Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 December 2011
Development, modernity, and industrialization became dominant themes in corporate advertising in Africa in the 1950s and remained prevalent through the following two decades while many African nations were gaining independence. British businesses operating there created a publicity strategy that couched their presence in less developed countries in terms of a commitment and a positive contribution to the progress of the new states. Eventually, British companies tried to “Africanize” their corporate image through these campaigns.
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28 Larkin Studios featured heavily in a recent three-part documentary on the history of British animation shown on BBC3, Animation Nation, especially in the first part on advertising, “The Art of Persuasion.”
29 Barclays Bank DCO, Board Minutes, ledger vol. 9, 22 Mar. 1956, 38; 27 Sept. 1956, 129; BGA 38/511.
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54 Of course there had been criticism of foreign multinationals before the 1970s, most notably Chief Awolowo's motion for nationalization in the Nigeria parliament in 1961. His party had already become the focus of foreign business criticism during decolonization. See Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire, 239–41.
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