Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?

  • Mattia Gallotti (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the “we-mode”). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.

Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

M. Gallotti (2012) A naturalistic argument for the irreducibility of collective intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42:330.

M. Gallotti & C.D. Frith (2013) Social cognition in the we-mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17:160–65.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 4
Total number of PDF views: 23 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 153 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 24th September 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.