiva’ (29 Jan 2021) <https://bit.ly/3JLw1X0> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
93 See eg, the partnership between Huawei and Campinas, the 4th largest city in Brazil: Huawei, ‘Campinas reforça parceria com a Huawei para implementar soluções de segurança’ (14 Dec 2018) <https://bit.ly/3p7SV2C> accessed 1 Dec 2022; and Huawei's partnership with the state of Bahia: Amanda Palma & Clarissa Pacheco, ‘Presos pela cara: polêmico sistema de reconhecimento facial identificou 109 foragidos na BA’ (Correio, 5 Jan 2020) <https://glo.bo/33GJqjA/> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Finally, see eg, Huawei's Smart Cities promotion event in Curitiba: Redação Digital Security, ‘Solução para Smart City da Huawei será destaque na Smart City Expo em Curitiba’ (Revista Digital Security, 21 Mar 2019) <https://bit.ly/3Iebie0> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
94 Paulo Soprana, ‘Chinesa Huawei faz parceria com Oi para câmeras de reconhecimento facial’ (Folha de São Paulo, 16 Oct 2018) <https://bit.ly/33Gc04y> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
95 See eg, Robert Wren Gordon, ‘Brazil Assembly Powers Hikvision Local Expansion’ (IPVM, 15 Jul 2020) <https://bit.ly/3h4iltR> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (highlighting that Hikvision is the only foreign video surveillance manufacturer with such an operation inside of a Brazil in the Manaus free trade zone).
96 Carolina Reis et al, ‘Vigilância Automatizada: uso de reconhecimento facial pela Administração Pública’ (LAPIN, Jul 2021) (finding that most of FRC devices used by Brazil's public sector come from China, although companies from the US, UK and Israel have also been important suppliers to the Brazilian market).
97 See Andrade et al (n 72) 36–37.
98 Simon Migliano & Samuel Woodhams, ‘Hikvision and Dahua Surveillance Cameras: Global Locations Report’ (Top 10 VPN, 3 Dec 2020) <https://bit.ly/33Iyv93> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
99 Anthony Boadle, ‘Brazil backs U.S. Clean Network proposal for transparent 5G technology’ (Reuters, 11 Nov 2020) <https://reut.rs/3sZY7H5> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
100 The legal strategy adopted required a publicly traded shareholding structure for companies taking part in Brazil's stand-alone private network, something Huawei does not meet as a (formally) privately held company. See Rui Maciel, ‘A Huawei não quis participar da rede privada do governo? Não foi bem assim’ (Canaltech, 13 May 2021) <https://bit.ly/3hapYyK> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
101 Juan Pedro Tomás, ‘Huawei negotiating with most Brazilian telcos for 5G equipment: Report’ (RCR Wireless, 22 Nov 2021) <https://bit.ly/3p9n6Xh> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
102 Julio Wiziack, ‘Governo vai baixar tom contra Huawei no 5G para agilizar importação de insumos de vacina da China’ (Folha de São Paulo, 21 Jan 2021) <https://bit.ly/3BLksMv> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
103 ibid.
104 Interlocutory Appeal no 2079077-58.2022.8.26.0000 Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo. See Elaine Patricia Cruz, ‘TJ mantém proibição de câmeras de reconhecimento facial no Metrô de SP’ (Agência Brasil, 18 Apr 2022) <https://bit.ly/3SFqWF0> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
105 See eg, Victoria Damasceno & Samuel Fernandes, ‘Sob críticas, reconhecimento facial chega a 20 Estados do país’ (Folha de São Paulo, 9 Jul 2021) <https://bit.ly/352Y2KJ> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (showing that 20 states in Brazil have already adopted FRCs although the LGPD does not provide specific safeguards for this type of technology).
