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Agenda Control and Electoral Success in the US House

  • David Fortunato (a1) and Nathan W Monroe (a2)
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Corresponding author
*Corresponding author. Email: fortunato@tamu.edu
References
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Fortunato, D and Monroe, NW (2018) Replication Data for: Agenda Control and Electoral Success in the U.S. House, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KTGFRE, Harvard Dataverse, V1.
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British Journal of Political Science
  • ISSN: 0007-1234
  • EISSN: 1469-2112
  • URL: /core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science
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