This article explores the innovative use of public procurement as a tool to respect, protect and promote human rights by capitalizing on the significant leverage that public buyers have over corporate practices in their supply chain. It provides an analysis of Electronics Watch, an organization that focuses on the role of states’ own procurement practices as central to the state duty to protect the human rights of those who are affected by its activities as an economic actor. Through the assessment of the Electronics Watch model this article argues that by bringing together the economic leverage of public buyers and corporate human rights due diligence, one can create transformative tools for the improvement of working conditions in global supply chains.
Reader in Public International Law, School of Law, University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London SE10 9LS, UK (email:
1 Stumberg, Robert, Ramasastry, Anita and Roggensack, Meg, ‘Turning a Blind Eye? Respecting Human Rights in Government Purchasing’, ICAR, 2014 ; O’Brien, Claire Methven, Mehra, Amol, Andrecka, Marta and Meulen, Nicole Vander, ‘Public Procurement and Human Rights: A Survey of Twenty Jurisdictions’, International Learning Lab on Public Procurement, 2016, p. 20 , http://www.hrprocurementlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Public-Procurement-and-Human-Rights-A-Survey-of-Twenty-Jurisdictions-Final.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
2 See, for example, Locke, Richard M, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy, New York (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Locke, Richard, Kochan, Thomas and Qin, Fei, ‘Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers’ (2007), 146 International Labour Review ; Locke, Richard, Rissing, Ben A and Pal, Timea, ‘Complements or Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains’, (2013) 51(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 519–552 .
3 Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (Guiding Principles), A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).
4 European Union, DG Grow, ‘Public Procurement Indicators 2015’, DG GROW G4 – Innovative and e-Procurement, 10 December 2016.
5 OECD, ‘Size of Public Procurement Market’ (2011), Government at a Glance, 148 .
6 European Commission, DG Trade website, Public Procurement in a Nutshell [undated], http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/ (accessed 1 February 2017).
7 World Bank Group, ‘Benchmarking Public Procurement 2016: Assessing Public Procurement Systems in 77 Economies,’ Washington, 2016.
8 With regard to services the UNGPs are more specific, establishing that states should ‘exercise adequate oversight in order to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract with, or legislate for, business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights’. On state obligations and services see, for example, Claire Methven O’Brien, ‘Essential Services, Public Procurement and Human Rights in Europe’ (2015), University of Groningen, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2591898## (accessed 1 April 2017).
9 O’Brien, Methven, Mehra, Andrecka and Vander Meulen, note 1.
10 The main international instrument on public procurement is the World Trade Organization’s Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). The purpose of this international framework is to establish a fair system for providing goods and services to public authorities through the application of rules on transparency, non-discrimination and fair competition. The EU is party to this Agreement. Within this framework the emphasis has been placed on the concept of ‘value for money’, narrowly defined to exclude most social considerations, and the aim of promoting free trade and competition.
11 Procurement to achieve social aims has been used since the nineteenth century, within the framework of the welfare state, mainly to achieve horizontal policies linked with domestic employment policies such as fighting discrimination, promoting local and inclusive employment and manufacturing (e.g., veterans, disabled people and long-term unemployed). See McCrudden, Christopher, Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
12 Methven O’Brien, Mehra, Andrecka and Vander Meulen, note 1.
13 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 CFR §101 et seq, at 22.15 (Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labour).
14 Modern Slavery Act (2015), Section 54 Transparency in Supply Chains, etc. This section imposes the obligation on commercial organizations which turn over a certain threshold (established currently at £36 million) to produce an annual slavery and human trafficking report. Certain bodies subjected to public procurement regulation are considered to be commercial organizations for the purposes of Section 54, including most universities.
15 In the framework of the EU, all public sector authorities, whatever the procurement, are subject to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), most significantly in relation to rules on equal treatment, freedom of establishment, and freedom to provide services. This means that at the very least, contracting entities must act transparently and must treat all bidding parties equally, proportionately and without discrimination.
16 Martin-Ortega, Olga and Eroglu, Muzaffer, ‘The European Union’s Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy: a Pole of Excellence?’ in Jan Orbie and Lisa Torrell (eds), The European Union and Social Dimension of Globalisation (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Outhwaite, Opi and Martin-Ortega, Olga, ‘Human Rights in Global Supply Chains: Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Procurement in the European Union’ (2016) 10:1 Human Rights and Legal Discourse 41 .
17 The Directive only applies to public contracts above the specified economic threshold, therefore national legislators are free to regulate public procedures for lower amounts in different ways from those specified in the Directives, as long as they comply with EU Treaty provisions.
