This article examines the concept of moral responsibility in psychopathy. In doing so it shows how philosophical ideas can be used to help approach a complex issue in psychiatry. Building on a fictitious case, we explore two arguments: the exempting view, which proposes that psychopaths lack any ability to function as moral agents; and the mitigating view, which concedes that there are impairments in moral understanding in psychopathy, but takes these to be insufficient to be completely exempting, instead concluding that such individuals are at least partially morally responsible. Typically, clinicians (and the courts) are more comfortable with a mitigating view, whereas philosophers tend to extol an exempting view. Through discussion of the case, we illustrate the value that philosophy brings to clinical psychiatry and the ways in which psychiatry can enrich philosophical debate.
• Appreciate the diversity of views about moral responsibility in psychopathy, ranging from mitigation to exemption
• Understand the philosophical arguments used to support both the mitigating and exempting views
• Consider the benefits of philosophical reasoning in explicating a complex problem in psychiatry
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.
Usage data cannot currently be displayed