The Selfish Goal: Autonomously operating motivational structures as the proximate cause of human judgment and behavior

Here we argue that the selfish goal concept may well be suitable to explain inconsistencies not only in micro-behaviors, but also in the gross behavioral repertoire of an individual, which is often associated with psychopathologies, such as addiction. Neurophysiological evidence for pathological conditions like addiction emerged, and this evidence may also serve as an explanatory model for normal behaviors.

Recognizing that there is a multiplicity of motives – and that the accessibility and strength of each one varies chronically and temporarily – is essential if motivational scientists are to achieve genuine theoretical and empirical integration. We agree that system justification is a case of nonconscious goal pursuit and discuss implications of the fact that it conflicts with many other psychological goals.

I present evidence in favor of an overarching motivational self: a mental function that regulates expression of multiple goals. Goals often conflict with each other, and the role of a motivational self is to consciously or unconsciously prioritize pursuit of these goals. When observing inconsistency in expression of goals, it is therefore useful to consider whether the motivational self is attempting to balance between conflicting goals or if such inconsistency results from temporary self-control weakness.

Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) general picture might underestimate the role played by conscious self and overestimate the behavioral inconsistencies at the personal level. This follows from how they delimit the goals under consideration: Their theses that goals are not consciously selected and that the conscious self is involved just in post hoc rationalization should also be tested against concrete and long-term goals.

Our conscious abilities are learned in environments that have evolved to support them. This insight provides an alternative way of framing Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) provocative hypothesis. To understand the conflict between unconscious goals and consciousness, we can study the emergence of conscious thought and control in childhood. These developmental processes are also central to the best available current evolutionary theories.

The connection between selfish genes and selfish goals is not merely metaphorical. Many goals that shape contemporary cognition and behavior are psychological products of evolutionarily fundamental motivational systems and thus are phenotypic manifestations of genes. An evolutionary perspective can add depth and nuance to our understanding of “selfish goals” and their implications for human cognition and behavior.

We argue that it is possible to go beyond the “selfish goal” metaphor and make an even stronger case for the role of unconscious motivation in cognition and action. Through the relevance of a representation (ROAR) framework, we describe how not only value motivation, which relates to “selfish goals,” but also truth motivation and control motivation impact cognition and action.

Conceptually integrating Selfish Goal Theory with modern evolutionary psychology amplifies theoretical power. Inconsistency, a key principle of Selfish Goal Theory, illustrates this insight. Conflicting goals of seeking sexual variety and successful mate retention furnish one example. Siblings have evolved goals to cooperate and compete, a second example. Integrating Selfish Goal Theory with evolutionary theory can explain much inconsistent goal-directed behavior.

It may be useful to consider the application of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) theory of unconscious motivational processes to psychopathology. In disorders of compulsivity and impulsivity, an unconscious habit system may play a key role in explaining ego-dystonic or self-destructive behaviour. H&B's theory may provide some insights into understanding conditions such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and drug addiction; however, additional work is needed to address the neurocircuitry and neurochemistry mediating their abnormal underlying motivational processes.

This commentary offers a friendly extension of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) account. Not only do active goals sometimes operate unconsciously to dominate or preempt others, but simultaneously active goals can also collaborate or compromise in shaping behavior. Because neither goal wins complete control of behavior, the result may be that each is only partly satisfied.

The selfish goal metaphor is interesting and intriguing. It accounts for the idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in peoples' goal pursuits without invoking free will, self-regulatory, or self-control failures. However, people pursue multiple goals, sometimes simultaneously. We argue that the model proposed in the target article may gain significant theoretical and practical value if the principles underlying goal selection and/or balancing on a moment-to-moment basis are clearly specified and integrated with the notion of the selfish goal.

Proximate selfish goals reflect the machinations of more fundamental goals such as self-protection and reproduction. Evolutionary life history theory allows us to make predictions about which goals are prioritized over others, which stimuli release which goals, and how the stages of cognitive processing are selectively influenced to better achieve the aims of those goals.