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Uniting for MH17

  • Michael RAMSDEN (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Russia’s veto in the Security Council of a proposed ad hoc tribunal for the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 disaster prompts consideration of alternative mechanisms to bring the offenders to justice. It is arguable that the General Assembly, drawing upon the text of the UN Charter and the Uniting for Peace mechanism, possesses the constitutional powers to establish the tribunal. The unique features of the General Assembly, comprising the international community, also mean that it is able to act in a way that would facilitate the functioning of an ad hoc tribunal, even in the absence of mandatory powers. Although many practical obstacles lie ahead, an ad hoc tribunal established by a broad coalition in the General Assembly may offer the best hope in securing accountability for the MH17 disaster.

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Assistant Dean (Research) and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Door Tenant, 25 Bedford Row, London.

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1. UN Security Council Resolution 2166 (2014), UNSC Res. 2166, UN Doc. S/Res/2166 (2014).

2. Eleven members supported the resolution, three abstained, with only Russia in opposition. As to the draft resolution, see UN Security Council Draft Resolution (S/2015/562), UN Doc. S/2015/562 (2015).

3. UN Security Council 7498th Meeting (29 July 2015), UN Doc. S/PV.7498 (2015), at 4–5.

4. See the statements of the investigating states after the resolution was vetoed: ibid.

5. For an analysis of the alternative prosecutorial options, see MATTAAaron and IORDACHEAnca, “Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17—Possible Legal Avenues for Redress” Opinio Juris (28 August 2015), online: Opinio Juris <http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/28/guest-post-malaysia-airlines-flight-mh17-possible-legal-avenues-for-redress-part-2/>.

6. See generally REYDAMSLuc, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); SAMMONSA., “The Under-Theorization of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts” (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 111 .

7. Sammons, ibid., at 6.

8. Russia has signed but has not ratified the Rome Statute.

9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute].

10. See International Criminal Court, “Ukraine Accepts ICC Jurisdiction over Alleged Crimes Committed since 20 February 2014” (8 September 2015), online: ICC <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1146&ln=en>.

11. For a critique of Ukraine’s first declaration, see Rebecca HAMILTON, “Justice for MH17” Foreign Policy (25 July 2015), online: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/25/justice-for-mh17/>.

12. JAKOBSSONNiklas, “ICC Prosecution ‘Likely’ to Look at MH17 Downing” Justice Hub (10 September 2015), online: Justice Hub <https://justicehub.org/article/icc-prosecution-likely-look-mh17-downing>.

13. Although see UN News Centre, “Eastern Ukraine: UN Rights Chief says Downing of Plane may be ‘War Crime’, Urges Probe” UN News Centre (28 July 2014), online: UN <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48360-.Vu5Hrbzww0o>.

14. See in particular HELLERKevin Jon, “MH17 Should be Framed as Murder, Not as a War Crime” Opinio Juris (11 August 2014), online: Opinio Juris <http://www.opiniojuris.org/2014/08/11/mh-17-framed-murder-war-crime>; Alex WHITTING, “How to Prosecute the Perpetrators of the Malaysian Jet Downing” Just Security (25 July 2014), online: Just Security <http://www.justsecurity.org/13269/prosecute-perpetrators-malaysian-jet-downing/>.

15. Heller, ibid. Whitting, ibid.

16. Aviation Offences Act 1984, Act 307 of Malaysia [Aviation Offences Act], at s. 9.

17. See UN Security Council Draft Resolution (S/2015/562), supra note 2.

18. Uniting for Peace, GA Res. 377, UN Doc. A/RES/377(V) (1950).

19. Ibid., at para. 1.

20. For analysis of its uses, see generally BINDERChristina, “Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950)” Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (June 2013), online: Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e568?prd=EPIL>; PETERSENKeith S., “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950” (1959) 13 International Organization 219 ; RAMSDENMichael, “‘Uniting for Peace’ and Humanitarian Intervention: The Authorising Function of the U.N. General Assembly” (2016) 26 Washington International Law Journal 267 .

