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Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion

  • Joel Pust (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.

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R. Bogdan (1993) The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology. Mind and Language 8: 189205. [rAIG]

A. Goldman (1993b) Consciousness, folk psychology and cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition 2: 364–82. [JP]

A. Gopnik (1993c) Psychopsychology. Consciousness and Cognition 2: 264–80. [rAG]

A. Gopnik & A. N. Meltzoff (1994) Minds, bodies and persons: Young children's understanding of the self and others as reflected in imitation and “theory of mind” research. In: Self-awareness in animals and humans, ed. S. Parker & R. Mitchell . New York: Cambridge University Press. [rAG]

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J. Van Brakel & J. P. M. Geurts (1988) Pragmatic identity ot meaning and metaphor. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2: 205–26. [JvB]

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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