No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 September 2018
Some authors have questioned the moral authority of advance directives (ADs) in cases in which it is not clear if the author of the AD is identical to the person to whom it later applies. This article focuses on the question of whether the latest results of neuroimaging studies have moral significance with regard to the moral authority of ADs in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Some neuroimaging findings could provide novel insights into the question of whether patients with DOCs exhibit sufficient psychological continuity to be ascribed diachronic personal identity. If those studies were to indicate that psychological continuity is present, they could justify the moral authority of ADs in patients with DOCs. This holds at least if respect for self-determination is considered as the foundation for the moral authority of ADs. The non-identity thesis in DOCs could no longer be applied, in line with clinical and social practice.
We thank Mary Clare O’Donnell for editing the manuscript.
3. Kahane, G, Savulescu, J. Brain damage and the moral significance of consciousness. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009;34(1):6–26.Google Scholar
5. Buchanan, A, Brock, D. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1989.Google Scholar
6. See note 5, Buchanan, Brock 1989.
13. Jennett B, Plum F. Persistent vegetative state after brain damage. A syndrome in search of a name. Lancet 1972;1(7753):734–7.
14. See note 11, Friedrich, Jox 2017.
16. See note 11, Friedrich, Jox 2017.
17. See note 11, Friedrich, Jox 2017.
26. See note 11, Friedrich, Jox 2017.
31. See note 23, Fisher, Appelbaum 2010.
32. Hohwy, J, Reutens, D. A case for increased caution in end of life decisions for disorders of consciousness. Monash Bioethics Review 2009;28(2):14:1–12.Google Scholar
34. See note 32, Hohwy, Reutens 2009.
35. Gallagher, S, Dan, Z. Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In: Zalta, EN, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Laboratory; 2015.Google Scholar
37. Siewert, C. Consciousness and intentionality. In: Zalta, EN, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Stanford: Metaphysics Research Laboratory; 2011.Google Scholar
38. See note 23, Fisher, Appelbaum 2010.
43. See note 23, Fisher, Appelbaum 2010.
54. See note 23, Fisher, Appelbaum 2010.
55. See note 3, Kahane, Savulescu 2009.
57. See note 23, Fisher, Appelbaum 2010.
58. See note 32, Hohwy, Reutens 2009.
59. See note 32, Hohwy, Reutens 2009.
62. Mental Capacity Act 2005. London: The National Archives; 2012; available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents (last accessed 3 June 2018).Google Scholar
63. See note 5, Buchanan, Brock 1989.
69. See note 5, Buchanan, Brock 1989.
78. See note 5, Buchanan, Brock 1989.
82. Dresser, R. Advance directives, self-determination, and personal identity. In: Hackler, C, Moseley, R, Vawter, DE, eds. Advance Directives in Medicine. New York: Praeger; 1989:155–70.Google Scholar
84. Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Original Edition 1689. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008.Google Scholar
96. Shoemaker, S. Identity, Cause, and Mind. Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1984.Google Scholar
105. See note 5, Buchanan, Brock 1989.
111. Northoff, G. Qualia and the ventral prefrontal cortical function ’neurophenomenological’ hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2003;10(8):14–48.Google Scholar
112. Heinzel, A, Moerth, S, Northoff, G. The central role of anterior cortical midline structures in emotional feeling and consciousness. Psyche 2010;16(2):23–47.Google Scholar
113. Chalmers, DJ. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1996.Google Scholar
No CrossRef data available.