106 Other relevant providers are, e.g., Admobilize (US), Ineo Infracon (France), Johnson Controls (Ireland) Tecway, Engie and Brisanet (Brazil). See ‘Facial recognition in Latin America: Trends in the implementation of a perverse technology’ (AlSur, 2021) 11 <https://bit.ly/3qciZKQ> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
107 Amy Tong, ‘China's ICT Engagement in Africa: A Comparative Analysis’ (The Yale Review of International Studies, Feb 2021) <http://yris.yira.org/essays/4702> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
108 Institute of Developing Economies, ‘China's Telecommunications Footprint in Africa’ (Japan External Trade Organisation, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3vfpKPn> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
109 ibid.
110 Frans Viljoen et al, ‘Implications of Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19 in South Africa’ (2020) 20 African Human Rights Law Journal 540, 544.
111 ‘Regulations and Guidelines – Coronavirus Covid-19’ (South African Government, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3JDqdyG> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
112 South Africa is one of the largest mobile markets in Africa. Nine in ten adult South Africans have a mobile device and around 51 per cent of cell phone owners have a smartphone that can access the internet and apps. See Laura Silver & Courtney Johnson, ‘Majorities in Sub-Saharan Africa own mobile phones, but smartphone adoption is modest’ (Pew Research Center, Oct 2018) <https://pewrsr.ch/3BFf5P3> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
113 ‘COVID-19 Online Resource and News Portal’ (Health Department of South Africa, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3LP4upv> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
114 ‘Apps: South Africa Project Report’ (Alt Advisory, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3JPyQ9A> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
115 ibid.
116 Jonathan Klaaren et al, ‘South Africa's COVID-19 Tracing Database: Risks and rewards of which doctors should be aware’ (2020) 110 SAMJ: South African Medical Journal 617, 617–620 <https://bit.ly/3JNZfUY> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
117 Marco Schepers & Zinhle Novazi, ‘COVI-ID: SA's contact tracing app ensures protection of privacy’ (Tabacks, 3 Jun 2020) <https://bit.ly/3iN5Abi> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
118 Google Play, ‘Covi-ID’ <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?hl=en&id=com.coviid> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
119 See Schepers & Novazi (n 117).
120 ibid.
121 South African Government, ‘Personal Information Act 4 of 2013’ (26 Nov 2013) <https://bit.ly/36nIyBm> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
122 ‘Tracking the Global Response to COVID-19’ (Privacy International, 2022) <https://bit.ly/36rNOnz> accessed 1 Dec 2022; see Alt Advisory (n 114) 13.
123 Farei Shawn Matiashe, ‘WHO adopts Whatsapp platform developed in South Africa to provide information on the coronavirus outbreak’ (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 27 Mar 2020) <https://bit.ly/35ir8FY> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
124 WhatsApp, ‘The World Health Organization launches WHO Health Alert on WhatsApp’ <https://www.whatsapp.com/coronavirus/who> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
125 Philip de Wet, ‘South Africa will be tracking cellphones to fight the Covid-19 virus’ (Business Insider, 25 Mar 2020) <https://bit.ly/3IfwrnZ> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
126 Ignatius M Viljoen et al, ‘Contact tracing during the COVID-19 pandemic: Protection of personal information in South Africa’ (2020) 13 South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 20.
127 Specifically, South African Constitution, s 7(2). See South African Government, ‘Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996’ <https://bit.ly/3JLxwV8> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
128 All regulations, directions and guidelines relating to COVID-19 in South Africa can be accessed at: South African Government (n 111).
129 Marco Schepers, Zinhle Novazi & Andrew Attieh, ‘Pandemic control through the use of Personal Data’ (Tabacks, 4 May 2020) <https://bit.ly/3IbKET6> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
130 Health Department of South Africa, ‘COVID-19 Online Resource and News Portal’ https://bit.ly/3LP4upv accessed 1 Dec 2022.
