When prices for basic commodities increase following a disaster, these price increases are often condemned as 'price gouging.’ In this paper, I discuss what moral wrongs, if any, are most reasonably ascribed to accusations of price gouging. This discussion keeps in mind both practical and moral defenses of price increase following disasters. I first examine existing anti-gouging legislation for commonalities in their definitions of gouging and then present arguments in favor of the permissibility of gouging, focusing on the economic benefits of price increases following disasters. I argue that gouging takes the form of a specific failure of respect for persons by undercutting equitable access to essential goods. While I discuss anti-gouging legislation throughout this paper, my aim is to give an account of the moral wrongs associated with gouging rather than guidance for developing morally defensible anti-gouging legislation.

This commentary develops my position on the ethics of price gouging in response to Jeremy Snyder's article, “What's the Matter with Price Gouging.” First, it explains how the “nonworseness claim” supports the moral permissibility of price gouging, even if it does not show that price gougers are morally virtuous agents. Second, it argues that questions about price gouging and distributive justice must be answered in light of the relevant possible institutional alternatives, and that Snyder's proposed alternatives to price gouging fare worse on the dimension of justice than a system in which goods are allocated by a system of market prices.

In this response, I reiterate my argument that price gouging undercuts the goal of equity in access to essential goods whereas Zwolinski emphasizes the importance of the efficient provision of essential goods above all other goals. I agree that the efficient provision of essential goods is important as I argue for the goal of equitable access to sufficient of the goods essential to living a minimally flourishing human life. However, efficiency is a means to this goal rather than the end itself. Finally, I offer additional arguments against the non-worseness claim.