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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 September 2026
We argue that by focusing on an unanswerable ontological question, both computational functionalism and biological naturalism miss the empirical question of scientific and practical interest: what are systems of some kind capable of experiencing?
Target article
Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism
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Author response
The stuff matters: Consciousness, computation, and biology