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Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?

  • Mattia Gallotti (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the “we-mode”). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.

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References
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Bacharach M. (2006) Beyond individual choice. Princeton University Press.
Frith C. D. (2012a) Implicit metacognition and the we-mode. Paper presented at the Workshop on “Pre-reflective and Reflective Processing in Social Interaction,” Clare College, University of Cambridge, UK, March 12–14, 2012.
Gallotti M. (2012) A naturalistic argument for the irreducibility of collective intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42:330.
Gallotti M. & Frith C.D. (2013) Social cognition in the we-mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17:160–65.
Tomasello M. (2009) Why we cooperate. MIT Press.
Tsai C., Sebanz N. & Knoblich G. (2011) The GROOP effect: Groups mimic group actions. Cognition 118:135–40.
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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