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Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Sid Kouider
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France, and CNRS/EHESS/DEC-ENS, 75005 Paris, France. sid.kouider@ens.frgardelle@ens.frdupoux@lscp.echess.frwww.lscp.net
Vincent de Gardelle
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France, and CNRS/EHESS/DEC-ENS, 75005 Paris, France. sid.kouider@ens.frgardelle@ens.frdupoux@lscp.echess.frwww.lscp.net
Emmanuel Dupoux
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France, and CNRS/EHESS/DEC-ENS, 75005 Paris, France. sid.kouider@ens.frgardelle@ens.frdupoux@lscp.echess.frwww.lscp.net

Abstract

The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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