18 Martin-Ortega, See Olga, Outhwaite, Opi and Rook, William, ‘Buying Power and Working Conditions in the Electronics Supply Chain: Legal Options for Socially Responsible Public Procurement’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Human Rights, 341–368 ; and Outhwaite, andMartin-Ortega, , note 16.
19 OECD, ‘Mapping Global Value Chains’. Report TAD/TC/WP/RD(2012)9, 2012, 27–29.
20 Locke, Richard, ‘We Live in a World of Global Supply Chains’ in Dorothee Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan (eds), Business and Human Rights. From Principles to Practice (Oxon: Routledge, 2016) 299 .
22 ILO, Non-standard forms of employment. Report for discussion at the Meeting of Experts on Non-Standard Forms of Employment (Geneva, 16–19 February 2015), International Labour Office, Geneva, 2015.
23 The electronics industry supply chain extends from the extraction of raw materials to the manufacture and assembly of products at large factories contracted by global brands and beyond to the management of waste and recycling of products and components. There are human rights concerns in all of these parts of the chain, with extraction, trade, processing and transportation of raw materials – including the so-called ‘conflict minerals’ – attracting important attention in the past years. This article focuses only on the upper levels of the supply chain where products and components are manufactured and assembled.
24 Interbrand, Best Global Brands 2015, http://interbrand.com/best-brands/best-global-brands/2015/ranking/ (accessed 1 April 2017). In this report, the top 10 companies include Apple Inc. (the world most profitable enterprise), Google, Microsoft, IBM, Samsung and Intel.
25 Locke, , note 2, pp 6–7 .
26 See, for example, ILO, Ups and Downs in the Electronics Industry: Fluctuating Production and the Use of Temporary and Other Forms of Employment, GDFACE/2014, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2014.
27 OECD, ‘Mapping Global Value Chains’, note 19, 28. FoxConn, Flextronics and Inventec are examples of those. This is the case in most supply chains. In fact, as described by Mayer and Gereffi, by 2000, 50 per cent of the world’s manufacturing production was located in developing countries and this trend has only increased over the last decade; Frederick Mayer and Gary Gereffi, ‘Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance’, (2010), 12 Business and Politics.
28 Good Electronics, Reset. ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Global Electronics Supply Chain’ (2009), 19, https://goodelectronics.org/publications-en/Publication_3248 (accessed 1 April 2017).
29 Sturgeon, Timothy J and Kawakami, Momoko, ‘Global Value Chains in the Electronics Industry: Was the Crisis a Window of Opportunity for Developing Countries?’ (2010), 5417 The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, 4–5 .
30 Chan, Jenny, Pun, Ngai and Selden, Mark, ‘Apple, Foxconn and China’s New Working Class’, in Richard P Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein, (eds), Achieving Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press, 2016), 173 .
31 For an in-depth analysis of the companies involved in the supply chain and their roles, see Electronics Watch (WEED), The ICT Sector in the Spotlight, Leverage of Public Procurement Decisions on Working Conditions in the Supply Chain, 2014, http://electronicswatch.org/the-ict-sector-in-the-spotlight_723519.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017). In particular, in relation to Apple, a New York Times study of the iPhone and iPad’s supply chain in 2012 revealed the following distribution of the production: the software is produced in the USA, whilst semiconductors are produced in countries such as Germany and Taiwan, memory boards, display panels and circuits in Japan, data ships in Europe and hundreds of components are assembled in China. Metals are extracted, smelted and refined in countries of Africa and Asia; Charles Duhigg and Keith Bradsher, ‘How the US Lost Out on iPhone Work’, New York Times, 12 January 2012.
32 ILO, The impact of procurement practices in the electronics sector on labour rights and temporary and other forms of employment. WP 313. International Labour Office, Geneva, 2016.
33 Jenny Chan and C Ho (WEED – World Economy, Ecology, and Development – and SACOM –Students and Scholars against Corporate Misbehavior), The Dark Side of Cyberspace. Inside the Sweatshops of China’s Hardware Production (2008), http://electronicswatch.org/the-dark-side-of-cyberspace_3378.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
34 ILO, note 26.
35 McFalls, Ricarda, The impact of procurement practices in the electronics sector on labour rights and temporary and other forms of employment, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2016 .
