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The question is not “are they conscious?” but “what could they be conscious of?”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2026

Chris Fields*
Affiliation:
Allen Discovery Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA fieldsres@gmail.com
James Glazebrook
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, USA jfglazebrook@eiu.edu
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

We argue that by focusing on an unanswerable ontological question, both computational functionalism and biological naturalism miss the empirical question of scientific and practical interest: what are systems of some kind capable of experiencing?

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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