21. See STAVRIDISJames, “Are We Entering a New Cold War?” Foreign Policy (17 February 2016), online: Foreign Policy <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-war-russia-europe/>.

22. LEGVOLDR., “Managing the New Cold War” (2014) 93 Foreign Affairs 74 .

23. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 3 August 2012, GA Res. 66/253B, UN Doc. A/RES/66/253B (2012): 133 votes to 12, with 31 abstentions (emphasis added).

24. UN, “Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution” UN (22 May 2014), online: UN <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm>.

25. Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009), at para. 197; Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza to the League of Arab States, “Report of the Independent Fact Finding on Gaza: No Safe Place” ICAHD-USA (30 April 2009), online: ICAHD-USA <http://icahdusa.org/multimedia/no-safe-place.pdf> at para. 610.

26. UNHRC Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (2014), at 362; UNHRC Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/69 (2015), at para. 139.

27. WILLIAMSSarah, Hybrid and Internationalized Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) at 7 .

28. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), at para. 21. The Council took responsibility for establishing the ICTY because this was perceived as the more expeditious route given the executive character of the Council. The assumption here is that the Assembly could not act fast enough, which could be countenanced in practice provided that the will for a rapid response exists amongst states. One proposal by the Cambodian Group of Experts in this respect was an Assembly subsidiary organ comprising a small number of states that could prepare the constituent instruments of the proposed tribunal expeditiously, see Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, UN Doc. A/53/850 (1999), at para. 144 [Cambodia Report].

29. ROPERSteven D. and BARRIALilian A., Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) at 39 .

30. Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, GA Res. 52/135, UN Doc. A/RES/52/135 (1997); Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, GA Res. 55/95, UN Doc. A/RES/55/95 (2000).

31. SIDDIQUEHaroon, “Flight MH17: Possible Parts of Missile System Found at Ukraine Crash Site” The Guardian (11 August 2015), online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/11/mh17-possible-parts-missile-system-found-ukraine-crash-site>.

32. Heller, supra note 14.

33. Both Russia and Ukraine are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]. While Ukraine is keen to pursue a variety of claims before the ICJ, Russia does not accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, nor has it entered into any special agreement with Ukraine to resolve these issues. Indeed, Ukraine has lodged various applications before international tribunals pertaining to Russia’s conduct on its territory, for a summary of which see NURIDZHANYANGaiane, “Ukraine vs. Russia in International Courts and Tribunals” EJIL: Talk! (9 March 2016), online: EJIL: Talk! <http://www.ejiltalk.org/category/international-tribunals/european-court-of-human-rights>.

34. Indeed, when the US Air Force shot down an Iranian airliner in international airspace in 1988, the US did not acknowledge any blame but did pay compensation to the government of Iran, for which see LINNAND.K., “Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-Defense, and State Responsibility” (1991) 16 Yale Journal of International Law 245 .

35. Thus the earlier Council Resolution on the MH17 disaster, Resolution 2166 (2014), was passed unanimously, “emphasizing the importance of holding those responsible for violations of these rules to account” and “[d]emands that those responsible for this incident be held to account and that all States cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability”.

36. Thus art. 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life, which encompasses both negative and positive duties. It is possible that a claim is brought to the ECtHR against Ukraine that it failed in its positive duties (such as to close the air space), or against Russia pertaining to its negative duty (in that Russia ordered the strike or provided Ukrainian rebels with weaponry to carry out the strike). Indeed, the ECtHR in Ioppa v. Ukraine, Case No. 73776/14, is currently examining a complaint from the mother of one of the victims of the MH17 crash, on the basis that Ukraine failed in its positive duty to safeguard life.

37. For example, one of the criticisms of investigations conducted by UN mandated commissions of inquiry is the variable standards that are applied in gathering and interpreting evidence, in contrast to ad hoc tribunals, see generally HARWOODCatherine, “Human Rights in Fancy Dress? The Use of International Criminal Law by Human Rights Council Commissions of Inquiry in Pursuit of Accountability” (2015) 58 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 71 .

