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The stuff matters: Consciousness, computation, and biology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2026

Anil K. Seth Open the ORCID record for Anil K. Seth [Opens in a new window]
Anil K. Seth*
Affiliation:
Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science and Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, Toronto, Canada
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

I was delighted, challenged, and somewhat overwhelmed by the breadth and depth of the commentaries elicited by the target article. I am very grateful to every one of my commentators for offering such thoughtful perspectives. Here, I attempt to isolate some common themes and offer some thoughts in response. One conclusion is immediately evident: it is increasingly urgent to think clearly about the prospects for conscious AI and about the consequences of seemingly conscious AI. The commentaries also flesh out the potential for an exciting research programme investigating the substrate dependence of both consciousness and cognition.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e366
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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