36 A Ferus-Comelo and P Pöyhönen. (Finnwatch, Cividep and SOMO), Phony Equality: Labour standards of mobile phone manufacturers in India, 2011, http://electronicswatch.org/phony-equality_3565.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
37 Danwatch, Servants of Servers, Rights Violations and Forced Labour in the Supply Chain of ICT Equipment in European Universities, 2015, https://www.danwatch.dk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Servants-of-servers.-Danwatch-Investigation.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017); Electronics Watch, Regional Risk Assessment: Semiconductor and Electronics Industry, Philippines, December 2016 and Electronics Watch, Regional Risk Assessment: Semiconductor and Electronics Industry, China, October 2016, http://electronicswatch.org/en/publications-by-electronics-watch_1633 (accessed 25 September 2017).
38 Chan and Ho, note 33; Danwatch, note 37; China Labor Watch, An Investigation of Eight Samsung Factories in China: Is Samsung Infringing upon Apple’s Patent to Bully Workers?, 2012, http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/64 (accessed 1 April 2017).
39 Kakuli and Schipper (SOMO and Swedwatch and Global Standards), Out of Focus: Labour Rights in Vietnam’s Digital Camera Factories, 2011, http://electronicswatch.org/out-of-focus_3571.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017); China Labour Watch, note 38.
40 Ferus-Comelo and Pöyhönen, note 36; Kakuli and Schipper, note 39; Chan and Ho, note 33.
41 China Labor Watch, note 38.
42 Kakuli and Schipper, note 39; Chan and Ho, note 33. A growing share of those employed in global supply chains are women, particularly as a percentage of supply chain workers in emerging economies, ILO Non-Standard Forms, note 22.
43 Chan, Annita, ‘Organizing Wal-Mart in China: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back for China’s Unions’ (2007) 16 New Labor Forum 86–96 ; Chan and Ho, note 33; Ferus-Comelo and Pöyhönen, note 36.
44 Pringle, Tim, ‘Reflections on Labor in China: From a Moment to a Movement’ (2013) 112 South Atlantic Quarterly ; Chan and Ho, note 33; China Labor Watch, note 38.
45 Verité, Forced Labor in the Production of Electronic Goods in Malaysia. A Comprehensive Study of Scope and Characteristics, 2014, http://www.verite.org/research/electronicsmalaysia (accessed 1 April 2017).
46 Chan and Ho, note 33.
47 Kakuli and Schipper, note 39.
48 Ferus-Comelo and Pöyhönen, note 36.
49 Pun, Ngai and Chan, Jenny, ‘Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience’ (2012) 38 Modern China, 383 .
50 Together with individual company initiatives, industry associations such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) are making efforts to raise the social and environmental standards in the supply chain, see www.eiccoalition.org.
51 Berliner, Daniel, Greenleaf, Anne Regan, Lake, Milli, Levi, Margaret and Noveck, Jennifer, Labor Standards in International Supply Chains. Aligning Rights and Incentives (Edward Elgar, 2015), 22 .
52 Arnold, Denis G. and Hartman, Laura P., ‘Worker Rights and Low Wage Industrialization: How to Avoid Sweatshops’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 676–700 .
53 See, for example, Landmark Project, Success Stories in Socially Responsible Public Procurement. Using Public Spending to Drive Improvements for Workers in Global Supply Chains, 2014, available at http://www.landmark-project.eu/fileadmin/files/en/LANDMARK_Success_Stories_2014_-_eng.pdf (accessed 1 December 2017).
54 Electronics Watch is the result of European Commission funded project from 2013 to 2015, led by the Spanish non-governmental organization, SETEM. Other project partners included Centrum CSR (Poland), DanWatch (Denmark), People and Planet (UK), SOMO (Netherlands), Südwind (Austria), and WEED (Germany). This consortium conducted research on the electronics industry, developed model contract clauses, a code of labour standards, and other procurement tools consistent with the EU procurement directive, developed dialogue and educational forums with public sector buyers in their own regions, recruited 70 advisors and the first affiliates to Electronics Watch. The project ended in 2015 and Electronics Watch was incorporated under Dutch law and started conducting activities in its own right.
55 There are no up-to-date figures on the amount of ICT hardware purchasing, but in 2002 it was estimated that by 2007 ICT procurement in the EU would amount to 94 billion Euros (European Union, Guidelines for Public Procurement of ICT Goods and Services, 2012, 4, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/ssai/docs/study-action23/d2-finalreport-29feb2012.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
56 Many of these multi-stakeholder initiatives include non-governmental organizations, business and governments. Electronics Watch does not include businesses.
57 See http://www.workersrights.org/.
58 For further information, see the Consortium’s website at http://www.sweatfree.org/about_us.
59 UNGP 19: ‘In order to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should integrate the findings from their impact assessments across relevant internal functions and processes, and take appropriate action: […] (b) Appropriate action will vary according to: (i) Whether the business enterprise causes or contributes to an adverse impact, or whether it is involved solely because the impact is directly linked to its operations, products or services by a business relationship; (ii) The extent of its leverage in addressing the adverse impact.”