131 See eg, TimesLive, ‘Massive data attack exposes personal info of 24 million South Africans’ (Sunday Times, 19 Aug 2020) <https://bit.ly/3halW9Q> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
132 Alexander Winning, ‘South Africa extends tight COVID-19 restrictions for another 14 days.’ (Reuters, 12 Jul 2021) <https://reut.rs/3JPRZYD> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
133 Feldstein, ‘Hearing on China's Strategic Aims in Africa’ (n 33).
134 ‘Huawei Smart City Overview Presentation’ (Huawei, Jun 2018) <https://bit.ly/3Hp9UEh> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
135 Karen Allen & Isel van Zyl, ‘Who's watching who?’ (ENACT, Issue 11, Nov 2020) <https://bit.ly/3IfdVfs> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
136 Chris Burt, ‘Iveda brings biometrics and surveillance analytics to South Africa with AXIOM partnership’ (Biometric Update.com, 7 Jun 2019) <https://bit.ly/35iqxnI> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
137 Dorcus Basimanyane & Dumisani Gandhi, ‘Striking a balance between CCTV surveillance and the digital right to privacy in South Africa’ (APCOF, 27 Dec 2019) <https://bit.ly/3sYIdN5> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
138 ‘IIOC provides for intelligent policing using CCTV cameras’ (Media release, City of Johannesburg, 2018) <https://bit.ly/3HbsKhO> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
139 Emma Willoughby, ‘An ideal public health model? Vietnam's state-led, preventative, low-cost response to COVID-19’ (Brookings, 29 Jun 2021) <https://brook.gs/3LPBwWm> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
140 See eg, Shahbaz (n 25) 2–10; Justin Sherman, ‘Vietnam's Internet Control: Following in China's Footsteps?’ (The Diplomat, 11 Dec 2019) <https://bit.ly/3HaBy7x> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (arguing that China's exports to Vietnam have encouraged the adoption of authoritarian internet control practices); Trinh Huu Long, ‘Vietnam's Cybersecurity Draft Law: Made in China?’ (The Vietnamese, 8 Nov 2017) <https://bit.ly/3JIKdjt> accessed 1 Dec 2022; He Huifeng, ‘In a remote corner of China, Beijing is trying to export its model by training foreign officials the Chinese way’ (South China Morning Post, 14 Jul 2018); ‘How China is supplying surveillance technology and training around the world’ (Privacy International, Feb 2019).
141 Scholars have already observed diffuse regulatory effects that China's engagement produces in Vietnam through other economic sectors. See Matthew Erie & Do Hai Ha, ‘Law and Development Minus Legal Transplants: The Example of China in Vietnam’ (2021) 8 Asian Journal of Law and Society 372.
142 ‘Viet Nam SARS-free’ (World Health Organisation, 28 Apr 2003) <https://bit.ly/3Ie7WHU> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
143 KPMG & Oxford University Clinical Research Unit, ‘Digital Health in Vietnam: Market Intelligence Report’ (Dec 2020) <https://bit.ly/3LN1PfX> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
144 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘Vietnam update: community-based surveillance yields results’ (2017) 25 Updates from the Field <https://bit.ly/3va5kHf> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
145 See KPMG & Oxford University Clinical Research Unit (n 143).
146 Thi Phuong Thao Tran et al, ‘Rapid response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Vietnam government's experience and preliminary success’ (2020) 10 Journal of Global Health 020502 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7567433/> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
147 ‘NCOVI and Bluezone in Vietnam: Government Launches Digital Apps to Contain COVID-19’ (Exemplars in Global Health, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3p8r8iL> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
148 Smartphones are the most popular device in Vietnam with 93% penetration and more than half of the population (53%) have mobile connection via broadband (3G–5G) with high speed. See ‘Mobile Landscape in Vietnam 2019-2020’ (MMA, Dec 2020) <https://bit.ly/350BPNx> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
149 World Health Organisation Representation Office for Viet Nam, ‘Viet Nam COVID-19 Situation Report #1’ (19 Jul 2020) <https://bit.ly/3BKnXmE> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
150 ibid.
151 Nổi Bật, ‘Ứng dụng SmartCity hỗ trợ cơ quan chức năng Hà Nội giám sát người cách ly’ (Cần Biết, 20 Mar 2020) <https://bit.ly/3Hefwkt> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
152 Adam Ang, ‘Vietnam launches unified mobile app for COVID-19 prevention and control’ (HIMSS, 5 Oct 2021) <https://bit.ly/3H5sjWo> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
153 Raymond Zhong, ‘Is Huawei a Security Threat? Vietnam Isn't Taking Any Chances’ (The New York Times, 18 Jul 2019) <https://nyti.ms/34V46VR> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
154 ibid.
