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Philosophical Bioethics and the Struggle to Remain Relevant
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2015
This article argues that practicality is currently overemphasized in philosophical contributions to bioethics. The inclinations to aim at relevance, to ground normativity on common morality, and to involve many academic disciplines in ethical discussions is understandable, but they are all poorly founded. When answers to difficult questions are already known at the outset, these endeavors can help decisionmakers in gaining the acceptance of the general public. Wider theoretical analyses, in which philosophers could excel, however, tend to be lost in these practical enterprises.
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14. See note 12, Ives 2013.
15. See note 12, Ives 2013, at 11.
16. See note 12, Ives 2013, at 9.
17. This phrase is from Jonathan Ives; see note 10, Ives 2013, at 3. His methodological piece surely belongs to an academic journal.
18. This is especially true of those of us in the analytical tradition.