60 According to the Commentary of UNGP 19, ‘Leverage may reflect one or more of a number of factors, such as: (a) whether there is a degree of direct control between the enterprise and the supply chain entity; (b) the terms of contract between the enterprise and supply chain entity; (c) the proportion of business the enterprise represents for the supply chain entity; (d) the ability of the enterprise to incentivize the supply chain entity for improved human rights performance in terms of future business, reputational advantage, capacity-building assistance etc.; (e) the reputational benefits for the supply chain entity of working with the enterprise, and the reputational harm of that relationship being withdrawn; (f) the ability of the enterprise to engage other enterprises that work with the supply chain entity in incentivizing improved human rights performance; (g) the ability of the enterprise to engage local or central government in requiring improved human rights performance by the supply chain entity through implementation of regulations, monitoring, sanctions, etc.’
61 Lukas, Karin, ‘Human Rights in the Supply Chain: Influence and Accountability’ in Radu Mares (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).
62 Electronics Watch, Contractor Guidance for Electronics Watch Contract Conditions, version 1.1, September 2017, available at http://electronicswatch.org/nl/the-electronics-watch-contractor-guidance_2525835 (accessed 25 September 2017).
63 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices, available at http://electronicswatch.org/code-of-labour-standards_2460399.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
64 The Code was developed by a Working Group including representatives from numerous human rights and labour rights organizations, academics and practitioners. The author was part of this group.
65 These sub-standards condense the more than 300 compliance points developed by the ILO Better Work Programme into a more manageable number of compliance points that serve as indicators of broad compliance.
66 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices, Introduction, note 63. The Code also defines the workers involved in the production of goods for its purposes as any worker who has ‘any involvement, however slight, in the assembly of the Goods or the production of the electrical components from which the Goods are assembled’.
67 Ibid, Standard 3.
68 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Standards, Standard 12, note 63.
69 See, for example, the work of the Global Living Wage Coalition to define and design a calculation methodology: http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/improving-effectiveness/global-living-wage-coalition (accessed 1 April 2017).
70 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices, Standard 12, note 63.
71 Martin-Ortega, , Outhwaite, and Rook, , note 18. The Electronics Watch Model Working Group discussed several options to include contractor obligation in the supply chain during the drafting process of the Contract Clauses, including cascading clauses that needed to be inserted in every contract at every level of the supply chain.
72 Article 70 establishes that contract performance conditions are permitted where related to the subject matter of the contract within the broader meaning established in article 67(3), which defines what subject matter is in relation to award criteria: ‘Award criteria shall be considered to be linked to the subject-matter of the public contract where they relate to the works, supplies or services to be provided under that contract in any respect and at any stage of their life cycle’.
73 Baumann-Pauly, Dorothee, Nolan, Justine, van Heerden, Auret and Samway, Michael, ‘Industry-Specific Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives that Govern Corporate Human Rights Standards – Legitimacy Assessments of the Fair Labor Association and the Global Network Initiative’ (2015) 12 University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series ; Nolan, Justine, ‘Refining the Rules of the Game: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’ (2014) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 30–78 ; Jerbi, Scott, ‘Assessing the Roles of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Advancing the Business and Human Rights Agenda’ (2013) 94 International Review of the Red Cross, 887 ; Tamo, Atabongawung, ‘New Thinking on Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: Towards a Multi-Stakeholder Approach’ (2016) 34 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 147–173 .
75 Becks, Anna, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes (Oxford: Hart, 2015).
76 Electronics Watch Contract Conditions, http://electronicswatch.org/en/the-electronics-watch-contract-conditions_2459984 (accessed 1 April 2017).
77 McCorquodale, Robert, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law’ (2009) 87 Journal of Business Ethics 392 ; Martin-Ortega, Olga, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: form Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at Last?’ (2014) 32 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 49–50 ; McCorquodale, Robert, Smit, Lise, Neely, Stuart and Brooks, Robin, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence in Law and Practice: Good Practices and Challenges for Business Enterprises’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 198 .
78 UNGP 15. The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Corporations follow the UNGPs in the definition of corporate human rights due diligence.
79 Electronics Watch Contract Conditions, note 76.
80 Electronics Watch, Contractor Guidance note 62. The Contractor Guidance has been developed in consultation with over 25 organizations, including affiliates, reseller and brand companies as well as human rights and health and safety experts and labour rights organizations. They have been endorsed by civil society organizations and public buyers and academics including Radu Mares and Robert Stumberg.