155 Tomoya Onishi, Vietnam's top telecom to adopt “self-developed” 5G tech’ (Nikkei, 10 Apr 2019) <https://s.nikkei.com/3BJL00L> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
156 John Boudreau & Nguyen Dieu Tu Uyen, ‘Vietnam prefers its mobile networks to be free of Huawei’ (The Jakarta Post, 26 Aug 2019) <https://bit.ly/36rxWBr> accessed 1 Dec 2022 (explaining that the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia have showed openness to deploy Huawei's technology).
157 ‘Vietnam engineers develop state-of-the-art face recognition technology’ (Viet Nam News/Asia News Network, 21 Apr 2020) <https://bit.ly/35lYF21> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
158 Trien Vinh Le, ‘Will Vietnam Follow China's Model for Digital Dictatorship?’ (The Diplomat, 22 Jun 2019) <https://bit.ly/3BHquxA> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
159 See Migliano & Woodhams (n 98).
160 It is important to bear in mind that as more information arrives and the pandemic passes, more analysis will be available to parse through China’ growing geopolitical footprint. To this end, other case studies could be useful to disentangle Chinese technology exports from data management influence. For instance, interesting cases are unfolding in Ecuador and Myanmar. See eg, Paul Mozur et al, ‘Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State’ (The New York Times, 24 Apr 2019) <https://nyti.ms/3HdDlJ0> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Jason Tower, ‘China Using Pandemic Aid to Push Myanmar Economic Corridor’ (United States Institute of Peace, 27 May 2020) <https://bit.ly/3LLTYz4> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
161 See Erie & Streinz (n 14) 42–47 (analysing how Chinese companies providing digital infrastructure to host countries shape the conditions under which these countries transition towards digitally-mediated economies and societies).
162 Surveillance practices were also part of many liberal democracies’ pandemic responses. See Woodhams (n 4).
163 See Feldstein, ‘The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance’ (n 17); ASPI (n 24).
164 See La Bruyère et al (n 11).
165 See Feldstein, ‘Digital Repression Index 2010-19’ (n 71).
166 Rubens Valente, ‘Ação sigilosa do governo mira professores e policiais antifascistas’ (UOL, 24 Jul 2020) <https://bit.ly/3vNQXbh> accessed 1 Dec 2022; ‘Governo Bolsonaro contrata empresa para espionar jornalistas e personalidades; confira a lista’ (RD1, 2 Dec 2020) <https://bit.ly/3s97Lbi> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
167 See eg, Maria Laura Canineu, ‘High-tech surveillance: from China to Brazil?’ (Human Rights Watch, 31 May 2019) <https://bit.ly/378ucFj> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Ana Ionova, ‘Brazil takes a page from China, taps facial recognition to solve crime’ (The Christian Science Monitor, 11 Feb 2020) <https://bit.ly/3MCbu9B> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
168 Duncan, Jane, Stopping the spies: constructing and resisting the surveillance state in South Africa (Wits University Press 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
169 In Africa alone, half of the countries still do not have laws on data protection, and, if legislation is in place, it generally does not have clear enforcement mechanisms and strategies for digital surveillance systems. See Brian Daigle, ‘Data Protection Laws in Africa: A Pan-African Survey and Noted Trends’ (Journal of International Commerce and Economics, Feb 2021) <https://bit.ly/3FxpP5q> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
170 The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative Launched at the Summit for Democracy’ (10 Dec 2021) <https://bit.ly/3v6JjsY> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
171 John Suffolk, ‘Cyber Security Perspectives’ (Huawei, Oct 2013) <https://bit.ly/33IkU1F> accessed 1 Dec 2022; Jane Zhang, ‘Tencent, Huawei, other major Shenzhen firms to bolster user data safeguards ahead of roll-out of new personal information law’ (South China Morning Post, 23 Oct 2021) <https://bit.ly/3JMg9Dr> accessed 1 Dec 2022.