38. HAMILTONTomas and RAMSDENMichael, “Politicisation of Hybrid Courts: Observations from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (2014) 14 International Criminal Law Review 115 at 117 .

39. For an overview, see NOUWENSarah M.H., “‘Hybrid Courts’: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts” (2006) 2 Utrecht Law Review 190 .

40. See FORSYTHEDavid P., “The UN Security Council and Response to Atrocities: The P-5 and International Criminal Law” (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 840 at 859 , noting how the European Union and other key international economic actors were instrumental in ensuring Serbia’s eventual co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

41. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN Charter], at arts. 11–17, 55.

42. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 6 at 50–1.

43. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (World Health Organization Request), Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 66 at 78.

44. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174, 182–4 (emphasis added) [Reparations].

45. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151 at 168 [Certain Expenses].

46. Ibid., at 167.

47. See also WHITENigel D., “The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues” (1996) 3 International Peacekeeping 43 at 45 .

48. UN Security Council 7498th Meeting (29 July 2015), supra note 3 at 4–5.

49. Ibid.

50. See e.g. UN Security Council Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/25274 (1993); UN Security Council Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935, UN Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994).

51. UN Security Council Resolution 1192, UN Doc. S/RES/1192 (1998).

52. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995 [Tadić]; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Decision on Preliminary Motions, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 8 November 2001 [Milošević].

53. UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).

54. Tadić, supra note 52 at para. 27.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., at para. 29.

57. Ibid. Equally, a threat to the peace could be manifested outside the context of an armed conflict, of which see such a characterization that led to the creation of the ICTR: UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).

58. Tadić, supra note 52 at para. 34.

59. Ibid., at para. 39 (emphasis added).

60. Certain Expenses, supra note 45 at 151, 163.

61. This itself is recognized in the draft MH17 resolution, see supra note 2: “Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for the incident will contribute to the safety of civil aviation and to the maintenance of international peace and security” (emphasis added).

62. UN Security Council 7498th Meeting (29 July 2015), supra note 3 at 3 (statement of Malaysia).

63. Tadić, supra note 52 at para. 28. It is arguable that the Appeals Chamber erred in this interpretation of the Council’s powers, especially as the ICJ had previously held that the Council possesses “general powers” to discharge the responsibilities conferred by the UN members on it: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16 at 112 [Namibia].

64. SIMMABruno, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 731734 .

65. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47 at 56 [Effect of Awards].

66. Tadić, supra note 52 at para. 28.

67. Ibid., at para. 31.

68. For a recent restatement of this proposition, see WHITENigel D., “The Relationship Between the UN Security Council and General Assembly in Matters of International Peace and Security” in Marc WELLER, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), at 311 .

69. General Comment of the Human Rights Committee on Article 14 of the ICCPR, UN Doc. A/43/40 (1988), at para. 4; Milošević, supra note 52 at para. 8.

70. See further Namibia, supra note 63 at 22.

71. Reparations, supra note 44.

72. Namibia, supra note 63 at 22 (emphasis added).

73. Tadić, supra note 52 at para. 38.

74. See generally KEARNEYMichael G., “Humanitarian Action Through Legal Institutions” in Roger M. GINTY and Jenny H. PETERSON, eds., The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action (London: Routledge Press, 2015) 349 .

75. For example UN General Assembly Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique, UN Doc. A/9621(SUPP) (1974); UN General Assembly Resolution 52/135, UN Doc. A/RES/52/135 (1997); UN General Assembly Resolution 55/95, UN Doc. A/RES/55/95 (2000).

76. WHITENigel, “From Korea to Kuwait: The Legal Basis of United Nations’ Military Action” (1998) 20 International History Review 597 at 613 .

77. See further UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), at para. 28

78. Effect of Awards, supra note 65 at 57.

79. SCHORLEMERSabine VON, “The United Nations” in Jan KLABBERS and Åsa WALLENDAHL, eds., Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011), at 469 .

80. BRÖLMANNCatherine, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: International Organisations and the Law of Treaties : (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), at 119 .

