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Green beards and signaling: Why morality is not indispensable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Toby Handfield
Affiliation:
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies (SoPHIS), Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. toby.handfield@monash.eduJohnthrasher23@gmail.comwww.tobyhandfield.comwww.JohnJThrasher.com
John Thrasher
Affiliation:
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies (SoPHIS), Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. toby.handfield@monash.eduJohnthrasher23@gmail.comwww.tobyhandfield.comwww.JohnJThrasher.com
Julian García
Affiliation:
Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. julian.garcia@monash.eduhttp://garciajulian.com

Abstract

We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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