Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 September 2019
Following the 2011 endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), states have begun to implement National Action Plans (NAPs) to operationalize the UNGPs. Using a case study approach and applying a conceptual framework for polycentric governance, this article aims to provide an early assessment of the effectiveness of NAPs adopted by the United Kingdom and the United States to combat one of the worst human rights abuses in global supply chains: modern slavery. This study demonstrates that both NAPs contain elements addressing the governance gaps surrounding modern slavery, such as enacting new laws, adapting existing regulations, strengthening multi-stakeholder mechanisms for business accountability, and promoting innovation. However, it is argued that the NAPs themselves were not the catalysts for the majority of these measures. This article concludes that states should optimize the five characteristics of polycentric governance outlined in this study to improve the relevance and effectiveness of NAPs as drivers of change.
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77 Ibid.
78 In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council appointed the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (UNWG) to promote implementation of the UNGPs; see Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities’, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011).
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90 Ibid, 15.
91 Ibid, 16 and 18.
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110 Ibid, 8.
111 Ibid, 13.
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117 Ibid, 32–33.
118 Ibid.
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123 US Department of State, Responsible Business Conduct: First National Action Plan for the United States of America, 16 December 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265918.pdf (accessed 12 July 2019).
124 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/business/pages/nationalactionplans.aspx (accessed 12 July 2019).
125 The US NAP also references its commitment and action on SDG 8.7 to eliminate forced labour and human trafficking; US Department of State, note 123, 16.
126 US Department of State, note 123, 6.
127 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, H.R. 644 (24 February 2016) (United States), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/signing-statement-hr-644 (accessed 12 July 2019).
128 US Department of State, note 123, 11.
129 Ibid, 10.
130 Ibid, 14.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid, 20.
133 US Department of State, note 123, 9.
134 ICAR, Assessment of the United States National Action Plan (NAP) on Responsible Business Conduct, March 2017, 9.
135 Ibid.
136 Kevin McAleenan, ‘TFTEA – Two Years and Counting’, US Customs and Border Protection (28 February 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/blogs/tftea-two-years-and-counting (accessed 10 July 2018).
137 Human Rights First, ‘TIP Report Underscores Need for Global Accountability to Combat Human Trafficking’ (27 June 2017), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/tip-report-underscores-need-global-accountability-combat-human-trafficking (accessed 25 August 2018).
138 Ibid, 26.
139 Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 4967 (2 March 2015) (United States), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/01/29/2015-01524/federal-acquisition-regulation-ending-trafficking-in-persons (accessed 1 September 2018).
140 Ibid.
141 Mehra and Shay, note 68, 462.
142 This organization is now called the Responsible Business Alliance.
143 Responsible Business Alliance, ‘Electronics Industry Leads the Way in Combating Forced Labor EICC Code of Conduct Bans Recruitment Fees, Strengthens Key Protections for Workers’ (8 April 2015), http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/news-and-events/news/electronics-industry-leads-the-way-in-combating-forced-labor/ (accessed 12 July 2019).
144 Ibid.
145 Institute for Human Rights and Business, ‘Launch of the Leadership Group for Responsible Recruitment’ (5 May 2016), https://www.ihrb.org/employerpays/view-news/news-launch-of-the-leadership-group-for-responsible-recruitment (accessed 12 July 2019).
146 Ibid.
147 US Department of State, note 123, 15.
148 See https://partnershipforfreedom.org (accessed 12 July 2019).
149 US Department of State, note 123, 14. The Partnership for Freedom was part of the US government’s broader strategy to address human trafficking; see Partnership for Freedom, ‘White House Announces Pathways to Freedom, a new Partnership for Freedom challenge’ (24 October 2016), https://partnershipforfreedom.org/white-house-announces-pathways-to-freedom-a-new-partnership-for-freedom-challenge/ (accessed 12 July 2019).
150 See https://partnershipforfreedom.org/rethinksupplychains/#winners-current (accessed 12 July 2019).
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153 Ibid, 8.
154 See ICAR-DIHR, note 83, 80.
155 UNWG, note 79, i.
156 US Department of State, note 123, 11.
157 OHCHR, note 18, 10.