81. For an early pronouncement, see KELSENHans, “Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations” (1946) 55 Yale Law Journal 997 .

82. UN General Assembly Resolution 820 (IX), UN Doc. A/RES/820(IX) (1954); UN General Assembly Resolution 917 (X), UN Doc. A/RES/917(X) (1955).

83. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone), Advisory Opinion, [1923] P.C.I.J. Rep. Series B No 4.

84. DUGARDJohn, “The Legal Effect of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid” (1966) 83 South Africa Law Journal 44 at 54 .

85. See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution 67/262, UN Doc. A/Res/67/252 (2013).

86. UN General Assembly Resolution 67/262, UN Doc. A/RES/67/262; Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 25.

87. UN General Assembly 18th Session Official Records (11 October 1963), UN Doc. A/PV.1239 (1963); UN General Assembly Report, GA Rep. A/9621 (1974); UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 52/135 (1998); UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 54/185 (1999); UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 55/95 (2001).

88. See further SILVAM., “The United Nations Human Rights Council: Six Years On” (2013) 10 SUR International Journal on Human Rights 99 ; PATRICKStewart M., “Gaining Ground at the UN Human Rights Council” The Internationalist (3 October 2014), online: The Internationalist <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/10/03/gaining-ground-at-the-un-human-rights-council/>.

89. Rome Statute, supra note 9 at art. 17.

90. See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 67/262 (2013), noting that “the Syrian authorities have failed to prosecute such serious violations”; Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 25.

91. For an overview, see PLACHTAMichael, “The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare” (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 125 .

92. Still, there have been notable instances where states have failed to co-operate with the ICC notwithstanding a Council decision, which have become a central theme running through ICC debates within the UN; see UN General Assembly Report of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/69/321 (2014).

93. BEIGEDERY., International Criminal Tribunals: Justice and Politics (London: Palgrave, 2011) at 109 .

94. Ibid.

95. Cambodia Report, supra note 28 at para. 145.

96. See generally WOODMichael C., “The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions” (1998) 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 73 .

97. Namibia, supra note 63 at 53.

98. Ibid.

99. UN Charter, supra note 41 at art. 39; TZANAKOPOULOSAntonios, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures Against Wrongful Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 60 .

100. Wood, supra note 96 at 82.

101. This view is supportive of Russia’s position, in that the creation of an ad hoc tribunal for MH17 was not a necessary intendment from Resolution 2166, as it had not considered the downing of the aircraft as a threat to international peace and security: UN Security Council 7498th Meeting (29 July 2015), supra note 3 at 5.

102. Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67 at 115.

103. White, supra note 76 at 614.

104. UN General Assembly Official Records (VI), UN G.A.O.R Supp. 13 at para. 265.

105. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. US), Provisional Measures, [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 114 (dissenting opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). Although see UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 41/38 (1988), which did not address Libya’s culpability for the Lockerbie bombing, but only condemned the military campaign against it.

106. Supra note 2.

107. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, [1992] I.C.J. Order of 14 April 1992 (Joint Declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume, and Aguilar) at 25.

108. 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force 27 January 1973) [Montreal Convention].

109. Ibid., at art. 7.

110. Ibid.

111. Dugard, supra note 84 at 46–8 (and authorities cited there).

112. See UN Charter, supra note 41 at arts. 25, 94.

113. UNCIO Documents, Volume 2 (1945), at 70.

114. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), supra note 42. Also, Dugard, supra note 84 at 46–8 (authorities cited there).

115. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), ibid.; Dugard, ibid.

116. FITZMAURICEGerald, “Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure” (1958) 34 British Yearbook of International Law 1 at 5 .

117. SLOANF. Blain, “The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations” (1948) 25 British Yearbook of International Law 1 at 16 .

118. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) [Vienna Convention], at art. 31; Reparations, supra note 44 at 174.

119. SCHACHTEROscar, “Law and the Process of Decision in the Political Organs of the United Nations (Volume 109)” in Hague Academy, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (The Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, 1963), at 180 ; KELSENHans, The Law of the United Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950) at xiii .

120. Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, 13 UNCIO Doc. 933, IV/2/42(2) (1945), at 710; Schachter, supra note 119 at 187.

121. UN Repertory of Practice Vol. IV Study on Article 73, UN Repertory of Practice (1955), at para. 226; NAWAZM.K., “Colonies, Self-Government and the United Nations” (1962) Indian Yearbook of International Affairs 3 ; Schachter, supra note 119 at 187; CONFORTIBenedetto and FOCARELLICarlo, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Leiden: Brill, 2010) at 365 .

122. Namibia, supra note 63 at 50 (emphasis added).

123. Ibid., at 22 (noting that the practice at issue “has been generally accepted”).

124. See generally BLEICHERSamuel A., “The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions” (1969) 63 American Journal of International Law 444 at 457 .

125. Ibid., at 457.

126. Ibid., at 453, 457.

127. Cambodia Report, supra note 28 at para. 145.

128. HIGGINSRosalyn, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 5 .

129. UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 95 (1946); UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 96(1) (1946) (leading to the Genocide Convention 1968); UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 3314 (XXVIII) (1974), where the Assembly’s definition of aggression was subsequently included in the text of art. 8bis, Rome Statute. Interestingly, in adopting the Genocide Convention, the Contracting Parties considered the Assembly’s definition to “confirm” that genocide was an international crime (see UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 260 (III) A (1948)). See also BASSIOUNIM., Introduction to International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) at 76 , 158.

130. The focus here is not functional immunities (ratione materiae), which concern the acts of former state officials, as such immunities arguably do not pertain where the person’s conduct in office involved the commission of international crimes, for which see R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 at 204 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); AG of Israel v. Eichmann, [1968] 36 I.L.R. 277 at 308.

131. SCHACHTEROscar, “The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and General Assembly” (1964) 58 American Journal of International Law 960 at 961 . On the role of the Assembly generally in international justice, see further RAMSDENMichael, “Uniting for Peace in the Age of International Justice” (2016 forthcoming) Yale Journal of International Law (online).

132. UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, UN Doc. A/RES/67/19 (2012). See also International Criminal Court, “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine” International Criminal Court (16 January 2005), online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1083.aspx>.

133. UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262, UN Doc. A/RES/68/262 (2014).

134. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, [2002] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 41.

135. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), [2012] I.C.J. Rep. 99 at para. 95. In Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (Decision on Cooperation of the DRC), [2014] ICC-02/05-01/09 at para. 30 the PTC relied on Germany v. Italy in noting that the immunity attached to Al Bashir was a procedural bar from prosecution before the Court, albeit waived by para. 2 of Council Resolution 1593 [DRC Decision].

136. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), supra note 134 at 58, 61.

137. Rome Statute, supra note 9 at art. 27.

138. DRC Decision, supra note 135 at para. 29.

139. UNSC Res 827, supra note 53 at para. 4; UNSC Res 955, supra note 57 at para. 2.

140. Supra note 2.

141. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (Corrigendum), [2011] ICC-02/05-01/09 at para. 43. For a recent critique, see Michael RAMSDEN and Isaac YEUNG, “Head of State Immunity and the Rome Statute: A Critique of the PTC’s Malawi and DRC Decisions” (2016 forthcoming) International Criminal Law Review.

142. Milošević, supra note 52 at para 32.

143. DRC Decision, supra note 135 at para. 29.

144. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment on Merits, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 at 100 (emphasis added).

145. OBERGM.D., “The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ” (2006) 16 European Journal of International Law 879 at 897 .

146. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226 at 254–5.

147. Ibid.

148. SCHARFM., Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 449 .

149. In reality, the acts of international organizations with their own personality do not fit neatly into the traditional source of international law, but have come to be regarded as state practice by some commentators: ARAJÄRVIN., The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals (London: Routledge, 2014) at 18 .

150. Oberg, supra note 145 at 904.

151. Forsythe, supra note 40 at 859.

* Assistant Dean (Research) and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Door Tenant, 25 Bedford Row, London.

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