81 Electronics Watch, Contractor Guidance note 62, p 11.
82 Radu Mares, Endorsement of Electronics Watch Contract Clauses, available at http://electronicswatch.org/en/the-electronics-watch-contractor-guidance_2525835 (accessed 25 September 2017).
83 See in particular, Cossart, Sandra, Chaplier, Jerome and Beau de Lomenie, Tiphaine, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017), 2 Business and Human Rights Journal, 317–323 .
84 See publicly available information on the Electronics Watch website: http://electronicswatch.org/en/the-electronics-watch-contract-conditions_2459984 (accessed 1 April 2017).
85 The OECD has provided detailed guidance on how to articulate corporate due diligence in other sections of the supply chain, e.g., with regard to the extraction of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold, but so far this remains one of the most pressing challenges in the development of standards and practice regarding the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. See http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm (accessed 1 April 2017).
86 See http://electronicswatch.org/the-uk-higher-education-and-national-apple-equipment-and-services-framework-agreement_2455571.pdf. This Framework Agreement had been signed with four suppliers, not including Apple.
87 Electronics Watch Impact and Project Results at a Glance, 1 August 2017 (on file with the author).
89 Santoro, Michael, ‘Beyond Codes of Conduct and Monitoring: An Organizational Integrity Approach to Global Labor Practices’ (2003), 25 Human Rights Quarterly 407–424 .
90 Ibid. The author provides an interesting simile: ‘while codes of conduct and monitoring systems can uncover human rights problems, they are not, in and of themselves, solutions to these problems. Just as financial accounting can’t generate profits, monitoring factories can’t generate good conditions. In each case, the process can only help us to determine whether or not financial or social objectives are being met.’
91 Le Baron, Genevieve, Lister, Jane and Dauvergne, Peter, ‘Governing Global Supply Chain Sustainability through the Ethical Audit Regime’ (2017), 14 Globalizations 958–975 .
92 Lukas, note 61, 161. As the author says, improvements suggested in these kind of audits – such as better lighting, ventilation, etc. – ‘relate to processes upgrading as they also increase productivity by a more “efficient” use of the “human resource”’.
93 AFL-CIO, Responsibility Outsourced: Social Audits, Workplace Certification, and Twenty Years of Failure to Protect Worker Rights, 2013, http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/77061/1902391/CSReport.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
94 Business for Social Responsibility, Beyond Monitoring: A New Vision for Sustainable Supply Chains, 2007, https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view/beyond-monitoring-a-new-vision-for-sustainable-supply-chain (accessed 1 April 2017); Locke, Richard, Fei, Q and Brause, A, ‘Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike’ (2007), 61 ILRREVIEW 3–33 .
95 Electronics Watch Worker Driven Monitoring, http://electronicswatch.org/en/worker-driven-monitoring_2460012 (accessed 1 December 2017).
96 Ibid. The models of worker-centred or worker-driven monitoring are still being tested and defined, so is specific methodology to guarantee not only a better representation of workers in the monitoring process but their own capacity to be the drivers of such a process. Both practice and research on it is lacking and urgently needed.
97 Ibid, and Business, Human Rights and the Environment and International Labour Rights Forum, Report on Worker Driven Monitoring in the Electronics Industry (Hong Kong, April 2017) (2018, in press, on file with the author).
98 Electronics Watch Worker Driven Monitoring, note 95.
99 See, for example, Electronics Watch, Electronics Watch Monitoring and Reform Programmes, 2015, http://electronicswatch.org/monitoring-and-reform_98120.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017), p. 4.
101 Electronics Watch Impact and Project Results at a Glance note 87.
102 This report is only available to the affiliates – on file with the author.
103 This report is only available to the affiliates – on file with the author. At the time of writing affiliates were still engaged in taking these measures.
104 For example, Locke, , note 2.
105 Electronics Watch Impact and Project Results at a Glance, note 87.
106 LUPC’s action was prompted by the Danwatch investigation into the factory of the company Wistron Corporation in Zhongshan (China), Danwatch, 2015, note 26. The case study of this collaboration is confidential and not openly available (on file with the author). LUPC used Electronics Watch reports and recommendations in their engagement with the factory and the brands.
* Reader in Public International Law, School of Law, University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London SE10 9LS, UK (email: firstname.lastname@example.org). The author is grateful to Björn Claeson for his comments and corrections; to Anita Ramasastry for her invaluable suggestions and to Jim Cranshaw for embarking her in the great adventure of improving human rights in the electronics supply chain.
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